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Since the early 1970s, the Supreme Court has held in a variety of
contexts that the motive of the legislaturein passing a law is criticalin

determining the law's constitutionality. The speech or debate clause of
the Constitution, however, prevents the use of evidence of legislative acts
when such use would intimidate legislators in performing their legisla-

tive function. Thus, if this privilege were appliedas an absolute privilege
in this context, it potentially could disable a court's inquiry into legisla-

tive intent and could prohibit the questioning of decisionmakers, themselves, about their motives. Professor Raveson argues that the speech or
debate clause privilege is intended to guaranteethe separationofpowers,
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ers concerns in determining thatjudicialinquiry into legislative motive
was necessary in certain cases. Nevertheless, although the privilege
should not be absolute, the need for legislative independence cannot be
ignoredentirely; in determiningwhether to admit evidence subject to the
privilege, courts must balance the interest in legislative autonomy
against the need for and probative value of such evidence on a case-bycase basis. ProfessorRaveson discusses the factors courts must weigh in
making this determination, including the type of evidence involved, the
particularlegal definition of unconstitutionalpurpose used, whether the
evidence is of institutional or individual intent, and the availability of
other evidence. By weighing these and otherfactors, courts can accommodate their obligation to examine legislative intent with a healthy degree of legislativefreedom.
In determining the constitutionality of official acts, the judicial significance
of the motives1 of government decisionmakers has had a tortured history.2 The
Supreme Court has held that legislative motivation is irrelevant, 3 while contemporaneously striking down laws because their purpose was impermissible. 4 As
recently as 1971 the Court, in Palmer v. Thompson,5 held that evidence of decisionmakers' motives should not be considered in adjudicating the constitutionality of a governmental action. This refusal to consider motivation was based
largely on the Court's perception that proving government officials' intent would
be extremely difficult and that invalidating a law which would be "valid as soon
as the legislature . . repassed it for different reasons," would be futile. 6 In
addition, commentators have identified another concern that the Court surely
must have considered, based on its understanding of the separation of powers:
judicial review of motivation involves a significant
intrusion into the integrity
7
and independence of decisionmaking institutions.
Since Palmer, however, the Court has embraced enthusiastically reviewing
the purpose for which an official act was taken as a critical factor in determining
the action's constitutionality,8 In a variety of contexts the Court has held that if
1. The terms "motive," "purpose," and "intent" are used interchangeably in this Article to
mean the results decisionmakers "desire to achieve by the operation of their decision." See infra
note 421.
2. See Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and IllicitMotive: Theories of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 39 (1977); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J 1205, 1207 (1970) (confusion surrounding role of motive has reached
"disaster proportions").

3. See, eg., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968).

4. See, eg., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144 (1963).
5. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
6. Id. at 224-25; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
7. See, eg., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 208-21 (1962); Note, EqualProtection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1093-94 (1969);
infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
8. At least one commentator has voiced a fear that the Court might too readily accept illicit
motivation as the critical factor for determining the unconstitutionality of a governmental action.
See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusr: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW 145 (1980) ("It would
be a tragedy of the first order were the Court to expand its burgeoning awareness of the relevance of
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constitutionally impermissible motives influenced a decision, that decision itself
is unconstitutional. 9 In these areas of constitutional adjudication, decisionmaker motive has become the touchstone of unconstitutionality. Accordingly, the focus of both courts and commentators has shifted from whether
purpose is relevant to how it can be proved.10
As predicted earlier by the Court, determining whether unconstitutional

motivation is present has proved difficult. Proving the intent of an individual
itself is often an arduous task, and ascertaining the motives that may have af-

fected the decision of a collective body can be even more demanding. A number
of methodologies for proving impermissible motives have been suggested by the

Court'" and commentators. 12 Not surprisingly, most of these proposals have
considered whether decisionmakers can be questioned about their reasons for

having taken an official action. Testimony and discovery from decisionmakers is
an obvious and potentially rich source of evidence of decisionmaker purpose;
few, if any, means of proving intent are better than examining those whose intent
is at issue. Such evidence has been considered by numerous courts and in many

cases has contributed to findings of unconstitutional motivation. 13 This Article
examines whether and to what extent government decisionmakers should be
privileged to refuse to submit to discovery to testify about their motives for an
official action. Decisionmakers undoubtedly should be protected from free and
hostile cross-examination on their processes of deliberation 14 and should be
shielded from unnecessarily intimidating external influences that threaten the
independence and integrity of the officials' judgment.

A number of privileges afford government officials such protection.
Although the various privileges that may be invoked by federal and state legislators and administrators differ considerably in scope, all are designed to protect
the functional independence of decisionmaking processes and guard them

against improper influence. The most potent of these privileges is the speech or
motivation into the thoroughly mistaken notion that a denial of a constitutional right doesn't count
as such unless it was intentional."); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (requiring proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose for equal
protection clause violation); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that racially disproportionate impact of law is in itself insufficient to find constitutionally prohibited purpose in the
law); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1972) (holding that legislative purpose of state property
tax exemption for religious organizations does not violate first and fourteenth amendments); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that, although legislative purpose of law to provide aid to
nonsecular schools did not attempt to establish religion, the law encouraged excessive government
entanglement with religion and violated first amendment).
9. See infra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
10. !g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Note, DiscriminatoryPurposeand Disproportionate Impact. An Assessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1376 (1979).
11. See infra notes 485-95, 540-42 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 485, 486, 492, 494, 543 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 528-31 and accompanying text.
14. Indeed, one writer has stated flatly that "[it is simply unthinkable that members of legislative majorities should from time to time be subject to cross-examination in various courts over the
country regarding their states of mind when they voted." A. BIcKEL, supra note 7, at 215; see also
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive,
1971 Sup. Cr. REv. 95, 129 (quoting Bickel and stating that Bickel's argument that legislators
should not be subject to subpoena to explain their motives for laws is persuasive).
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debate clause of the United States Constitution,1 5 which provides absolute immunity from suit challenging the legislative conduct of members of Congress, as
well as providing an evidentiary privilege that may prevent obtaining proof of
the deliberative processes of Congress. Analogous privileges protect the independence of noncongressional decisionmakers. These privileges pose a dilemma
because if successfully invoked, they may effectively prevent proper judicial inquiry into decisionmakers' motives-the precise inquiry that the Supreme Court
has required in reviewing certain categories of governmental actions.
An examination of the proper role of the speech or debate clause within a
tri-partite system of separation of powers reveals that even it should not provide
absolute protection from judicial inquiry into legislative motive. The historic
function of the clause was to prevent legislators from being intimidated, so that
their independence as a body would not be threatened. As such, the clause was
but one aspect of a larger separation of powers design. Insulating legislative
processes from review, however, is at odds with another aspect of the designthe judiciary's obligation to review the constitutionality of legislation. 16 When
the separation of powers requires review of legislative deliberations, the speech
or debate clause should not operate independently to prevent the courts from
inquiring into motive or obtaining the evidence needed for an effective review.
Rather, the use of such evidence, including the compelled testimony of legislators, should overcome the privilege when failure to do so would defeat the
courts' obligation to judge the constitutionality of the challenged legislation. By
establishing the inquiry into motive as permissible and even crucial, the Court
implicitly has determined that the intrusion resulting from this inquiry is
subordinate to the courts' constitutional mandate to determine the constitutionality of statutes.
Nevertheless, the legitimate institutional concerns that gave rise to the
clause remain. Although the courts must not be prevented from fulfilling their
role, neither must the legislature be stripped unnecessarily of the protection that
maintains the legislature's functional independence. Therefore, in this context,
the speech or debate clause should provide only a qualified privilege: members
of Congress should not be compelled to testify or submit to discovery unless
doing so is demonstrably critical for the court to discharge its obligation. Federal administrators and state legislative and administrative officials have no
greater protection than this qualified privilege; there is reason to conclude that
the scope of the privilege protecting them is somewhat narrower.
Whether a privilege should bar decisionmaker testimony or discovery is
best determined by balancing the competing interests on a case-by-case basis.
The courts should balance the harm to the government from not recognizing the

privilege against the necessity for the evidence in the particular case. Whether
the evidence is necessary will depend on both the availability of alternate sources
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides: "IFlor any Speech or Debate in either House [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
16. This conflict is evidenced by the Court's vacillation regarding the constitutional significance

of decisionmaker motive. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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of evidence to prove the specific facts at issue and whether the probative value of

the evidence is sufficiently great to outweigh the interests underlying the qualified privilege. A court should recognize the privilege unless the evidence is both
unavailable through other sources and highly probative.
The relevance and probative value of various kinds of evidence will depend

largely on the underlying theories that necessitate inquiry into unconstitutional
motive. Although a vigorous debate continues on the shape and substance of

those theories, the methodology that this Article proposes for determining
whether the need for the evidence should overcome a particular claim of privilege will yield the correct results within the context of each theory. The need to
protect from coercive influence the decisionmaking processes of government offi-

cials frequently will outweigh the benefits of compelling decisionmakers to testify. Officials should be required to testify about their reasons for making a
decision, however, when such testimony is likely to affect adjudication of a case.
This Article attempts to identify the various factors that the court should con-

sider in making this assessment.
I.

THE ROLE OF PURPOSE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION

In determining the constitutionality of statutes and acts of public officials,

the Supreme Court in recent years increasingly has considered the subjective
purpose of decisionmakers. The Court has deemed inquiry into legislative and

administrative purpose to be relevant or essential in cases arising under the due
process, 17 bill of attainder, 18 free exercise, 19 and establishment2 0 clauses, as well

as more recently under the equal protection, 2 1 freedom of speech, 22 and commerce2 3 clauses and perhaps the fifteenth amendment. 24 The Court has held

itself is sufficient to invalidate
that in some instances a finding of illicit purpose
25

the challenged statute or administrative action.
This emphasis on decisionmaker purpose represents a significant reversal by
the Court. The change has been particularly evident in the Court's interpretation of the equal protection clause when "facially neutral" classifications have
17. E.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
18. See Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
19. See, eg., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1972).
20. E.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Abbington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963).
21. Eg., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). One court
has ruled that it is proper to examine a prosecutor's intent to determine if his exercise of peremptory
challenges was racially discriminatory. Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1220 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 3546 (1984).
22. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
23. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
24. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 619 n.6 (1982) (expressing no view on relevance of purpose to cases arising
under fifteenth amendment); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (same).
25. Eg., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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been challenged. 2 6 As late as 1971, the Supreme Court in Palmerv. Thompson 27
seemed to bar any judicial inquiry into legislative motive in such cases. 28 Justice

Black, writing for the Palmer majority, stated that "no case in this Court has
held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the

motivations of the men who voted for it."'29 Although conceding that "language

in some of our cases" suggests "that the motive or purpose behind a law is relevant to its constitutionality, ' 30 he asserted that "the focus in those cases was on
the actual effect of the enactments, not upon the motivation which led the States
'3 1
to behave as they did."
The reasons articulated by the Palmer Court for refusing to permit inquiry

into motive were the difficulty of ascertaining such motivation 32 and the futility
of invalidating a law that would be upheld as constitutional if simply reenacted
for different reasons. 33 The Court observed that it generally is "extremely diffi-

cult" to identify accurately a decisionmaker's motivation. 34 The evidentiary
problems associated with proving an individual's motives are numerous and sub26. "Facially neutral" classifications are those that do not explicitly separate or classify individuals on the basis of race, alienage, illegitimacy, or gender.
27. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
28. In Palmer the City Council of Jackson, Mississippi had voted to close the four city-owned
swimming pools and surrendered the lease to a fifth, following a court order invalidating the enforced segregation of the public recreation facilities. The justification for closing the pools was that
they could not be operated safely and economically on an integrated basis. Id. at 219. Complainants, black residents of the city, sued to compel the city to reopen and operate the pools on a desegregated basis. Id. The Court held that the closing of the pools, which affected all residents similarly,
did not constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment, and did
not create a "badge or incident" of slavery in violation of the thirteenth amendment. Id. at 226.
29. Id. at 224.
30. Id. at 225.
31. Id. Justice Black was distinguishing Griffin v. County School Bd., 337 U.S. 218 (1964), and
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960). Both Griffin and Gomillion contain language
suggesting that the Court considered the motive or purpose behind an enactment to be relevant to its
constitutionality. Brest, supra note 14, at 98-100. The Court's apparent conclusion in Palmer that
the equal protection clause was violated by a discriminatory effect rather than a discriminatory purpose was reinforced by its decision in what seemed to be an analogous case, Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs the Court held that a facially neutral employment classification
that operated to exclude a disproportionate number of blacks was unlawful under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (1982), unless shown to be job related. Griggs, 401
U.S. at 431. The Griggs Court held that "Itihe Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id.
Following what they perceived to be the Court's lead, numerous lower federal courts held that
proof that a challenged enactment, policy, or governmental action that had a substantial disparate
impact on a racial minority was sufficient to establish a violation of the clause. E.g., Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Hart v. Community School Bd. of
Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n,
482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st
Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F.
Supp. 723 (N.D. Ohio 1975); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill.
1974);
Wade v. Mississippi Corp. Extension Serv., 372 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Miss. 1974), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D.
Md. 1973), modified in part and aff'd in part sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir.
1973).
32. Palmer,403 U.S. at 224 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-384 (1968)).
33. Id. at 225.
34. Id. at 224-25; see also Tussman & tenBroek, The EqualProtectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
Rav. 341, 359 (1949) (stating that determination of legislative motive is difficult task).
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stantial. As commentators have observed, circumstantial evidence of an individual's motive often is reduced to an intuitive assessment, 35 and the usefulness of
direct evidence is limited seriously by the ease with which motive testimony can
be fabricated 36 and by the cost of obtaining such testimony from multimember
decisionmaking bodies. 37 Even if the actual purpose underlying the conduct of a
decisionmaker could be judicially determined, there also is the problem of
"mixed" or multiple motivation. A single decisionmaker may have had several
purposes for acting as he did-some constitutionally offensive and others not.3 8
The courts then would have to determine how much illicit intent underlying an
individual decisionmaker's conduct must be shown before his conduct is deemed
39
unconstitutional: must the improper motive be the "sole" or "dominant" one;
must the influence be one "but for" which the decisionmaker would not have
4°
acted as he did, even if that is less than an outright majority of the influences;
41
or must the improper motive merely "taint" the challenged action?
The difficulties of proving the purpose of a multimember decisionmaking
body are even more substantial. As Chief Justice Warren stated in United States
v. O'Brien,42 "What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is
not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are
sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork." 43 The inferences drawn from the
available evidence of the motives of many, if not most, of the members of such a
body may be untrustworthy. 44 Furthermore, the burden on complainants in
such cases is not at all certain. Are they required to show that a majority of the
members acted with an illicit motive, that a substantial number did so, or that
those that did were the decisive factor, a "but for" cause of the outcome? 4 5
It also is likely that if courts inquire into motive, decisionmakers may work
harder to conceal their illicit objectives. 46 Such inquiry thus could be self-defeating; once decisionmakers knew of the practice, they could make even more
perilous the task of identifying their purposes. 47 Reflecting this concern about
35. See Brest, supra note 14, at 120-21. But see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341
(1964) (finding that those responsible for drawing of Tuskegee's boundaries were "solely concerned
with segregating white and colored voters" based entirely on inferences drawn from shape of boundaries themselves).
36. See Brest, supra note 14, at 123-24.
37. Id. Professor Brest also notes that the utility of direct testimony may be limited further by
the legal doctrines that may immunize legislators and high executive officials.
38. See Ely, supra note 2, at 1213-14.
39. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224-25. Justice Black noted that it was particularly "difficult or
impossible for any court to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation behind the choices of a
group of legislators." Id.
40. See Brest, supra note 14, at 117-19. For a further discussion of the 'but for' standard, see
infra notes 451-86 and accompanying text.
41. See Brest, supra note 14, at 117.
42. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
43. Id. at 384.
44. See infra notes 513-14, 550-51, 560-67 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 451-84 and accompanying text.
46. Brest, supra note 14, at 125.
47. See infra notes 626-29 and accompanying text.
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futility, Chief Justice Warren noted in O'Brien48 that it would be inappropriate
to void a statute "which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or

another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it." 49 Not only would such a
reenactment or repetition expose the ineffectiveness of the initial judical intervention, it also would undermine the dignity and power of the judiciary as the
final arbiter of the constitutionality of statutes. A remedy that could be so readily circumvented would suggest that the Court's role somehow had been
compromised. 50

The courts considering this issue also have been sensitive to institutional or
separation of powers concerns. 5 1 Any inquiry into motive requires an extraordinary degree of intrusion into the decisionmaking process, which arguably indicates a lack of respect for the coordinate branches of government.5 2 Although
invalidating statutes or administrative actions on their merits may suggest that
decisionmakers made an error, invalidation on the basis of motive impugns the
essential integrity of those decisionmakers and is tantamout to accusing them of

violating their constitutional oath of office. 53 A decisionmaker thus could view
inquiry into his motives as an attack on his integrity and honesty; the intimidation accompanying such an inquiry would be magnified by the public nature of
the scrutiny and its potential consequences. 54 Given these potential threats to

legislative and administrative independence, the Court for many years refused to
permit inquiry into motive and characterized all evidence of illicit motive as
55
irrelevant.
In the 1973 case of Keyes v. School District No. 1,56 however, the Court

revived judicial review of intent as a permissible inquiry in equal protection
cases. Keyes was the Court's first opportunity to consider school desegregation
outside the South.5 7 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, set forth criteria
48. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
49. Id. at 384; see also Palmer,403 U.S. at 225 (it would be futile to invalidate a law because of
improper motive ifit is valid for other reasons because it can be reenacted).
50. See Ely, supranote 2, at 1214-15. Professor Ely notes that this process of invalidation and
reenactment would result in a "high ultimate cost in terms of public respect" for both the judiciary
and the legislature. But see Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 116.
51. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 117. Professor Eisenberg states that the "principal reason
for judicial reluctance to inquire into legislative motive is the supposed impropriety of one branch of
government questioning the good faith of another branch." Id. See also A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at
208-21 (attempts to diagnose motive will intrude on normal deference court accords to legislature);
Brest, supra note 14, at 128-30 (discussing the arguments that judicial examination of legislative and
executive action entails "an undesirable intrusion into the political process" and "a lack of proper
respect for" policymaking agencies); Note, supra note 7, at 1093-94 (stating that voiding an act of a
legislature would impugn integrity of a coordinate branch of government and involve judiciary in
politics).
52. See Brest, supra note 14, at 128-30; Note, supra note 7, at 1093; see also A. BICKEL, supra
note 7, at 214 (in reviewing legislative action, the courts must give strong consideration to the position of the legislature).
53. Brest, supra note 14, at 129; Ely, supra note 2, at 1216; Note, supra note 7, at 1093.
54. See infra text accompanying note 297.
55. Palmer,403 U.S. at 224-25; see also O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383-84 (noting that what motivates
one legislator does not necessarily motivate other legislators, and that, while one legislator's purpose
may be invalid, another legislator's may be valid).
56. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
57. The case involved allegations of racial and ethnic segregation of students in the Denver,

1985]

INQUIRY INTO DECISIONMAKER MOTIVE

for a finding of de jure discrimination in the absence of a history of state-mandated segregation. 58 Although it stopped short of requiring a showing of illicit
purpose, the Court held such a showing sufficient to establish a prima facie case
59
of unconstitutional discrimination.
Three years later, the Court completed its apparent reversal on the issue in

Washington v. Davis.6° In that case, several District of Columbia police officer
candidates challenged the validity, under the equal protection clause, of a "qual-

ifying test" 6 1 that resulted in the exclusion of a disproportionately large number

of black candidates. 62 Justice White, writing for the majority, 63 rejected the
notion that this proof of a disparate impact established a prima facie constitutional violation. Stating that because "[tihe central purpose of the Equal Protec-

tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct
discriminating on the basis of race," 64 the Court held that it could not find such

conduct unconstitutional "solely because [it has] a racially disproportionate impact." 65 The Court instead placed on complainants in such cases the additional

burden of demonstrating that the'66challenged conduct was undertaken with a
"racially discriminatory purpose."

One year later, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,67 the Court further amplified Davis' discriminatory-purpose re-

quirement. Complainants in Arlington Heights challenged restrictive zoning
practices that allegedly had prevented the construction of low and moderate
income housing in the village. 68 Reaffirming Davis, the Court stated without
Colorado school district. Id. at 191. Although the evidence of intentional segregation was limited
largely to only one portion of the city-wide school district, plaintiffs sought a desegregation remedy
that would encompass the entire district. Id. at 191-95.
58. Id. at 201-03, 206-10.
59. Id.
60. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
61. Id. at 234-35. The candidates were required "to receive a grade of at least 40 out of a
possible 80 on 'Test 21,'" an examination used throughout the federal service, as a precondition to
acceptance into the police department's training program. Id.
62. Fifty-seven percent of the black candidates who took the test failed, while only thirteen
percent of the white candidates failed. Washington v. Davis, 512 F.2d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
63. Although Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented on statutory grounds, Washington, 426
U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting), the newly established requirement of proof of discriminatory
purpose apparently had the unanimous support of the Court.
64. Id. at 239. Washington itself involved the equal protection component of the fifth amendment. Id.
65. Id. Justice White observed that "[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution." Id. at 242.
66. Id. at 239-42. The Court's later cases have made clear that proof of purposeful racial discrimination invokes the Court's "strictest scrutiny," but does not result in automatic invalidation of
the challenged action. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 n.5 (1982); Washington, 436 U.S. at 24748.
67. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
68. Id. at 255-58. Plaintiffs sought to have a 15-acre parcel of land rezoned from a singlefamily to multiple-family classification to permit the building of 190 clustered townhouse units for
low and moderate income tenants. The village denied this request. Id. at 254. Plaintiffs then sued in
federal court contending that the denial was racially discriminatory. Id. Following a bench trial,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered judgment for the village. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D.
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elaboration that racially discriminatory intent or purpose must be proved to establish a prima facie violation of the equal protection clause. 69 Evaluating the
evidence adduced at trial, the Court conceded that the impact of the village's
actions "arguably" bore more heavily on the affected racial minorities. 70 Nonetheless, the Court found that plaintiffs had not met their "burden of proving that
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor," a conclusion that "ends the
'7 1
constitutional inquiry."
The Court subsequently extended the intent requirement to other equal
protection clause cases: those involving facially neutral classifications that result
in a disparate impact on gender 7 2 and those involving at-large municipal election

systems that allegedly dilute the votes of racial minorities. 73 The Court also

considered evidence of legislative purpose relevant in a commerce clause chal-

lenge to a state highway regulation. 74 Most recently, in Board of Education v.
Pico, 75 a plurality of the Court found motive decisive and established a test for
detecting improper
motive in a case brought under the free speech clause of the
76
first amendment.

Permitting judicial inquiry into purpose in these varied contexts represents
a change in thc Court's position. As if in response to its previously expressed
doubts on how to ascertain motive reliably, the Court's more recent opinions

77
permitting the inquiry contain substantial discussion on methods of proof.

The Court also apparently dismissed its concerns that its actions ultimately
would be futile if the statute later were reenacted. The Court's determination to

permit the inquiry implicitly was predicated on an understanding that it is not
the words of a statute that are constitutionally repugnant, but rather the decisionmaker's consideration of improper objectives. 78 Accordingly, a deciIll.
1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the "ultimate effect" of the denial was
racially discriminatory, and that the refusal to rezone therefore violated plaintiffs' rights to equal
protection of the laws. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d
409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
69. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
70. Id. at 269.
71. Id. at 270-71.
72. See, eg., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
73. See, eg., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980).
74. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1981). Justice Brennan
noted that both his opinion and the majority's opinion "have found the actual motivation of the
Iowa lawmakers. . . highly relevant to, if not dispositive of, the case." Id. at 683 n.3 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
75. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
76. In Pico five students challenged the decision of a local school board to remove certain books
from junior high and high school libraries. Id. at 856-58. Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan
determined that whether the removal of the books violated the first amendment "depends upon the
motivation behind" those actions. Id. at 891. The plurality established a two-part inquiry: First,
did the school board intend to deny students access to ideas with which the school board disagreed?
Second, was that intent the "decisive factor" in the board's decision? Id.
77. E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622-28 (1982); Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-75; Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.24 (1979); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68; Davis, 426
U.S. at 241-42.
78. See Brest, supra note 14, at 125.
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sionmaker arguably would remain free to reenact or readopt the challenged
79
action if done with the proper intent.
Permitting judicial inquiry into motive also signals that the Court is reassessing the doctrine of separation of powers. On the one hand, the Court sought,
by means of the intent requirement, to restrain the exercise of judicial power to
intrude into governmental functions that otherwise are confined properly to the
legislative and executive branches. 80 Democratic theory accords substantial
weight to the legislature's policy decisions and the executive branch's implementation of those decisions, 81 both of which necessarily involve the weighing of
competing interests and the allocation of scarce resources.8 2 By requiring proof
of illicit purpose pursuant to its understanding of separation of powers, the
Court allows the judiciary to nullify such legislative and administrative acts only
when these processes have been tainted by impermissible considerations. Thus,
in the equal protection context, the Court limited judicial intervention by requiring that the plaintiffs bear the burden of proving illicit purpose.
The Court also determined implicitly that its obligation to review the constitutionality of such legislative and administrative acts outweighed the instrusive effect of the inquiry. The Court did not opt, as it might have, for a case-bycase "balancing" of this potential intrusion, permitting inquiry into purpose only
when the need for review of the underlying constitutional issue outweighed the
intrusion. Instead, it concluded that its constitutional mandate was, in these
circumstances, absolute. Because the Court determined that a decisionmaker's
very consideration of improper objectives is offensive to the Constitution, the
intrusiveness of the inquiry into motive-no matter how great--could be of no
83
consequence.
II.
A.

THE BASES FOR A DECISIONMAKER'S PRIVILEGE

The Speech or Debate Clause

84
A number of generally recognized legislative and administrative privileges
arguably provide a basis for barring decisionmaker testimony or the introduction of legislative or administrative documents pertaining to the issue of uncon-

79. Id. A decisionmaker whose action was invalidated because it was wrongly motivated, however, should not be allowed to conceal his illicit motives in readopting it. Id. at 126; see infra note
427.
80. See Note, supra note 10, at 1383; see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 642-43 (1982)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that intent requirement is often treated "as a restraint on the exercise
of judicial power . . . that otherwise would be confined to the legislature"); Personnel Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 247 (1979) (stating that legislature must be motivated "because of" and not
merely "in spite of" a law's discriminatory purpose for court to void the law).
81. A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 19; Brest, supra note 14, at 127-28; Note, DiscriminatoryPurpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE LJ. 111, 115 (1983).
82. A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 19.
83. See infra notes 254-69 and accompanying text.
84. It always is possible that a new privilege prohibiting testimony of and discovery from decisionmakers can be created statutorily by Congress or state legislatures or through the rulemaking
authority of the courts.

890
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stitutional motivation.85 Of these privileges, the most potent is the speech or
85. In addition to the speech or debate clause, there are two other possible constitutional
sources of legislative privilege from compelled testimony or disclosure of documents: the publication
clause and the immunity from arrest clause. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 3, the publication clause,
provides: "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy. .. ." This relatively obscure
clause has received scant treatment from both the courts and commentators. Although facially addressed only to the publication of information in its "Journal of Proceedings," this clause nevertheless has been cited by two lower federal courts as creating a congressional privilege to withhold
documentary evidence from judicial scrutiny. See United States v. Ehrlichman, 389 F. Supp. 95
(D.D.C. 1974), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1120 (1977); Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rey'd, 519 F.2d 184 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976). The district courts' conclusions that the publication
clause was the source of such a documentary privilege, however, were neither endorsed nor rejected
by the respective courts of appeals. Both the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Ehrlichman and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Calley
found it unnecessary to address the privilege issue, concluding that the failure to provide the requested materials had been harmless. Ehrlichman, 542 F.2d at 83; Calley, 519 F.2d at 220 n.60.
One commentator has concluded that both district courts erred in finding that the publication
clause conferred a general privilege of confidentiality. Kaye, CongressionalPapers,JudicialSubpoenas and the Constitution, 24 UCLA L. Rv. 523 (1977). As Professor Kaye correctly notes, a literal
reading of the publication clause grants Congress only the power to refuse or prevent the publication
of certain matters in the Congressional Record or other "Journal," but not otherwise to prevent their
disclosure. Moreover, unlike the speech or debate clause, the ratification debates over the publication clause confirm this literal interpretation. Id. at 531; see also 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTON OF 1787, at 270 (1911) (affirming public's right to disclosures of legislative action). These debates reveal that the Framers intended to create only a narrow band of confidentiality to protect against the disclosure of military and diplomatic secrets. See Kaye, supra, at
533-34 nn.48-51. Furthermore, this history refers only to Congress' power to protect these secrets
by withholding their publication from its journal. Id.
It seems logical, however, to conclude that the clause permits Congress not only to omit secrets
from its journal but to withhold them from discovery in other ways. Esentially, the clause confers
the power to keep certain confidential material out of the public domain. This power is eroded
significantly if Congress can be forced to make such materials public pursuant to a judicial subpoena.
See id. at 576-79. To the extent that the clause implies such a privilege, protection should be limited
to the narrow realm of military and diplomatic secrets that the Framers originally sought to guard.
Furthermore, if the secrets at issue are not matters of national security but merely confidential internal proceedings, the privilege need only be qualified. See infra notes 286-95 and accompanying text.
It thus appears that the privilege issues in both Ehrlichman and Calley were decided incorrectly by
the district courts since in neither case did the documents sought contain any secret material. See
Kaye, supra, at 531.
The other potential source of legislative privilege is the immunity from arrest clause. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6 provides: "[Congressmen] shall in all cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of
the Peace, be privileged from arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same ..
" The language of the clause appears to
protect members of Congress only from physical restraint while traveling to or from a legislative
session; the clause neither refers to protection against other types of interference, nor extends to
periods when the legislature is not in session. The language and history of the clause fully support
the Court's interpretation that it does not protect legislators from compliance with either subpoenas
duces tecum or subpoenas ad testificandum. See Kaye, supra, at 536-46.
The English antecedent of this clause at one time was extremely broad in scope, exempting
members of Parliament from the obligation of ever appearing in court as either defendant or witness.
See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court consistently has intepreted the
clause more narrowly than its English equivalent. The Court first confronted a claim of privilege
based on this clause in Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908). Following his conviction
for conspiracy to suborn perjury, Representative Williamson argued that the clause protected him
from imprisonment during his term of office. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the
clause does not provide immunity from criminal process or sanctions. Id. at 445-46. Tracing the
origins and development of the English parliamentary privilege, the Court found that the identical
language of its qualifying phrase, "treason, felony, and breach of the peace," exempted all criminal
prosecutions from the coverage of the clause. The Framers' use of the same phrase, without discus-
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debate clause 86 of the United States Constitution.8 7 The speech or debate clause

provides legislators with substantive immunity, which has been invoked as a
shield against criminal prosecution 88 and grand jury investigation 89 initiated by
the executive branch and damage90 and injunctive91 actions brought by private
citizens. The Supreme Court also has barred the use of evidence of legislative
acts and motives 92 when judicial inquiry into those acts or motives otherwise
would be barred by the clause's grant of substantive immunity. This evidentiary
aspect of the privilege is important because it potentially provides lawmakers
with the right to refuse to testify, submit to discovery, or produce documentary
evidence. In this wide variety of contexts, the Supreme Court consistently has
concluded that if the speech or debate clause privilege is applicable, its protec93
tion is absolute.
The clause was created and developed as an aspect of the doctrine of separation of powers to prohibit, for the benefit of the people, interference with their

elected representatives. By insulating legislators from intimidation, the clause
protects the integrity of the legislative process. Separation of powers principles,
sion, suggested a similar intention to limit the operative scope of the clause in this country. Id. at
438.
Subsequently, in Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934), the Court considered the applicability of
the immunity from arrest clause in civil actions. In that case Senator Long moved to quash a summons in a libel suit on the grounds that the clause protected him from civil process. The Court,
again turning to the English analogue for guidance, found that the privilege in England at the time
the United States Constitution was drafted provided no immunity from civil process as long as
members of Parliament were not detained physically. Id. at 82-83. They were protected only
against arrest as a means of commencing a civil action, not the simple service of a summons. Id.
The Court determined that the American privilege must be construed similarly. Id.
Finally, in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), the scope of the clause was narrowed
further. Senator Gravel sought to dismiss a grand jury subpoena that required his aide to testify in
an investigation of the senator's actions. The Court concluded that the clause did not provide immunity from the service of such a subpoena, stating that the clause's protection was limited to arrest in
the civil context. Id. at 614-15. A subpoena requiring testimony by a legislator as a witness in a
criminal proceeding was not within the scope of the privilege. Id.
These decisions do not determine whether the clause provides a legislator ith immunity from
being called as a witness in a civil action. Because the Court consistently has viewed the privilege as
limited to protecting legislators from arrest at the initiation of a civil action, however, it appears that
the Court would, if faced with the question, find that the clause does not protect a legislator called as
a witness. Cf. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31 (1980) (Despite concerns that a judge's time would
be consumed unduly by being called to testify, members of the judiciary enjoy no immunity from
appearing as witnesses in civil matters.). Testimony from legislators need not be barred completely
to ensure that their constituents are not deprived of representation. All court appearances simply
could be scheduled so as to minimize any intrusion on legislative functioning.
86. See supra note 15 for the full text of the speech or debate clause.
87. The majority of state constitutions provide similar protection for state legislators. See infra
note 241.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S.
169 (1966).
89. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
90. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168

(1881).
91. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169
(1966). Similar lower court holdings include United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973); United States v. Garmatz, 445 F. Supp. 54 (D. Md. 1977).
93. See, eg., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509-10 (1975).
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however, also require the judiciary to protect the people from the excesses of
legislative power. The Court has attempted to reconcile these competing constitutional commands by interpreting the clause to distinguish between "legislative
acts,"' 94 which are absolutely protected from the scrutiny of the coordinate
branches, and nonlegislative or "political acts," 95 which are not. Although the
Supreme Court uses these terms in its analysis, the speech or debate clause cases
may be explained most clearly by focusing on the extent to which separation of
powers principles require insulation of the legislature from judicial scrutiny that
otherwise might subvert legislative processes. The Court therefore readily has
extended the clause to protect legislators in situations in which inquiry regarding
legislative acts might intimidate members of Congress in the performance of
legislative functions.
Nevertheless, separation of powers principles at times may require such in94. The Court over time has narrowed the definition of "legislative acts," as shown by the
following chronological progression of cases: Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881) (legislative acts are those "things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in
relation to the business before it"); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951) (legislators protected "for what they do or say in legislative proceedings"); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169,
185 (1966) (parameters of what constitutes legislative activity generally have been narrowed by the
Supreme Court over time and include preparation and delivery of speeches); Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (act other than speech or debate protected only when it is "an integral part
of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and

House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation

or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either

House").

Although the Supreme Court's analytic framework generally has been endorsed, its definition of
"legislative act" has been subject to a great deal of criticism. See, e.g., Reinstein & Silverglate,
Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1113 (1973). According to
Reinstein and Silverglate, the Supreme Court's adherence to a literal and static interpretation of the
speech or debate clause leads the Court to define the term "legislative activity" far too narrowly. Id.
at 1145, 1147, 1149. Analyzing the speech or debate clause from a functional-historical perspective,
the authors assert that the privilege should be expanded to protect legislators in their performance of
all proper legislative functions. Id. at 1148. They suggest that the privilege "arose dynamically to
preserve the functional independence of the legislature"; therefore, the clause today must be shaped
by the contemporary functions of a legislature in a representative democracy. Id. at 1149; see also
Hearings on ConstitutionalImmunity ofMembers of Congress Before the Joint Comm. on Congressional Operations,93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973) (opening statement of Sen. L. Metcalf) (Gravel definition of legislative activities is a "far-reaching institutional challenge"); id. at 5 (prepared statement
of Rep. J. Cleveland) (Graveland Brewster v. United States, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), represent "major
assault" by Court); id. at 54 (testimony of former Justice Goldberg) (Gravel and Brewster mark
"unprecedented and undue narrowing" of scope of legislative powers); id. at 75 (testimony of Sen. J.
Fulbright) (Gravel and Brewster impair legislators' ability to act with candor and independence);
Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Speech or Debate: The New Interpretationas a Threat
to Legislative Coequality, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1019, 1021-22 (1974) (Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S.
306 (1973), Gravel, and Brewster administered "potentially fatal blow" to Congress as coequal
branch); Cleveland, Legislative Immunity and the Role of the Representative, 14 N.H.B.J. 139, 13940 (1973) (Gravel and Brewster sharply limit scope of congressional immunity); Ervin, The Gravel
and Brewster Cases: An Assault on CongressionalIndependence, 59 VA. L. REv. 175, 175 (1973)
(Graveland Brewster so restrict immunity that legislators cannot acquire information and report it to
constituents without risk of criminal prosecution). But see Comment, The ConstitutionalLimits of
the Speech orDebate Clause, 25 UCLA L. REv. 796, 803 (1978) (Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), and Doe suggest "movement toward broad deference to congressional discretion").
95. See, eg., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314-16 (1973) (public distribution of arguably
actionable committee reports); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972) (intervention
before government agencies on behalf of constituents, preparing and distributing constituent newsletters, and delivery of speeches outside of Congress).
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quiry rather than prohibit it. Judicial review of enacted legislation reflects different separation of powers concerns than when, for example, the courts are asked

to enjoin ongoing legislative activity. Since Marbury v. Madison,96 the Supreme
97
Court often has reaffirmed its central and unique obligation to do the former,
yet also has foreclosed any possibility of doing the latter. 98 When the judiciary
is fulfilling its constitutional commitment to review enacted legislation, it neces-

sarily must override the legislature's interest in freedom from encroachment.
The Supreme Court has confirmed this constitutional allocation of balanced
powers in the context of motivation analysis. Although the Court otherwise has
interpreted the speech or debate clause to place the motives or purposes underlying legislative acts beyond judicial inquiry, 99 the Court has required precisely

that inquiry in motive cases. 100 When a court undertakes to review the constitutionality of legislative actions the clause should not act as an independent shield
to forestall judicial inquiry. 10 1 When this inquiry is undertaken, the clause also

should not bar the use of legislators' testimony and documentary evidence of
legislative acts and motives to the extent that such evidence is necessary for the
court's review. Such a qualified evidentiary privilege sufficiently protects the

legislative process from improper interference by the judiciary in motive cases,
while allowing for meaningful judicial review of legislative action. 10 2
1. The Historical Development of the Clause
As several commentators have observed, the various historical perspectives
on the origins and evolution of the speech or debate clause suggest differing
contemporary constructions of the scope of the privilege.10 3 Although the
clause's historical development and definition are somewhat controversial, 104
this Article adopts the premise that the privilege arose and evolved to preserve
96. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
97. See, eg., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). The judiciary's special role as the interpreter of
the Constitution is not limited to challenged acts of Congress. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1952) (judicial review of President Truman's steel seizure);
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816) (judicial review of state enactment); see
infra notes 255-60.
98. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
99. See id.; United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S.
169, 184-85 (1966).
100. See supra notes 60-76 and accompanying text; infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text.
102. The proposal in this Article for qualified legislative and administrative privileges and a
methodology for determining their applicability in a particular case is limited to constitutional litigation in which the purpose of the decisionmaking body is a determinative factor. The appropriateness
of this proposal in other contexts, such as statutory construction, is beyond the scope of this Article.
The principles articulated in this Article, however, should be applicable generally to statutory construction cases and other types of litigation in which the courts have required inquiry into the acts
and goals of governmental decisionmakers. Even if the methodology for balancing the competing
interests at stake is the same, however, the results may differ dramatically.
103. E.g., Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1120-21; see also United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501, 516-21 (1972) (past abuses of privilege support limited construction).
104. See C. WrrIKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 23-32 (1970);
Neale, The Commons' Privilege of Free Speech in Parliament,in 2 HISTORICAL STUDIES OF THE
ENGLISH PARLIAMENT 147-76 (E. Fryde & E. Miller ed. 1970).
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legislative independence in a system of separation of powers. 10 5 This view ac-

cordingly suggests that the contours of the privilege depend on the nature and
functions of the legislative branch vis-A-vis those of the other branches of
government.

The speech or debate clause originated in the prolonged struggles between
the British Parliament and the Crown."° 6 In its earliest form, the privilege grew

out of the predominantly judicial function of the contemporary Parliament. As
the supreme judicial council, the Parliament claimed for itself a privilege pro-

tecting the speeches and debates of its members from interference by private
persons through the lower courts. 107 Parliament also claimed several other privileges that flowed from its judicial function, including freedom from civil arrest
and the right to impose sanctions for contempt.10 8 The narrow scope of the
judicially based free speech privilege, however, provided no shield against coer-

cive prosecutions or investigations by the Crown.10 9 It was not until 1542, a
century and a half after this first free speech privilege originated, that Parliament
asserted a more comprehensive freedom of speech or debate. 110
Expansion of the scope of the privilege was triggered by the growth and
change in Parliament's functions. By the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the House of Commons had enlarged its legislative role by exerting author-

ity over bills submitted by the Crown.111 As Parliament's powers changed, so
too did the scope of its claimed privilege. Experience with the legislative process

caused the House to expand the judicially based free speech privilege into "a
guarantor enforcing a nascent system of separation of powers."'

12

The newly

shaped privilege was incorporated into the Speaker's Petition in 1542,113 and
105. The author's analysis relies heavily on the seminal work by Reinstein & Silverglate, supra

note 94, which in turn built on the ground-breaking research by J.E. Neale. See supra note 104.
106. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966). As stated by Justice Harlan: "Behind
these simple phrases lies a history of conflict between the Commons and the Tudor and Stuart
monarchs during which successive monarchs utilized the criminal and civil law to suppress and
intimidate critical legislators." Id. (citing C. WITrKE, supra note 104; Neale, supra note 104).
107. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1122. See generally C. MCILWAIN,THE
HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY: A HISTORICAL ESSAY OF THE BOUNDARIES
BETWEEN LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION IN ENGLAND 229-46 (1910) (House of Commons as-

serted that its privilege should not be reviewed by lower courts); Neale, supra note 104, at 147-76
(freedom of speech attained when House of Commons became sole judge of conduct of its members
except in extreme circumstances). The House of Lords was created as a judicial body and remains
the highest appellate court in England. The House of Commons had jurisdiction over the quasijudicial function of acting on private petitions. See C. MCILWAIN, supra, at 202-05; Neale, supra
note 104, at 151-52; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1123 n.50.
108. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1122.
109. Id. at 1122-23. This judicially based privilege in essence was a corollary of sovereign immunity; the members of the highest court were the personal delegates of the King and were answerable
only to him for their conduct. Id.
110. Id. at 1123; see also Neale, supra note 104, at 157 (historical evidence shows that at least
until 1539 no member of Parliament made petition for free speech as a right).
111. Neale, supra note 104, at 163-64; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1123-24.
112. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1124; see also Neale, supra note 104, at 163-64

(parliamentary free speech arose from "need for unrestrained criticism of government measures").
113. Neale, supra note 104, at 157; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1123-24. The
Speaker's Petition "defined, albeit vaguely, the relations of Parliament and the Crown." Id. at 1123
(citing Neale, supra note 104, at 157).
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first was invoked by a harrassed member in 1575.114
The Crown, however, steadfastly refused to accept this attempted broadening of the scope of the privilege; consequently, members of Parliament remained
largely unprotected from prosecution before the King's Bench on charges of "licentious" or "seditious" acts stemming from their legislative speech or debate. 115 The power struggle continued throughout the next century, with the
House of Commons claiming for itself an ever greater role in government affairs, 116 and the Tudor and Stuart monarchs asserting an inherent sovereign
right to impose criminal sanctions for legislative activities. 117 This dispute was

brought dramatically to a head by events leading up to the Revolution of 1689
and the exile of James I.118 The English Bill of Rights, which was enacted as a

result, included the declaration "that the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or
place out of Parliament." ' 1 9 The Bill of Rights also abolished the Crown's
power to suspend or nullify statutes passed by Parliament. 120 These two provi114. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1124; see also Celia, The Doctrines of Legislative
Privilege ofFreedom ofSpeech and Debate Its Past,Present,and Futureas a Bar to CriminalProsecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1 (1968) (A speaker stated that the Crown's censure of
speech is a violation of the rights of the House of Commons.).
The member invoking the privilege was Peter Wentworth. In a speech in which he elaborated
on the rationale for the newly broadened privilege, he noted that free speech would not be secure as
long as the House heeded the Crown's commands not to discuss matters involving the Crown's
prerogatives. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1124 n.54 (citing S. D'EWES, JOURNAL OF
ALL THE PARLIAMENTS DURING THE REIGN OF QUEEN ELIZABETH 236-37 (1682)).

He then

called for an absolute and exclusive right of the House to control its debates:
[I]t is a dangerous thing in a Prince to oppose or bend herself against her Nobility and
People .... And how could any Prince more unkindly intreat, abuse, oppose herself
against her Nobility and People, than her Majesty did the last Parliament?. . . [I]s it not
all one thing to say, Sirs, you shall deal in such matters only, as to say, you shall not deal in
such matters? And so as good to have Fools and Flatterers in the House, as men of Wisdom. . . . It is a great and special part of our duty and office, Mr. Speaker, to maintain
the freedom of Consultation and Speech, for by this, good Laws. . .are made. . .for we
are incorporated into this place, to serve God and all England, and not to be Time-Servers
• . .or as Flatterers that would fain beguile all the World.. . [but] let us show ourselves a
People endured with Faith. . .that bringeth forth good Works. . . . Therefore I would
have none spared or forborn that shall from henceforth offend herein, of what calling soever he be, for the higher place he hath the more harm he may do ....
Id. (citing S. D'Ewas, JOURNAL OF ALL THE PARLIAMENTS DURING THE REIGN OF QUEEN ELIZABETH 238-40). Immediately after his speech Wentworth was placed under arrest, interrogated, and
imprisoned for one month. Id. (citing S. D'EwEs, JouRNAL OF ALL THE PARLIAMENTS DURING
THE REIGN OF QUEEN ELIZABETH 241-46); see also Cella, supra, at 8-9 (Wentworth was arrested
after the speech and imprisoned for over a month after stating that he would refuse to discuss his
speech ifthe committee hearing was conducted on behalf of the Crown because the Crown lacked
authority.).
115. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1126.
116. Id. During this period the House of Commons began to involve itself in matters once
considered to be within the exclusive domain of the Crown, including foreign policy and the succession. Id. The House "began to conceive of itself seriously as Grand Inquest of the Nation, demanding 'a voice in the general policy of the country, and [the right] to criticize the action of the executive
in modern fashion."' Id. (quoting W. ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION 35
(5th ed. 1922)).
117. Id.
118. For a detailed analysis of these events, see id. at 1129-35.
119. 1 W. & M. Sess. 2, c.2 (1689).
120. Id. The first article of the Bill of Rights stated "[tihat the pretened Power of Suspending of
Laws, or the Execution of Laws by Regal Authority, without Consent of Parliament is Illegal." Id.
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sions together "preserved the freedom of legislative debate and the force of legislative enactment, thus assuring the functional independence of Parliament in a
system of separate powers." 12 1 The struggles between Crown and Commons
were resolved, and the basis for the eventual supremacy of Parliament was
122
firmly established.
The legislative privilege developed in the colonies out of a parallel concern

for the functional independence of the legislature.12 3 The language of the speech
or debate clause ultimately adopted by the Constitutional Convention was
nearly identical to that of the English Bill of Rights. 124 The American version,
however, having been tailored to the uniquely American political context, was

somewhat narrower in scope. In contrast to the preeminent English Parliament,
Congress was to be but one of three coequal branches of government;' 25 the
early American experience cautioned against a system of unchecked legislative
power. 126 The unrestrained power of any of the branches of government, including the legislature, was perceived as a danger to liberty.

The clause elicited little discussion at the Constitutional Convention, presumably because the principal of legislative independence was established firmly
in the minds of the Framers. 127 A similar provision had been included in the
121. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1135.
122. See C. WrrrKE, supra note 104, at 12-14; see also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169,
178 (1966) (referring to free speech and debate clause as "the culmination of a long struggle for
parliamentary supremacy").
123. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1144.
124. See supra text accompanying note 119. Cf. supra note 15 (text of American speech or
debate clause).
125. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972). As Justice Burger stated in
Brewster:
Although the Speech or Debate Clause's historic roots are in English history, it must be
interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the context of the American constitutional scheme of government rather than the English parliamentary system. We should
bear in mind that the English system differs from ours in that their Parliament is the
supreme authority, not a coordinate branch. Our speech or debate privilege was designed
to preserve legislative independence, not supremacy. Our task, therefore, is to apply the
Clause in such a way as to insure the independence of the legislature without altering the
historic balance of the three co-equal branches of Government.
Id.; see also Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 374-76 (1976)
(separation of powers acts as check on legislative power).
126. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in Notes on the State of Virginia, quoted in THE FEDERALIST
No. 48, at 341 (J.Madison) (Dunne ed. 1901):
All the powers of government, legislative, executive and judiciary, result to the legislative
body. The concentrating of these in the same hands, is precisely the definition of despotic
government. It will be no alleviation, that these powers will be excercised by a plurality of
hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as
oppressive as one ....
As Gordon Wood stated: "Tyranny was now seen as the abuse of power by any branch of the
goverment, even, and for some especially, by the traditional representatives of the people." G.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 10, 608 (1969), quoted in Levi,
supra note 125, at 375. The Framers' deletion of the phrase "or proceedings" from the version of the
privilege ultimately adopted also has led at least one commentator to infer an intent to exclude from
the privilege acts of official legislative corruption. Bradley, The Speech or Debate Clause: Bastion of
CongressionalIndependence or Haven for Corruption?,57 N.C.L. REv. 197, 209-14 (1979).
127. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951); see also Reinstein & Silverglate, supra
note 94,at 1136 (stating that the principle was so "firmly rooted" that little discussion took place at
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Articles of Confederation, 128 and three state constitutions previously had
adopted the privilege. 129 The Framers' intentions were clear, however, from
their modification or exclusion of certain other privileges being claimed at that
time by members of Parliament. 130 For example, the unlimited privilege from

arrest and civil process was limited strictly in article I, section 6,131 and the
32
general privilege of contempt power was withheld entirely from Congress.'

Furthermore, the Framers included within the Constitution a provision that unmistakably nullified the House of Commons' controversial rule forbidding the
publication of its proceedings by either members or the press, except by specific
leave of the whole body. 13 3 Thus, although the evolution of the speech or debate

clause privilege reflects a concern for protecting the functional independence of
the legislature, the American version was equally tempered by a concern that the
separation of powers between coequal branches be maintained.

2. Judicial Interpretation
Although the historical justification for the speech or debate clause privi-

lege was to insulate the legislature from executive intrusions, 134 the Supreme
Court has expanded the privilege to provide protection from judicial interferthe Constitutional Convention). James Wilson, an influential member of the Committee on Detail
that was responsible for the provisions, summarized the reason for including the clause:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the excercise of that liberty may occasion offense.
2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (Andrews ed. 1896), quoted in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
373 (1951).
128. Article V of the Articles of Confederation provided: "Freedom of speech or debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress.
129. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951).
The Maryland Declaration of Rights, Nov. 3, 1776, provided: "That freedom of speech,
and debates or proceedings, in the legislature, ought not to be impeached in any other court
or judicature." Art. VIII. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided: "The freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to
the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution,
action, or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever." Part I., Art. XXI.
Id. The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 provided: "The freedom of deliberation, speech, and
debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be
the foundation of any action, complaint, or prosecution in any other court or place whatsoever."
N.H. CONST. art. XXX, part I.
130. Reistein & Silverglate, supranote 94, at 1136-37. Most of these privileges had grown out
of Parliament's original judicial character, and thus, at the very least, were unnecessary to protect
the independence of the legislative processes of Congress. Id.
131. Id.; see also T. JEFFERSON, MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § 3 (1797-98) (article
I limitations on privilege). The privilege from arrest and civil process had been extended before this
time to include not only the members of Parliament and their servants, but their families and estates
as well. See C. WrrrIKE, supra note 104, at 41-43. In the period between the Revolution of 1689 and
1769, several statutes were passed eliminating these excesses. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94,
at 1137 & n.128.
132. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1137. The contempt power had been used during
this period to imprison offending newspaper reporters. Id.; see also W. ANSON, THE LAW AND
CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION 161-64 (5th ed. 1922) (contempt power privilege).
133. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1137; see supra note 85.
134. See supra notes 106-22 and accompanying text.
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ence 135 and suits initiated by private individuals. 136 The Court has concluded

that the clause provides absolute immunity "from executive and judicial
over137
sight that realistically threatens to control

. .

. [legislative] conduct."

To function independently, the legislature, at a minimum, must be free

138
from any pressures that threaten the "integrity of the legislative process."'

The Supreme Court has been extremely sensitive, in defining the scope of speech
or debate immunity, to the kinds of coercive influences that might cause legislators to modify their official behavior. The Court has identified several species of
coercive pressure that warrant the absolute prohibition of the clause: "intimidation by the executive,"

139

"accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary," 14°

and "the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial."' 14 1 Despite varied
characterizations of the interests at stake, it appears that in every case in which
the Court has held the speech or debate clause privilege applicable, the Court

was responding to a perceived threat to the integrity of the legislative process,
resulting from either the intimidation of individual legislators or interference
with ongoing congressional activity.142
135. See, eg., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975); United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966).
136. See, eg., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881) (action for false imprisonment brought by private citizen jailed for
contempt of Congress).
The Court's failure to distinguish between executive interference with legislative activity and
private civil actions seeking redress for the violation of individual rights has been criticized severely.
See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1113.
137. Gravel v. United States; 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972); see also United States v. Helstoski, 442
U.S. 477, 491-92 (1979) (purpose of clause is to prevent intrusion by Executive and Judiciary into
legislative activities) (quoting Gravel); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491,
502 (1975) (clause ensures that Congress may perform its constitutional functions independently);
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311, 316 (1973) (clause prevents "intimidation of legislators by the
Executive or 'a possibly hostile judiciary' "); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507, 516
(1972) (clause protects "integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual
legislators"); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 503, 505 (1969) (clause "insures that legislators
are free to represent the interest of their constituents" without risk of being taken to court); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967) (legislators should not be subject to burden of defense);
United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179-81 (1966) (clause ensures "independence of the legislature"); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75 (1951) (clause essential for legislators' exercise of
free speech); McSurely v. McClellan, 535 F.2d 1277, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (clause intended to
maintain "independence and integrity" of legislative branch), cert. dismissed, 438 U.S. 189 (1978); cf.
Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808) (interpreting state constitution) ("These privileges are thus
secured, not with the intention of protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit,
but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of
their office without fear of prosecution, civil or criminal.").
138. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507, 517 (1972).
139. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966).
140. Id.;seealso Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975) (judicial
power over legislators threatens legislative independence).
141. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (analogizing common-law state legislative
immunity to the speech or debate clause privilege). Because Tenney did not involve a claim of
speech or debate clause privilege, its discussion of the clause is dictum.
142. See, e-g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972). The Court saw "independence of individual legislators" as the means by which to achieve the public good of protecting the
"integrity of the legislative process." Id. The Court explicitly noted that this protection was not for
"the personal or private benefit" of individual members. Id.
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In United States v. Johnson 143 the Court considered whether the speech or
debate clause protected a member of Congress from criminal prosecution for
making a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives, favorable to certain private banks, in exchange for a sum of money. 14 4 Although the speech
itself had not been admitted into evidence, the trial court had permitted extensive questioning concerning the authorship of the speech and the reason for including certain sentences.145 Reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held
that during the course of a prosecution, inquiry into the motives of legislators for
such conduct violated the speech or debate clause. 146 The Court noted that the
privilege serves as "an important protection of the independence and integrity of
the legislature," as well as serving "the additional function of reinforcing the
separation of powers."' 47
The Johnson Court was concerned primarily with protecting the legislature
from executive-initiated prosecution 148 and from the judiciary's power to determine and impose liability. 149 The Court's sensitivity to separation of powers
principles prompted its proscription of judicial inquiry into congressional motive
in these circumstances. As if to underscore this point, the Court noted that such
inquiry might be permissible in a prosecution under a narrowly drawn statute
enacted by Congress to regulate the conduct of its own members.' 50
Since Johnson the Supreme Court consistently has concluded that the
speech or debate clause provides members of Congress with absolute immunity
143. 383 U.S. 169 (1966). Johnson was the first criminal case involving the speech or debate
clause that the Court considered.
144. Id. at 171. Johnson had been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964) (conspiracy to
defraud the United States) and 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1964) (conflict of interest).
145. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178.
146. Id. at 180. After reviewing the history of the privilege in England and the United States,
the Court cited Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 110 (1810) in support of this proposition.
Fletcher was the earliest case in which the Court stated that legislative motivation is irrelevant in a
judicial determination of a statute's propriety. Thus, the Court's interpretation of the scope and

nature of the clause was founded at least in part on its earlier resolution of the relevant separation of
powers issues inherent in determining the relevance of legislative motivation. Accordingly, the
Court's new position on the propriety ofjudicial inquiry into legislative motivation suggests the need
for reexamination of the doctrinal basis for an absolute privilege.
The extension in Johnson of the speech or debate privilege from "anything generally done in a
session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it," Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881), to the motivations for such activities has been criticized as "totally
without historical justification." Bradley, supra note 126, at 220.
147. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 179. The Court added: "We see no escape from the conclusion that
such an intensive judicial inquiry, made in the course of a prosecution by the Executive Branch
under a general conspiracy statute, violates the express language of the Constitution and the policies
which underlie it." Id. at 177.
148. The Court noted:
There is little doubt that the instigation of criminal charges against critical or disfavored
legislators by the executive in a judicial forum was the chief fear prompting the long struggle for parliamentary privilege in England and, in the context of the American system of
separation of powers, is the predominate [sic] thrust of the Speech or Debate Clause.
Id. at 182.
149. The Supreme Court declared that the "central role" of the speech or debate clause is "to
prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." Id. at 181, quoted in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975);
Doe v McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972).
150. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 185.
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from prosecution for "legislative acts." 1 5 1 In those cases in which the Court has
found the privilege applicable, it has reiterated its prohibition of inquiry into the
motivation for legislative acts.15 2 When the Court has found the conduct to be
"nonlegislative," prosecution for such conduct has been permitted, as well as the
use of relevant evidence of motive. 153 Thus, the Court permits executive intimi-

dation through prosecution when it will affect only the performance of "nonlegislative" acts.

The Supreme Court also has extended the clause to bar civil damage actions
against legislators. 1 54 In Dombrowski v. Eastland 55 the Court articulated its
151. See, eg., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972) ("[Ihe Speech or Debate
Clause prohibits inquiry only into those things generally said or done in the House or the Senate in
the performance of official duties .
). In Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) the
Court stated:
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the Clause is speech or debate in
either House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach other matters, they must be an
integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution
places within the jurisdiction of either House. As the Court of Appeals put it, the courts
have extended the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate in either House, but
"only when necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations." United States
v. Doe, 455 F.2d, at 760.
Id. at 625. The Court's definition of a "legislative act," however, has narrowed in the years since
Johnson. See supra note 94.
152. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975):
Our cases make clear that in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act we do not
look to the motives alleged to have prompted it . . . . In Brewster we said that "the
Speech or Debate Clause protects against inquiry into acts that occur in the regular course
of the legislative process and into the motivationfor those acts." 408 U.S., at 525 (emphasis
added). And in Tenney v. Brandhove we said that "[t]he claim of an unworthy purpose
does not destroy the privilege." 341 U.S., at 377.
Id. at 508.
153. Courts apparently have not considered whether prosecution for "nonlegislative" activity
might significantly chill "legislative" activity. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1159-63;
see also infra note 184 and accompanying text (The only way to ensure total legislative independence
is to dispose of all judicial checks on congressional action and accord absolute immunity to congressmen for legislative and nonlegislative acts.).
154. See, eg., Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (per curiam); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). In Kilbourn, the first speech or debate case, the Court held members of a
congressional committee immune from a private damage action for an illegal arrest, Interestingly,
the Court did not bar absolutely any inquiry into legislative motive, and even implied that certain
motives---"an utter perversion of [legislative] powers to a criminal purpose"-might render a legislator liable even for a clearly legislative act. Id. at 204-05. That potential liability was refuted, however, by United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying
text.
155. 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (per curiam). In Dombrowski plaintiffs had claimed that the Chairman
of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Eastland, and the
Subcommittee's Chief Counsel, Sourwine, tortiously entered into and participated in a conspiracy
with certain Louisiana officials to seize plaintiffs' property and records in violation of the fourth
amendment. Id. at 83. Louisiana courts had held the searches and arrests illegal because the warrants secured by the police had not been supported by a showing of probable cause. Id. While the
records were in the possession of the Louisiana officials, they were subjected to a subpoena issued in
the name of the Subcommittee, and the records accordingly were transferred into its custody. Dombrowski v. Burbank, 358 F.2d 821, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in partsub nom. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (per curiam). Plaintiffs, asserting that the subpoena was
issued without authority, sought both damages and injunctive relief preventing use by the Subcommittee of the records and requiring their return to plaintiffs. Id. at 822-25. The Court affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint against Senator Eastland, finding that "[t]he record does not contain
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rationale for doing so:
It is the purpose and office of the doctrine of legislative immunity, having its roots as it does in the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution. . . ,that legislators engaged 'in the sphere of legitimate activity'

.. .should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation's

15 6
result but also from the burden of defending themselves.

This broadening of the clause to protect not only against liability, but also
against the burdens of litigation, appeared to one commentator more like an "ad
hoe response to separate attacks on the privilege than like elements of an overacting, comprehensive theory of the Clause." 157 In fact, the Court consistently

has protected the legislature from those influences that it perceived as sufficiently strong to subvert independent action.15 8 Although the potential threat
to legislative independence is far more apparent in criminal prosecutions, the
burdens of defending against civil litigation and possible damage awards are sufficiently burdensome to affect a legislator's behavior.159
In Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund 160 the Court held that the
clause absolutely protected against civil suits seeking purely injunctive relief. In

Eastland, members of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security issued a
subpoena to a bank, directing it to produce all records pertaining to the account
of the United States Servicemen's Fund (USSF).1 61 Before the bank complied,
the USSF sued members of the Subcommittee and its chief counsel, seeking to
enjoin enforcement of the subpoena. 162 Finding that defendants' action fell
within the "legitimate legislative sphere,"' 16 3 the Court concluded that the
speech or debate clause privilege provided "complete immunity" for both the
senators and the chief counsel. 164 The Court also stated that it would not inquire into whether the subpoena was motivated by an illicit purpose or whether
evidence of his involvement in any activity that could result in liability." Dombrowski, 387 U.S. at
84. Citing Tenney and Kilbourn, however, the Court reversed the dismissal as to chief counsel
Sourwine, noting that the privilege was "less absolute, although applicable, when applied to [legislative] officers or employees." Id. at 85. Accordingly, postenforcement review of a congressional subpoena was permitted through an action against a legislative employee.
156. Dombrowski, 387 U.S. at 84-85.
157. Comment, The Scope of Immunity for Legislatorsand Their Employees, 77 YALE L.J. 366,
382 (1967). The comment notes the Court's departure in Dombrowski from the rationale offered
only a year-and-a-half earlier in Johnson, that the "predominant thrust" of the clause was to afford
immunity from "instigation of criminal charges against critical or disfavored legislators by the executive in a judicial forum." Johnson, 383 U.S. at 182 (emphasis added). The author suggests that the
sudden shift in rationale may be attributed to the fact that Dombrowskiwas a civil suit rather than a
criminal prosecution.
158. See Dombrowski, 387 U.S. at 84-85.
159. The potential threat to legislative independence from civil actions brought by individuals is
so much less than in other contexts that some commentators have called for the abrogation of immunity in such cases, at least when suit is brought to redress an alleged violation of constitutional
rights. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1171-77.
160. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
161. Id. at 494.
162. Id. at 494-95. Apparently, the bank never was served with the subpoena. Id. at 494. At
least partially for that reason, the bank did not participate in the action. Id. at 495 n.5.
163. Id. at 505-06. The Court determined that the investigation of the USSF was "related to and
in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress." Id. at 505.
164. Id. at 507.
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16 5
its enforcement would infringe on plaintiffs' first amendment rights.

Eastland did not involve legislator liability for damages. 166 The Court instead was concerned that judicial review of the subpoena might disrupt the legislative process. The Court suggested that the demands of litigation could divert
the attention of the members from their legislative work. 167 To the extent that

the Court desires to protect legislators from time-consuming litigation, the
Court could be expected to interpret the clause broadly to prohibit all such dis-

tractions. The Court, however, has not attempted to protect legislators absolutely from incursions into their time. 168 Furthermore, the Court could not
have been concerned that legislators would forego certain activities for fear of
being sued and thereby distracted from their legislative work. Legislators never

would be coerced into foregoing activities if the most that a suit could achieve
was an injunction against that conduct because they could voluntarily stop their
actions when suit was brought and avoid any distracting litigation.
More fundamentally, the Court sought to avoid interference with ongoing
legislative activity that necessarily would result from preenforcement review 6 9
of a congressional subpeona.170 This preenforcement review posed the more sig165. Id. at 508-11. The Court, however, did not foreclose all possibility of judicial investigation
of legislative motive, and did not hold that such review in and of itself violated the speech or debate
clause. Rather, the Court's solicitude towards legislators' motives stemmed from its protection of
legislative independence. To the extent legislators' motives provide a potential basis for criminal or
civil liability, or for judicial interference with ongoing legislative activity, they are privileged from
inquiry. Id. at 510-11. In these contexts, there would be no other relevance to such a probe.
166. Id. at 496.
167. Id. at 511.
168. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; infra notes 177-81, 184, 298-302 and accompanying text.
169. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 509 n.16. The Supreme Court has justified its refusal to review the
validity of congressional subpoenas prior to enforcement in part because of the possibility of doing so
in contempt proceedings. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1971); Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-26 (1940). When review in such proceedings has been unavailable,
the Court has recognized the need for some preenforcement review, at least to determine whether the
investigation is pursuant to a legitimate legislative purpose. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501 n.14;
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691-92 (1974); Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 12-13

(1918).
170. The Eastland Court's overriding concern with protecting ongoing legislative activity from
judicial interference is evidenced further by a conflict between the majority and concurring opinions.
Justice Marshall's concurrence emphasizes that the speech or debate clause would not shield judicial
review of the congressional subpoena in Eastland if proper parties were being sued against whom
appropriate relief could be granted, such as legislative functionaries acting at the direction of the
subcommittee, or the party upon whom the subpoena was served. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 513-18
(Marshall, J., concurring). On the other hand, the majority opinion distinguished its prior cases that
had permitted judicial review of legislative action through suits against legislative functionaries. Id.
at 507-11. See infira notes 177-81 and accompanying text. In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1881), the Court had dismissed a damage action for wrongful false imprisonment against members
of Congress but allowed it against the Sergeant at Arms who carried out the congressional directive
to arrest plaintiff. Id. at 205. The Eastlandmajority argued that review of the arrest in Kilbourn
was permissible only because the arrest was not "'essential to legislating.'" Eastland, 421 U.S. at
508 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621 (1972)). The majority apparently considered the issuance of a routine subpoena to be "essential to legislating" and thus immune from judicial review, regardless of the identity of defendants. See id.
Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's characterization of Kilbourn. See id. at 517
(Marshall, J., concurring). Prior cases had established that the resolution authorizing the arrest in
Kilbourn "'was clearly legislative in nature.'" Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 315 n.9 (1973)
(quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972)). Thus, the decision to allow suit against
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nificant separation of powers issue:

This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial interference may
cause. A legislative inquiry has been frustrated for nearly five years
during which the Members and their aide have been obliged to devote
time to consulation with their counsel concerning the litigation, and
have been distracted from the purpose of their inquiry. The Clause
was written to prevent the need to be confronted with such questioning
171

The Eastland Court distinquished Watkins v. United States172 and Barenblatt v. United States,173 both of which had involved criminal contempt prosecutions in which defendants had raised their first amendment rights to justify their

refusals to answer congressional inquiries. In neither case had the separation of
powers doctrine barred the judiciary's obligation to review congressional action. 174 As the Court in Eastlandnoted, however, these cases had not involved
attempts to "impede" any ongoing legislative activity. 175 Any interference with

congressional action had occurred prior to judicial intervention and it had been
1 7 6
Congress itself that had sought "the aid of the judiciary to enforce its

will.'

Conversely, judicial interference with the pending operations of Congress represents a far greater intrusion on legislative independence. In circumstances in

which the courts' commitment to review legislative action is not delineated manifestly, the speech or debate clause appropriately may restrain such judicial

oversight.
These cases make clear that the speech or debate clause absolutely prohibits
review of and inquiry into the propriety of legislative acts or the motives of

members of Congress in civil damage and injunctive actions against them.
Often, such suits against members of Congress have been the only means available for testing the validity of legislative actions, and in those instances the
Court has concluded that the speech or debate clause precludes all review.
the Sergeant at Arms had rested not on the fact that the arrest was inessential to the legislative
process but rather on the fact that the speech or debate clause could not be used to deny judicial
review of the arrest. See supra note 99.
It is not entirely clear from the majority opinion in Eastlandwhether the Court considered the
Kilbourn arrest "inessential" because it amounted to enforcement rather than legislative activity, or
because the current activity of the legislature had concluded. The underlying question that the
Court seemed to address was whether review of the congressional action, in a suit against either the
legislators themselves or their employees, threatened the legislative processes. In that context, a
significant difference exists between reviewing completed legislative action and enjoining ongoing
legislative activity. If this was not the concern of the Court in Eastland,it should have been. Even if
an action challenging the validity of a legislative subpoena was permitted against parties other than
members of Congress, legislators most likely would be just as involved in defending that action as if
they were the named defendants themselves; the resultant interference with ongoing activities would
be identical. See, e.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Justice Department brought action to enjoin telephone company from complying with congressional subpoena and members of Congress intervened as defendants on their own motion).
171. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 511.
172. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
173. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
174. The speech or debate clause, however, never was invoked in an attempt to bar such review
in Barenblatt.
175. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 509 n.16.
176. Id.
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When other means of reviewing congressional actions have existed, the
Court explicitly has permitted inquiry into the validity of legislative acts. Thus,
the Court has approved the review of legislative actions in damage suits against
legislative employees-other than close legislative aides or agents-even when
these functionaries simply had executed the will of Congress. 177 For example, in
Powell v. McCormack,t 78 Adam Clayton Powell challenged members of the
House of Representatives, the Sergeant at Arms, the Clerk of the House, and the
Doorkeeper for actions excluding him from the House. The Supreme Court
held that the speech or debate clause required dismissal of the suit against House
members, but permitted review of the propriety of the House's actions in the suit
against the named House employees.' 79 The Court may have drawn this distinction because of the unseemliness of suits against legislators-to allow the
lawmakers to "save face." There is little indication, however, that reviewing
legislative actions through a suit against a legislative employee is significantly
less intimidating to the legislative process than would be a suit against a legislator. If legislators want to defend the validity of their actions, they will do so
vigorously despite the identity of the nominal defendant. Alternatively, the
Court may have felt that separation of powers principles requiredreview of legislative acts and therefore may have sought to create a means to circumvent the
absolute immunity accorded legislators. The Court hinted at this reasoning in
Powell,180 which did not foreclose the possibility that an action could be maintained solely against members of Congress when no agents participated in the
challenged action and no other remedy was available.' 81
The Court's interpretation of the speech or debate clause privilege therefore
reflects a consistent effort to reconcile the conflicting needs for judicial review
and legislative independence. To the extent that certain means of review are too
intimidating or interfere too much with legislative independence, the clause, as
an aspect of the doctrine of separation of powers, prohibits judicial inquiry.
When the intrusion on legislative autonomy is reduced to some degree' 82 by the
particular method of review, however, the Court has not interpreted the speech
or debate clause to bar inquiry. Thus, the Court's differentiation between legislative and nonlegislative action, and between legislators and functionaries, has
allowed it to review congressional actions 183 while accommodating legislators'
177. In four of the eight speech or debate cases decided by the Court, legislative employees were
found liable to suit although members of Congress were held immune. See Doe v. McMillan, 412
U.S. 306 (1973); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82
(1967); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
178. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
179. Id. at 503-06.
180. Id. at 506 n.26. But see Eastland,421 U.S. 491.
181. Powell, 395 U.S. at 506 n.26.
182. Judicial review has not been permitted every time that the threat to legislative independence
has been mitigated in some way. For example, interference with legislative autonomy is somewhat
less when a close legislative aide is sued rather than a legislator himself. The Court, however, has
found them equally protected by the speech or debate clause. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606, 616 (1972) ("[For the purpose of construing the [speech or debate] privilege a Member
and his aide are to be 'treated as one.' ").
183. By restricting the clause's immunity to legislative action, the Court allows review not only
of all nonlegislative activities of members of Congress but also of legislative acts through permissible
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needs for independence. These distinctions established inroads into the full protection of legislative autonomy that recognition of an absolute legislative immunity would achieve. 184 Additionally, the speech or debate clause does not
prevent judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation through a suit
against the noncongressional officials responsible for enforcing it, despite the degree to which such an inquiry can chill legislative autonomy. 185 In these instances in which the Court has determined that judicial review is appropriate,
the speech or debate clause has not barred what appears to be "questioning"
about legislative activity. The Court therefore has made it clear that complete
legislative independence must be subordinate to maintaining judicial checks on
congressional action. Given that the Court has decided that such review is
proper in some circumstances, whether the speech or debate clause plays any
further role in limiting the Court's inquiry must be considered.
The speech or debate clause privilege has an evidentiary aspect,' 8 6 which
supplements the clause's substantive immunity in protecting legislative independence. 1 87 Evidence of legislative acts could not be admitted to establish criminal
or civil liability for other acts, or the legislative process would be undermined as
88
effectively as if liability had been imposed for the legislative acts themselves.'
Mere disclosure of such acts, however, is not necessarily offensive to the
clause. '

89

suits against functionaries. Only when a functionary engages in activity "not essential to legislating," Eastland,421 U.S. at 509, is the underlying congressional action open to judiciai questioning.
For example, in Kilbourn the constitutionality of the House's decision to arrest Kilbourn could be
reviewed because the arrest by the Sergeant at Arms was not essential to legislating. See Kilboum v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 196-98 (1881). In this respect, the functionary doctrine merely restates the
Court's limitation of immunity to legislative acts; as the Court suggested in Gravel, if the legislators
themselves executed an unconstitutional arrest, the speech or debate clause would not protect them.
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 621. Conversely, if legislative employees engage in activities that are essential to
legislating, such as typing a subpoena or printing the CongressionalRecord, the Court would not
permit judicial review of the underlying Congressional actions in a suit against the functionaries.
When a functionary performs an act that is not essential to legislating, however, both the nonessential activity and the underlying congressional decision may be reviewed in a suit against the functionary. Thus, the Court may be concluding that review of purely legislative activities, even when in a
suit against low level employees, still might pose too great a threat to legislative independence.
184. As Professor Tribe also has noted, L. TRIBE, AMEmCAN CoNSTrrTIONAL LAW § 5-18, at
296 n.23 (1978), the potential threat to legislative independence would disappear only when legislators were accorded absolute immunity for legislative as well as nonlegislative acts. As ABSCAM
recently has demonstrated, the executive branch can interfere effectively with the independence of
select legislators through prosecution for nonlegislative acts.
185. See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169
(1966); United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973); United
States v. Garmatz, 445 F. Supp. 54 (D. Md. 1977).
187. See supra note 186.
188. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 487-89 (1979).
189. Rather, it is the use of evidence of legislative acts in imposing civil or criminal liability
against legislators that violates the privilege. Cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 597
(3d Cir. 1978) (evidentiary privilege not designed to foster secrecy in legislative process; democratic
system has only limited tolerance for secrecy); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Cianfrani), 563 F.2d
577, 584 (3d Cir. 1977) (evidentiary privilege frees legislative debate and action not by preventing
disclosure, for most protected acts already are on public record, but by preventing evidentiary use of
legislative acts in imposition of criminal liability). But see Note, Evidentiary Implications of the
Speech orDebate Clause, 88 YALE L.J. 1280, 1286 n.30 (1979), which contends that the evidentiary
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The evidentiary privilege first was announced in United States v. Johnson. 190 Johnson held that a member of Congress could not be prosecuted for
either a legislative act or for the motivations behind such an act, and further that
any prosecution "dependent on such inquiries necessarily contravenes the
Speech or Debate Clause." 191 In Johnson the motives underlying a legislative
act were relevant only as a basis for criminal liability. The Court held this inquiry impermissible-both when the legislative acts (or the motives behind
them) are the gravamen of the charge 192 and when they are used solely as evidence to prove some other illegal act. 19 3 In either case, requiring that legislators
justify their legislative acts and motivations to escape criminal liability would
194
chill legislative independence.
This view of the evidentiary privilege as an adjunct to the clause's grant of
substantive immunity has been followed by the Supreme Court in a number of
similar cases. In United States v. Brewster' 95 the Court reaffirmed that the
clause precluded "any showing" of a legislative act or of the motive underlying it
as evidence of a crime. 1 96 Later, in United States v. Helstoskit 97 the Court held
that the "past legislative acts" 198 of defendant Congressman "may not be shown
for any purpose in a prosecution" for bribery. 199 These cases reflect the Court's
concern that the mere use of evidence of legislative acts or motives in a criminal
prosecution against a legislator poses as great a threat to legislative independence as would allowing prosecution for the content of the acts. Thus, when the
speech or debate clause bars review of legislative activity, it also protects evidence of the activity.
In each of the cases in which the Supreme Court developed the evidentiary
aspect of the speech or debate clause, the privilege barred introduction of evi2°°
dence as a basis for criminal sanctions. Similarly, in Gravel v. United States
the legislator claiming the privilege was subject to potential criminal liability.
Senator Gravel, as chairman of the Public Buildings and Grounds Subcommitprivilege, in addition to insulating the legislative process by acting as an exclusionary rule, provides a

guarantee of confidentiality. Although confidentiality is a legitimate legislative interest that should
be protected, it should not be protected by the absolute strictures of the speech or debate clause. See
infra notes 285-96 and accompanying text.
190. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
191. Id. at 184-85.
192. However reprehensible such [legislative] conduct may be, we believe the Speech or
Debate Clause extends at least so far as to prevent it from being made the basis of a criminal charge against a member of Congress of conspiracy to defraud the United States by
impeding the due discharge of government functions.
Id. at 180.
193. Id. at 176-77.
194. Id. at 176-77, 180-81, 184-85.
195. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
196. Id. at 527.
197. 442 U.S. 477 (1979).
198. Id. at 489. The Court stated the "it is clear from the language of the Clause that protection
extends only to an act that has already been performed." Id. at 490. In contrast, "a promise to
introduce a bill" or "[a] promise to deliver a speech, to vote, or to solicit other votes at some future
date" is not a legislative act protected by the privilege. Id.

199. Id. at 487-88.
200. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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tee, had convened a night meeting and had inserted the entire forty-seven
volumes of the Pentagon Papers201 into the Congressional Record. Shortly
thereafter, Gravel and an aide arranged to have Beacon Press republish the classified study from the CongressionalRecord. A grand jury, investigating potential
criminal liability for the release and publication of the study, subpoenaed
Gravel's aide to testify. Gravel intervened to quash the subpoena, and the
Supreme Court, on appeal, held that although the privilege did not bar the aide's

testimony, it did limit

2

it. 02

Gravel's aide was required to answer questions

before the grand jury as long as the questions did not require testimony about or
203
impugn a legislative act.

Gravel appears to conclude 2° 4 that members of Congress cannot be ques-

tioned elsewhere than in Congress about their legislative acts or motivations:
"We have no doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to answer-either in

terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from prosecution-for the
events that occurred at the subcommittee meeting. '20 5 The Court never has
taken a literal approach to its interpretation of the speech or debate clause, however, and was not doing so in Gravel.20 6 Rather, the Court has used a functional
201. Id. at 609. The Pentagon Papers were a study officially titled, "History of the United States
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy," and was classified by the Defense Department as
"Top Secret Sensitive."
202. Id. at 627-29. The Court concluded that the scope of the privilege for congressional aides
was coextensive with that enjoyed by members of Congress themselves. Distinguishing Kilbourn,
Dombrowski, and Powell, the Court stated:
None of these three cases adopted the simple proposition that immunity was unavailable to congressional or committee employees because they were not Representatives or
conduct that
Senators; rather, immunity was unavailable because they engaged in illegal
was not entitled to Speech or Debate Clause protection. . . . In each case, protecting the
rights of others may have to some extent frustrated a planned or completed legislative act;
but relief could be afforded without proof of a legislative act or the motives or purposes
underlying such an act. No threat to legislative independence was posed, and Speech or
Debate Clause protection did not attach.
Id. at 620-21.
203. Id. at 621-22. The Court decided that although Gravel's conduct at the committee hearing
constituted legislative activity, id. at 624, both the private republication of the Pentagon Papers and
their acquisition by Gravel's aide did not. Id. at 625-27.
204. Some commentators have interpreted Gravel as holding that members of Congress may not
be questioned elsewhere. See, eg., Kaye, supra note 85, at 549-51.
205. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616.
206. An analysis of the literal language of the clause might even lead to the opposite conclusion-that it protects legislators only from suit and not from questioning about legislative activity.
The speech or debate clause states: "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl.1. Putting the preposition "for" in its
usual place produces: "they shall not be questionedfor any speech or debate." The phrase "questioned for" does not mean merely asking a question of a person; such terms as "about," "concerning," "relative to," and "pertaining to," would be more appropriate to convey that meaning. More
importantly, the expression "question for," now rare, commonly had been used at the time the
Constitution was drafted to mean: "to examine judicially: hence to call to account, challenge, accuse (of)." OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2390 (1984). The Oxford English Dictionary actually
cites the speech or debate clause as an example of this meaning of "question for." Moreover, the
word "question," with regard to judicial examination, at this time connoted the use of torture in
conducting the examination. Id. ("1761: Hume, Hist. Eng. III, li. 110. He urged too, that Felton
should be put to the question in order to extort from him a discovery of his accomplices."). The
phrase was used in 1801 in Trinidad, an English colony, to order the judicial torture of Luisa Calderon, a slave: "Appliquez la question a Luisa Calderon" ("Apply the question to Luisa Calderon.").
See V.S. NAIPUL, THE Loss OF EL DoRADo 205 (1969). Thus, the Framers of the clause may never
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approach, expanding the literal protection of the clause when necessary to en-

sure legislative autonomy,2 °7 and permitting judicial "questioning" of speech or
debate when the purpose of the clause was not found to foreclose judicial review.208 In Gravel the Court's real concern, as in Johnson, Brewster, and Hel-

stoski, was that evidence of legislative activity, for which a legislator is immune
from prosecution, should not be used to establish criminal liability for any other
act. In all four cases, the inquiry into legislative acts and motivations might
have provided a basis for finding a legislator or legislative aide criminally liable,
a finding barred by the clause's substantive immunity. 20 9 As the Court stated in
Gravel: "Having established that neither the Senator nor [his aide] is subject to

liability for what occurred at the subcommittee hearing, we perceive no basis for
inquiry of either [Gravel's aide] or third parties on this subject."'2 10
In a footnote the Court noted that the occurrence of at least one legislative

act at the subcommittee hearing-publication of the Pentagon Papers- might
"prove material" to the grand jury's investigation.2 11 The Court then concluded, however, that the fact of publication could be established by the public
record of the hearing. 2 12 Moreover, the footnote suggested that third-party wit-

nesses could be interrogated about legislative activities of members of Congress
during grand jury investigations or criminal trials of nonlegislators. 213 Thus,

when evidence of legislative conduct is relevant to some permissible inquiry, the
speech or debate clause does not prohibit completely its admissibility. Gravel,
however, does not establish clearly the extent to which such evidence should be
admissible. Presumably, Gravel does not indicate that evidence of legislative ac-

tivities should be used freely whenever it is material to a permissible inquiry,
since such an interpretation would contradict Brewster, Johnson, and Helhave intended it to preclude mere judicial questioning. Rather, it appears from the language of the
clause in light of its history that they intended the clause to prohibit certain intrusive means of
reviewing legislative acts, but not to preclude questioning when legislative decisions otherwise are
reviewable.
207. As the Gravel Court noted: "[P]rior cases have plainly not taken a literalistic approach in
applying the privilege." Gravel, 408 U.S. at 617. Thus, in Kilbourn the Court expanded the definition of "speech or debate" to encompass other kinds of legislative activity, and in Gravel, the Court
applied the clause to close legislative aides as well as members of Congress.
208. See, eg., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82
(1967); Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
209. The intimidation inherent in being questioned before a grand jury about legislative activity
violated the clause's "fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to control his conduct as a legislator." Gravel, 408 U.S. at 618.
Grand jury inquiry threatens legislative independence not only because evidence of legislative activity may lead to the discovery of nonlegislative activity for which members and their aides could be
indicted, which may pose fifth amendment problems, but also because consideration of evidence of
legislative activity by a grand jury might wrongly encourage it to indict for nonlegislative activity, if
it regarded the legislative conduct as undesirable.
210. Id. at 629 n.18.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. The Court prohibited third-party testimony about legislative activity in Gravel, presumably
because the only legislative act relevant to third-party criminal acts was publication of the Pentagon
Papers at the subcommittee hearing, which could be proven by the public record. Id. The Court
may have been suggesting a preference for modes of proof of legislative conduct less threatening to
legislative independence.
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stoski.

Thus, the Court must be distinguishing between the use of evidence of

legislative conduct that threatens legislative independence and use that does not.
Evidence of legislative activity could be used when material to permissible in-

quiries about third parties or at least third-party crimes, but not in inquiries
about legislators themselves. 2 15 When evidence of legislative conduct is used for

inquiries about third parties, neither a legislator nor a legislative act is being
"questioned"; no legislative activity is being justified to another governmental

branch. Rather, the mere fact of occurrence of the legislative act is being used
potentially to impose liability on a third party. Of course, using evidence of

legislative conduct in this manner still may chill the independence of legislators.2 16 When that is a real possibility, the speech or debate clause should bar

the use of such evidence even against third parties.
In the same footnote, the Gravel Court also appeared to distinguish between
the testimony of third parties concerning legislative deliberations, which it

deemed permissible, and the testimony of members of Congress (or their close
aides), which it implied is not permissible. 217 The Court's reference is too ambiguous and off-hand to merit a lengthy discussion of its meaning and reasoning.
To the extent that a prohibition on the questioning of legislators about legislative

conduct is limited to those circumstances when the legislative acts themselves
are not reviewable, however, the distinction would seem to be appropriate. The

nonreviewability of legislative deliberations justifies restrictions on the use of
evidence of congressional deliberations, as well as limitations on the source of

such evidence. When legislative acts or motives are not themselves reviewable,
much greater restrictions on the use and source of evidence of the acts are justi-

fied. Requiring legislators to testify about legislative conduct can seriously
threaten legislative independence, 218 and is not justified when courts are forbid214. It is even possible that evidence of Gravel's legislative activity might have been material to
the grand jury's investigation concerning his nonlegislative activity of preparing for the subcommittee hearing and republishing the Pentagon Papers privately. When the Court in Gravel stated that
the fact of publication at the hearing could be proven by the public record, it did not state explicitly
whether such use was limited only to possible third-party crimes; that appeared, however, to be the
Court's intent.
215. The use of evidence of legislative conduct as a basis for civil liability for a legislator's nonlegislative actions also should be precluded under the speech or debate clause as overly intrusive.
See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
216. See infra notes 221-34 and accompanying text.
217. After stating that third-party witnesses might not be excluded totally from testifying about
the legislative acts of Congress' members in grand jury investigations and criminal trials of third
parties, the Court noted:
As for inquiry of [Gravel's aide] about third-party crimes, we are quite sure that the District Court has ample power to keep the grand jury proceedings within proper bounds and
to foreclose improvident harassment and fishing expeditions into the affairs of a Member of
Congress that are no proper concern of the grand jury or the Executive Branch.
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 629 n.18. It is less than obvious that the Court was trying to draw a principled
distinction between the questioning of legislators and that of nonlegislators concerning legislative
activity. The terms of the protective order that the Court fashioned suggest that it was not drawing
this distinction in the grand jury investigation at issue; that order forbade questioning both Gravel's
aide and third-party witnesses about legislative conduct. The juxtaposition of the two sentences,
however, implies that the Court was noting some difference in propriety between the two sources of
evidence.
218. Despite the relevance of evidence of legislative conduct to third-party crimes and despite
the substantive immunity of legislators themselves, grand jury inquiry into legislative activity implies

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

den by the speech or debate clause from "questioning" or reviewing the legislative conduct in question. When the action and motives of legislators are

independently reviewable by the judiciary, however, courts are obligated to inquire into and "question" legislative deliberations, despite the resulting intrusion
on legislative autonomy, and without the same restrictions. 2 19
These decisions make clear that a member's legislative conduct and motives
for such conduct may not be the basis of a criminal judgment against him or an
investigation of him. The Court, however, never has faced whether the speech
or debate privilege protects a legislator from testifying about legislative deliberations when he faces mere civil liability, 220 or when evidence of legislative activity
is relevent to an inquiry concerning third parties. 221 A number of lower courts
have applied the privilege in such situations, concluding in several libel actions
that the privilege protects nonparty legislators from being compelled to testify
regarding their legislative conduct. 2 22 In Miller v. TransamericanPress,Inc.,223
for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the privilege protects a legislator from revealing his sources of information. 224
The court in Miller correctly reasoned that even though the legislator faced no
liability, the possibility of such public exposure could chill speech and debate on
the floor.225 These decisions follow the rationale of Gravel: when legislative
conduct itself is not reviewable, despite its materiality to third-party controversies, inquiry about such conduct should be allowed only when legislative independence would not be threatened. 226 When the court determines that judicial
a connection between those acts and criminal activity. Thus, even ifa legislator is granted immunity
or waives his fifth amendment rights prior to testifying before a grand jury, the threat to legislative
independence nevertheless might justify invocation of the speech or debate privilege. See United
States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 492 (1979).
219. See infra notes 253-60 and accompanying text.
220. Lower federal courts have applied the privilege in civil suits to bar inquiry into the legislative activities of party-defendant members of Congress. See, e.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d
1277 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert dismissed,438 U.S. 189 (1978). McSurely did not discuss explicitly the
evidentiary privilege, but instead applied the underlying substantive immunity from civil suit for
various legislative actions. The court's decision to prohibit inquiry into legislative acts correctly
parallelled the Supreme Court's criminal case decisions such as Johnson and Brewster. The court
nevertheless allowed a suit and thus discovery against a Senator and his aides for allegedly tortious
nonlegislative acts. It ignored the issue whether inquiry into legislative acts was permissible to help
establish civil liability for nonlegislative acts. Civil liability poses an obvious threat to legislative
independence. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text. Thus, to allow evidence of legislative
acts to form a basis for civil liability, even for other nonlegislative acts, arguably violates the clause.
221. Although the Gravel Court was not faced with the issue, the footnote discussed supra note
217 appeared to address it.
222. See, eg., Miller v Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1983) (congressman as
nonparty deponent in libel suit); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 527 F. Supp. 676 (D.D.C. 1981) (congressional staff as nonparty deponents in libel suit); Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (ex-congressman nonparty to libel suit); Smith v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 14 F.R.D. 514
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (congresswoman plaintiff in libel action).
223. 709 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1983).
224. Id. at 530-31.
225. The court stated: "The Congressman might censor his remarks or forego them entirely to
protect the privacy of his sources, if he contemplated that he could be forced to reveal their identity
in a lawsuit." Id. at 531.
226. The court's responsibility for providing a forum for the litigation of common.law torts also
is arguably less critical than its obligation to review the constitutionality of enacted legislation.
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inquiry into legislative activity will chill legislative deliberations,2 27 evidence of
such activity should be barred, 2 28 and the compelled testimony of legislators
229
prohibited.

At least one lower court also has held that legislators cannot be compelled
to honor a subpoena duces tecum from a defendant in a criminal trial for the
transcript of testimony, taken during legislative activity, of a prosecution witness. 230 In United States v. Ehrlichman,23 1 the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, fearing that the requested transcript would reveal con227. Since the legislator in Miller was no longer in office, the court was not concerned about
preventing distractions from legislative duties. Rather, the court found that the inquiry itself
threatened legislative independence. Id. at 528-31.
228. Conversely, when legislative activity is relevant to third-party litigation and would not be
intimidating to legislative autonomy, it arguably should be permitted. Since compelled testimony
always is intrusive to some degree, however, and this issue will arise only when a legislator feels
sufficiently threatened to claim the privilege the court perhaps should not compel a legislator's testimony about legislative activity unless the legislative activity itself is subject to review.
229. On the other hand, because the degree of intimidation in these cases is much less than when
a legislator is subject to criminal or even civil liability, the evidentiary privilege as so construed
arguably overprotects the interests of legislative independence. The Gravel Court held the threat to
legislative independence resulting from the compelled revelation of confidential sources subordinate
to the need to trace the leak of highly classified materials. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 628 & n.17. The
Court termed the acquisition of the classified materials "preparation for the subcommittee hearing,"
which it concluded was nonlegislative conduct and thus not protected. Id. at 629. Since then, and
with no attempt to distinguish Gravel, the Court consistently has held that the acquisition of information pertinent to potential legislation or investigation is legislative activity. See, eg., Eastland v.
United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313
(1973). Miller sought to distinguish Gravel on the ground that in Gravel the source's revelation of
the information constituted a crime. It is difficult, however, to see, how characterizing a third
party's actions as illegal affects whether the congressman's receipt of the information was legislative
or nonlegislative conduct. Regardless of whether the third-party source's revelations are illegal, the
compelled revelation of a legislator's source presumably would chill legislative independence to some
extent. The Court's failure to explain satisfactorily the disparate treatment in Gravel suggests that
the Gravel Court was responding in an ad hoc manner to what was perceived as a heightened need
for the evidence and the desire to discourage illegal activity.
Moreover, in distinguishing between legislative and nonlegislative activity, the Supreme Court
and lower courts have ignored the threat to legislative independence that results from denying applicability of the privilege to nonlegislative acts. Commentators have noted that the Court's narrowing
of the definition of legislative activity to some extent threatens the legislative process. See Reinstein
& Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1149. Th Court's efforts to distinguish between the two types of
activity, however, is at least intellectually consistent with its functional approach to the clause. Nevertheless, the Court has applied the functional approach inconsistently by failing to recognize that an
inquiry into nonlegislative conduct can significantly chill legislative activity. For example, if Senator
Gravel knew that he might have to reveal his source, he might have refrained from the legitimate
legislative activity of placing the information in the CongressionalRecord.
230. Whether congressional documents are privileged from disclosure under the speech or debate clause depends on the same general considerations as the legislator's testimonial privilege. See
infra notes 275-89 and accompanying text.
231. 389 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). In Ehrlichman defendant G. Gordon Liddy sought transcripts of prosecution witnesses
who had appeared before a congressional subcommittee to gain access to potentially exculpatory
material. Liddy contended that the subcommittee's refusal to obey the subpoena was a violation of
the Jenck's Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment. Liddy was convicted and on appeal the court failed to
address the privilege issue, concluding that Congress' refusal to produce the subpoenaed transcript
was harmless error in any event. Liddy, 542 F.2d at 83. The conflict between congressional privilege
and the sixth amendment rights of a criminal defendant is beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally Note, A Defendant'sRight to Inspect PretrialCongressional Testimony of Government Witnesses, 80 YALE L.J. 1388 (1971) (discussion of conflict between congressional privilege and sixth
amendment rights).
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gressional "deliberative and communicative processes," concluded that production of the document would violate the speech or debate clause. 232 As in the
libel cases discussed above, the rationale for this decision appears to be that the
exposure of legislative deliberations to judicial scrutiny may well menace legislative independence. To the extent that the transcript of the testimony before
Congress would reveal legislative deliberations that could threaten legislative autonomy, the case comports with those above. If the mere disclosure of the transcript would not expose legislative conduct or legislators themselves to
intimidating inquiry, the constitutionally compelling need for potentially exculpatory evidence in a criminal trial2a3 justifies its production.
Gravel seemed to approve such use by permitting proof of publication by
the legislative record and suggesting that third-party witnesses could testify
about legislative activities in criminal trials. The confidentiality of legislative
deliberations is not protected absolutely by the speech or debate clause, 234 but
only against impermissible exposure to executive or judicial influence. It is extremely unlikely that the possibility of coerced disclosure of the testimony in
Ehrlichman would have influenced the legislator's decision to take testimony or
their manner of doing so. Nevertheless, when the legislative activity itself is not
subject to the court's review, any threat to legislative independence should trigger the absolute protection of the speech or debate clause.
Finally, the Supreme Court has touched on, and a few courts have considered directly, whether a legislator can be compelled to testify or submit to discovery concerning legislative deliberations when the legislative acts or motives
themselves were properly under review by a court.2 35 In Arlington Heights the
232. Erlichman, 389 F. Supp. at 97. But see Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga.
1974) (Congress not entitled to invoke privilege of confidentiality at expense of criminal defendant's
right to evidence), rev'd, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976). In Calley,
as in Ehrlichman, the court of appeals held that regardless of the invalidity of Congress' claim of
privilege, the unavailability of the subpoenaed material did not violate the defendants' rights. Calley
v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 220-26 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
233. Both the compulsory process clause and the confrontation clause of the Constitution guarantee the accused certain rights. The clauses provide: "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him [and] to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The courts have used these
clauses to override claims of testimonial privileges based on various statutes and federal and state
constitutions. See, eg., Sans v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (defendant denied right of confrontation
clause by state statute making juvenile records privileged); United States v. Bleckner, 601 F.2d 382
(9th Cir. 1979) (defendant denied right of confrontation of witness by procedure limiting scope of
cross-examination of government witness); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978) (state
statute protecting confidential sources of press must yield in favor of defendant's right of compulsory
process to defend murder prosecution); State v. Roma, 140 N.J. Super. 582, 357 A.2d 45 (Law Div.
1976) (statutory privilege of marriage counselor gives way to defendant's right of compulsory process), aff'd, 143 N.J. Super. 504, 363 A.2d 923 (A.D. 1976). See generally Clinton, The Right to
Present a Defens. An Emergent ConstitutionalGuaranteein Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 711
(1976) (history of right to defend); Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MicH. L. REV. 71
(1974) (history and scope of compulsory process).
234. See infra notes 286-95 and accompanying text.
235. See, eg., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1564 n.2 (D.N.J. 1983); Greenburg v. Collier, 482 F.
Supp. 200 (E.D. Va. 1979) (state legislator can be deposed concerning content of news releases about
legislative activity but not about motives for supporting or opposing proposed laws); County of Los
Angeles v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 721, 532 P.2d 495, 119 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1975); Brown v. City of
Newark, No. L 34066-81, slip op. (Sup. Ct. N.J. Jan. 27, 1983); Lincoln Bldg. Assocs. v. Barr, 147
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Supreme Court, discussing possible sources of evidence that could tend to prove

unconstitutional purpose, stated that, "[i]n some extraordinary instances the
members [of legislative or administrative bodies] might be called to the stand at
trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official action, although even then
such testimony frequently will be barred by privilege. ' 236 The Court similarly
noted that because "judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation

represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of government, placing a decisionmaker on the stand is. .. 'usually to be avoided.' "237
Thus, the Supreme Court apparently contemplated that, in some circumstances,
legislators might be compelled to testify about the purpose for which a law was
2 38
enacted.
In May v. Cooperman2 39 the court considered this question in deciding

whether a state statute providing for a moment of silence in public schools had a
religious or secular purpose. 24" The court in May decided first that state legisla-

tors were protected by an evidentiary privilege deriving from their common-law
immunity from being sued in their official capacity. 241 Although the court
N.Y.2d 178 (Mun. Ct. 1955) (state legislator required to testify). Several courts also have considered
this question with regard to administrative decisionmakers. See also infra note 344 (discussion of
question with regard to administrative agencies).
236. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 (emphasis added).
237. Id. at 268 n.18 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
(1971)) (emphasis added).
238. The Court did not indicate why and under what circumstances legislators might not be
privileged to refuse to testify. The Court's only citation in support of the existence of a legislative
privilege was to Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). In Tenney the Court held that members
of the California legislature were immune from civil suit under a common-law privilege analogous to
the speech or debate clause. The Supreme Court's failure, in Arlington Heights, to cite any of the
Court's speech or debate cases involving members of Congress might suggest that the Court was
speaking only about state legislators. The courts have afforded state legislators the same degree of
protection in civil suits, however, as that afforded federal legislators under the speech or debate
clause, see infra note 241; thus the distinction, even if the Court intended to draw it, would not
appear significant.
239. Civ. No. 83-89, slip op. at 38-40 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 1983).
240. A legislative enactment violates the establishment clause of the first amendment if its purpose is to advance religion. See, e.g., Committee for Public Edue. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
241. May, slip op. at 38. Most state constitutions provide state legislators with analogous speech
or debate privileges. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 56; COLO. CONsT. art. V, § 16; N.J. CONST.
art. IV, § 4, 9; N.Y. CONsT. art. III, § 11. The individual clauses differ widely, both in applicability and scope, and are beyond the scope of this Article. By its very terms, the federal speech or
debate clause does not apply to state legislators in federal court actions. See Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979). State constitutional privileges also do
not protect state legislators in federal court, when the claim does not arise under state law. See
United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 (1980); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition
Corp., 671 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1982); FED. R. EvID. 501. In Gillock the Court also held that federal
law provides neither immunity nor an evidentiary privilege for state legislators in federal criminal
prosecutions. In civil cases, however, the Court has granted state legislators in federal courts immunity from challenges to their legislative activity in civil rights actions seeking damages and injunctive
relief. See Supreme Court v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). The Supreme Court has not determined whether this privilege in
civil cases includes an evidentiary aspect. To the extent that such a privilege does exist, its applicability and scope in motivation analysis should be governed generally by the same principles that
govern federal legislators. Arguably, separation of powers principles justify a lesser privilege for
state legislators in civil actions than that afforded members of Congress. See, eg., In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 587 (3d Cir. 1977) (Gibbons, J., concurring). For example, in Jordan v.
Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963), the court permitted an action for injunctive relief against a
state legislative committee that attempted to invoke a separation of powers privilege-an action
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stated that the policies leading the Supreme Court to grant state legislators such
immunity suggest that the legislators "should not be subject to discovery in the
normal course," 242 it is not clear whether the court based its ruling on the privilege it appeared to recognize or on general procedural rules prohibiting burdensome discovery.2 43 Furthermore, the court ruled that because the legislature
intervened in the action, and would be participating at trial, legislators would be
244
required to submit to any discovery necessary for plaintiffs' preparation.
All of the speech or debate cases discussed reveal a central theme: courts
should interpret the clause to protect the functional independence of the legislature by prohibiting certain means of reviewing legislative activity that are likely
to threaten legislative autonomy. The threat may take a variety of forms, 245 but
generally arises whenever legislators, either individually or as an institution, are
personally or collectively accountable to a coordinate branch 24 6 for their legislative conduct or motives. The clause circumscribes the power of the executive
and judicial branches to review legislative activity in these circumstances by
prohibiting any inquiry into the deliberative processes of Congress that seriously
threatens to chill legislative action.
3.

Evaluation

The legislative independence that the speech or debate clause guarantees
was derived from, and should be shaped by, the doctrine of separation of powers.247 The doctrine seeks to ensure the freedom of the legislative process from
analogous to that prohibited by Eastlandagainst members of Congress. Similarly, in Bond v. Floyd,
385 U.S. 116 (1966), the Supreme Court allowed an action against named state legislators, and held
that a state legislature could not refuse to seat one of its members because of objections to his views.
In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), however, the Court concluded that the speech or
debate clause prohibited an analogous action against named members of Congress even though the
action challenging congressional conduct was allowed to proceed against legislative functionaries.
See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Gillock Court's holding that federal
criminal statutes take precedence to some degree over state legislative autonomy would seem equally
applicable when state legislative conduct allegedly infringes federal constitutional guarantees.
242. May, slip op. at 39.
243. The May court stated that "whether this be deemed a privilege of some sort or whether it be
deemed an application for general principles of undue burdensomeness under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c),
. . .legislators normally should not be required to give discovery concerning their legislative activities." Id.
244. Id. at 39-40. The court decided that the legislators' intervention as party-defendants, however, did not waive completely their privilege from discovery. See infra notes 397-400 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
246. The contours of Congress' power to try and discipline its members is beyond the scope of
this Article. For cases discussing this issue see, e.g., United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 492
(1979); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 519-20 (1972). See generally McLaughlin, Congressional Self-Disciplin" The Power to Expel, to Exclude and to Punish, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 43
(1972) (analysis of procedural and substantive rules that limit Congress' power to expel, exclude, or
punish its members); Note, The Power of a House of Congress to Judge the Qualificationsof its
Members, 81 HARV. L. Rv.673, 682-83 (1968) (analysis of whether Congress' power to judge
qualifications of its members should include qualifications that are not enumerated expressly in the
Constitution). As elected officials, legislators ultimately are accountable to their consituents.
247. See, eg., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975) (The
speech or debate clause "serves the. . . function of reinforcing the separation of powers deliberately
established by the founders.") (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966)).
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intimidation by either of the other branches. The doctrine, however, also vests
in the courts the power and obligation to adjudicate claims by individuals that
congressional action has infringed their constitutional rights. By dividing the
powers of government among three departments-legislative, executive, and judicial-the Framers sought to ensure that no branch would have unchecked power
to threaten individual rights. 248 Each branch was to be independent, but reliant
upon the others. Although this structure restricts one branch from controlling
or exercising the powers properly belonging to another branch,249 it also provides each branch with the authority to check the others to protect against government excesses. Thus, the speech or debate clause privilege must
accommodate both of these interests-shielding the legislature from intimidation,
yet allowing the judiciary to guard legitimately against legislative excesses, particularly violations of constitutional rights.
Occasionally, these competing interests conflict. In resolving that conflict,
the Court has not always concluded, despite its pronouncements to the contrary, 250 that because the inquiry involves legislative acts or motivations, judicial
review is improper. When the courts have had an indirect method available for
reviewing the validity of legislative conduct such as through the nonlegislative
acts of functionaries, the courts have undertaken such review. 25 1 Although the
Supreme Court's willingness to review legislative conduct in this way is uncertain, 252 once the court decides to review legislative activities, it will consider
evidence about legislative deliberations without any apparent regard for whether
the inquiry itself intrudes on legislative autonomy. If a suit challenging the constitutionally of a legislative decision threatens legislative independence, the fact
that a legislative employee is the nominal defendant does not mitigate the threat.
Thus, although the Court may have appeared to have considered the intrusiveness of the inquiry in determining whether to review legislative action, the opposite was true: The Court made an independent decision whether to review, and
that decision determined whether the inquiry was allowed. The Court's determination whether to review, in turn, has been controlled by separation of powers
considerations. Because there always will be a nonlegislative official enforcing a
248. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (The Framers "had no illusion that our people enjoyed biological or psychological or
sociological immunities from the hazards of concentrated power.").

249. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966) (quoting THE FEDERALisT No. 48
(I. Madison) (Dunne ed. 1901)).

250. See, eg., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 508-09 (1975) ("Our
cases make clear that in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act we do not look into the
motives alleged to have prompted it."); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972) ("[Ihe
Speech or Debate Clause protects against inquiry into acts that occur in the regular course of the
legislative process and into the motivation for those acts.").
251. The courts have approached a holding that such review is permissible as long as legislators
are not personally required to defend their conduct. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505
(1969) ("Freedom of legislative activity and the purposes of the Speech or Debate clause are fully
protected if legislators are relieved of the burdens of defending themselves.").
252. For example, the Court appears unwilling to review the legislative activity of members of
Congress in suits against legislative employees who were performing acts essential to the legislation.
See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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statute against whom suit can be maintained, 253 these considerations guarantee

that the constitutionality of enacted legislation, unlike
some other kinds of legis2 54
lative conduct, will be subject to judicial review.
The Supreme Court recently has decided that, as a matter of substantive

law, the motives of legislators are a crucial factor in determining a law's consti-

tutionality. 2 55 Although the Court has not considered specifically whether the
speech or debate clause precludes an inquiry into motive, 256 it already has considered identical separation of powers issues in determining whether to allow
judicial review of the constitutionality of enactments. In fact, separation of powers concerns contributed to the Court's initial refusal to permit inquiry into
motive.2 57 Nevertheless, the Court now has established that such inquiry does
not encroach unjustifiably on the prerogatives of the legislative branch. 25 8 Because the speech or debate clause is derived from the doctrine of separation of
powers, the clause would not independently affect the Court's resolution of this
question. The clause should not operate to bar judicial review of the constitutional validity of enacted legislation. Moreover, since the Constitution prohibits
laws enacted for particular illicit purposes, and courts properly can review the
constitutionality of these laws, courts must be free to inquire into the issue of
purpose.2 59 Otherwise, Congress would have the unreviewable power to enact
26 °
certain unconstitutional statutes.

253. See, eg., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 119 (1976) ("[Ihe Legislative Branch may not
exercise executive authority by retaining the power to appoint those who will execute its laws
. ") (citing Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928)).
254. See, eg., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624 (1972) ("[A House] Member's conduct
at legislative committee hearings, [is] subject to judicial review in various circumstances, as is legislation itself. . . .") (emphasis added); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803)
(establishing judicial review of the constitutionality of congressional legislation).
255. See supra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
256. Cf De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 72-73 (9th Cir. 1978) (Wallace, J., dissenting)
(plaintiff failed to demonstrate discriminatory impact in gender discrimination suit, therefore, speech
or debate clause prohibited judicial inquiry into decisionmakers' motives).
257. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
259. Such inquiry is necessary because the Court's recognition of the relevance of legislative
purpose has narrowed the courts' previous power, in some contexts, to invalidate laws purely because of their effects. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
260. The adoption of the Bill of Rights arguably overrode some of the protections provided to
members of Congress by the speech or debate clause. Thus, the Framers of the Bill of Rights may
have contemplated that when violations of those rights are in issue, the Bill of Rights should limit
the scope of congressional privilege to the extent necessary to ensure those consitutional guarantees.
The Supreme Court followed similar reasoning in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1975). In
Bitzer the Court considered whether the eleventh amendment bars the award against a state of
backpay pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court held that section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment, which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article," expressly grants to Congress the power to enforce
the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment, "which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority." Id. at 456. Thus, the Court concluded that Congress, in determining
what is "appropriate legislation" with which to enforce the fourteenth amendment, may provide for
private suits against states which in other contexts are unconstitutional. See also Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978) (Congress has power to override states' eleventh amendment immunity
in enacting Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976). The proscriptions of various constitutional amendments, such as "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,"
U.S. CONST. amend. I, may embody similar limitations on the privileges possessed by members of
Congress in other circumstances. But see Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (Congress,
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Similarly, when courts are obligated to review the constitutionality of congressional action, the speech or debate clause should not bar disclosure or use of
the evidence necessary for such a review. The justification for precluding evidence of legislative acts or motives in the speech or debate cases has been the
inappropriateness of judicial inquiry into such matters. When courts investigate
motive, the evidence that frequently had been barred by the speech or debate
privilege no longer should be prohibited absolutely. 26 1 For example, although
legislative history, which includes the legislative record and internal documents,
routinely has been held admissible in statutory construction cases, 262 its introduction often has been prohibited by the speech or debate clause in other contexts. 263 In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.,264 however, the Court held that inquiry into the motive of the decisionmaker 265 was proper and could be proved by the introduction of legislative
history evidence. 266 Although Arlington Heights involved the motives of a local
in enacting the Civil Rights Statutes, did not intend to abolish state legislators' immunity from
liability.).
261. In Gravel the Court decided that the legislative record may be admitted in some circumstances, even though the Court could not review the underlying legislative conduct.
262. See, eg., Oscar Meyer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968); Mitchell v. Kentucky Fin. Co., 359 U.S. 290 (1959) (conference reports); O'Hara v.
Luckenbach Steamship Co., 269 U.S. 364 (1926) (records of committee hearings); Gossnell v. Spang,
84 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1936) (statements made in floor debate). There is some debate, however, concerning the use of internal legislative history sources. Most commentators favor such use. See, eg.,
Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the FederalCourts, 25 IowA L. REv. 737 (1940); Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930); Note, Re-evaluation of the Use of Legislative
History in the Federal Courts,52 COLUM. L. REv. 125 (1952). But see R. DicKERsoN, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATuTEs chs. 9-10 (1975) (benefits derived from use of internal
legislative history outweighed by costs and inconvenience resulting from efforts of production).
263. See, eg., United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 490 (1979):
As to what restrictions the Clause places on the admission of evidence, our concern is not
with the "specificity" of the reference. Instead, our concern is whether there is mention of
a legislative act. To effectuate the intent of the Clause, the Court has construed it to protect other "legislative acts" such as utterances in committee hearings and reports. Eg.,
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
Id. at 490; see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 116 n.3 (1975) ("[We assume, without
deciding, that a speech printed in the Congressional Record carries immunity under the Speech or
Debate Clause as though delivered on the floor."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 584
(3d Cir. 1977) ("To accomplish its purpose the privilege must bar evidence of legislative act or
speech; thus an admission of criminal complicity by a legislator during a debate cannot be introduced into evidence against him."). But see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 629 n.18 (1972)
("If it proves material to establish for the record the fact of publication [for which we perceive no
basis for inquiry] at the subcommittee hearing, which seems undisputed, the public record of the
hearing would appear sufficient for this purpose.").
Conversely, in motive analysis as well as other contexts, when an inquiry into legislative acts is
permitted, the legislative record is admissible as a source of proof. See, e-g., Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 118 n.9, 122 n.20, 125 n.24 (1959) (examination of debate in Congressional
Record to determine legitimacy and scope of congressional investigation); accord United States v.
Rumley, 345 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1953); McGrain v. Daughtery, 273 U.S. 135, 162, 179 n.20 (1927)
(consideration of Senate debates). The legislative history of statutes also has been considered in
countless cases seeking to construe statutes by divining the underlying legislative intent. See cases
cited supra note 262. As in motive analysis, the propriety of the courts' inquiry permits use of the
legislative record.
264. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
265. For a discussion of state administrative (or "decisionmaker") privilege in federal court, see
infra notes 326-36 and accompanying text.
266. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268. The Court stated that "[t]he legislative or administra-
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administrative body, the Court did not indicate that its discussion was limited to
noncongressional decisionmakers. 267 Rather, in discussing the possibility of
compelling decisionmakers to testify at trial, the Court specifically referred to

the potential conflict with the speech or debate clause.2 68 Moreover, the Court
also has considered legislative history to be probative of congressional purpose
federal legislation.2 6 9

in determining the constitutionality of

In permitting the use of legislative history to prove the motives of deci-

sionmakers, the Court implicitly has determined that the resulting pressures on
the decisionmaking body are justifiable. The use of such materials, however,
often will put substantial pressure on decisionmakers to account for the content
270
of their statements and to contest the accuracy or theory of plaintiffs' proofs.

Although this potential pressure long has been considered tolerable in the context of statutory interpretation, 271 decisionmakers are likely to feel more responsibility to respond in motive cases; 272 in most of the reported cases,

decisionmakers have testified voluntarily about their motives for the challenged
tive history may be highly relevant; especially where there are contemporary statements by members
of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports." Id.
The Court also suggested that legislative motive could be proven by the historical background
of the decision, the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged action, departures from
the normal procedural sequence, substantive departures, and testimony of the decisionmaker. Id. at
267-68. The various sources of evidence listed by the Court may implicate legislative acts and motives that the speech or debate clause, in other circumstances, places beyond the Court's power to
review.
267. Arlington Heights noted that United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-86 (1968), might
imply that congressional purpose is irrelevant to the constitutionality of a statute. Arlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 265. In concluding that the decisionmakers' purpose was a necessary inquiry, however,
Arlington Heights made no effort to distinguish O'Brien on the grounds that the law in O'Brien was
enacted by Congress. In addition, several Court decisions concerning the motives of state legislators
in enacting laws failed to mention the federal common-law immunity afforded state legislators,
which is closely analagous to the protection provided by the speech or debate clause. See, e.g.,
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); see alsosupra note 241 (state constitutions providing speech or debate privileges).
268. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.
269. See, eg., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 250 n.25 (1982); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
310 (1980); Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 650 (1980); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
270. Even the CongressionalRecord, a supposedly verbatim account of congressional proceedings, often has been criticized for unreliability. See, e-g., For the Record, Less Distortion, N.Y.
Times, March 5, 1978, at 2, col. 6; Neuberger, The CongressionalRecord is Not a Record, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 20, 1958, § 6 (Magazine), at 14, reprintedin 104 CoNG.Rac. 6816-18 (1958). When a
record of the proceedings does exist, the context of a statement may be examined to prevent distortion of meaning. .
271. Furthermore, legislators may anticipate that courts will use legislative history and similar
materials to interpret a statute, given the long history of doing so, but justifiably may not expect the
same materials to be used to interpret motive. See infra notes 559-67 and accompanying text.
272. Typically, when a court interprets a statute it strives to determine whether an otherwise
valid law applies to a particular set of facts. In contrast, when a court examines motive it considers
the very validity of the enactment process, and by extension the integrity of the decisionmaking
body. Legislators therefore may feel a strong urge to defend the statute's constitutionality. See, e.g.,
May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 1983) (intervention as party-defendants by New
Jersey legislators to defend constitutionality of "moment of silence" law).
There may be instances in which decisionmakers feel more strongly about a statute's interpretation than about its constitutionality. Legislators occasionally have filed amicus briefs in statutory
interpretation cases urging acceptance of their views. See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1981). Unlike
statutory interpretation, however, analyzing motive questions the integrity of the decisionmaking
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action. 273 Furthermore, there is a significant difference, in regard to separation
of powers analysis, between using legislative history in statutory construction
and for inquiring into motive. 274 In the former, the court is attempting to ascertain legislative will to help bring it to fruition; in the latter, determination of the

decisionmaker's intent may lead to invalidation of the legislation.
Although the use of legislative history may be more threatening to the sepa-

ration of powers in motivation analysis than in statutory construction, the Court
implicitly resolved these concerns by holding legislative purpose relevant to con-

stitutionality. Thus, in both contexts, to the extent that examination of motive is
valid and necessary, the speech or debate clause privilege does not prohibit the

use of legislative history. When a record of legislative deliberations is either
2 75

unavailable or inadequate, the court should permit third-party testimony
about legislative debates 276 and any other matters relevant to legislative purpose. 277 It is not the use of such evidence, per se, that might offend the privilege,
but the purpose for which the evidence is used. 278 Using the legislative record in
motivation analysis 279 is justified to the same extent that the court's inquiry itbody. Therefore, individual legislators probably will feel a greater need to defend both themselves
and their institution from such claims.
273. See, eg., Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 213-14 (8th Cir.), aff'd mem. 459
U.S. 801 (1982); Arthur v. Nyquist, 429 F. Supp. 206, 212 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978).
274. These differences may justify compelling legislators to testify in motive cases but not in
statutory construction cases.
275. "Third-party testimony" refers to the testimony of any witness, including a legislator, who
testifies voluntarily about the legislative acts or motivations of other legislators.
276. Third-party testimony about legislative debates probably will cause legislators to respond to
any inaccuracy or omission of context even more than use of the legislative record. Without resort
to the privilege, courts could minimize this problem by using only the most reliable of the methods
available for establishing the facts in each instance. In the congressional setting these methods may
include the CongressionalRecord (for floor debates), hearing records and committee reports (for
committee and subcommittee action), and even videotapes of House of Representatives deliberations,
which are televised by the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN). See J. MOREHEAD,
INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES PUBLIC DOCUMENTS 138-46 (1983).
277. Third-parties could testify on a potentially infinite number of matters, besides statements
actually made in Congress, relevant to the decisiomaker's motivation. Within that range are certain broad categories, the admissibility of which may vary with respect to both privilege and relevance. Testimony about a legislator's statements to the press or to constituents would not be
privileged under the speech or debate clause. See, eg., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
Furthermore, other categories of evidence that ordinarily would be privileged under the clause are
admissible to show legislators' motivations. See supra notes 261-76, infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text. Third parties also might testify about a legislator's personal beliefs and associations,
which might imply illicit motivation in a particular legislative action. Objections to such testimony
would be addressed more appropriately to the relevance and scope of the examination than to the
privilege. See infra note 534.
278. Although the Court has deemed the inquiry into legislative motive relevant in some constitutional cases, the clause still would bar a damage action against a legislator for his illicit intent. The
clause also would prohibit requiring legislators themselves to defend a suit seeking to invalidate
enacted legislation, despite the relevance of their motives in such an action. The voluntary choice of
legislators to intervene as defendants, without testifying, in actions challenging the constitutionality
of a statute should in itself have little effect on the applicability of the privilege. See infra notes 39498 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the imposition on legislative time, energy, and attention
when a court attempts to ascertain legislative purpose would be much less intrusive than if legislators
were party defendants.
279. See, eg., Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La.
1967), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968); infra notes 558-63.
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self is justified; the Supreme Court correctly has recognized that any threat to
legislative autonomy from either the inquiry or the use of the evidence is
subordinate to the judiciary's obligation to review. Numerous courts have made
proper use of decisionmakers' statements made both in the course of deliberative
proceedings and in other circumstances 28 0 to infer unconstitutional motivation.
In addition to creating pressure to respond, the compelled production of
internal legislative history also may impinge on legislators' legitimate interests in
time and confidentiality. Lower echelon legislative employees, however, nearly
always will be responsible for searching for and copying documents, delivering
them to court, and laying a foundation for their admission in response to a subpoena. 281 Thus, the speech or debate clause should not bar disclosure of these
materials simply to protect the legislators' interest in being free from time constraints. 28 2 The necessary protection of legislators' time, when they themselves
perform the tasks necessary to respond to subpoenas for documents, need not be
provided by an absolute privilege, 28 3 but may be accomplished by a qualified
privilege28 4 and by the various rules of civil procedure that guard against bur2 85
densome demands for the production of evidence.
The Supreme Court never has considered whether the speech or debate
clause protects the confidentiality of congressional deliberations. Those courts
that have addressed the issue, however, generally have concluded that the
speech or debate clause does not protect the confidentiality of legislative
processes. 2 86 Thus, when the disclosure of confidential congressional records
280. See infra notes 560-65. The speech or debate clause does not protect public statements by
decisionmakers, made outside the deliberative body. See, eg., May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp.
1561 (D.NJ. 1983) (legislators' statements to press); Greenburg v. Collier, 482 F. Supp. 200, 202
(E.D. Va. 1979). Statements by legislators made outside of legislative deliberations are nonlegislative
acts for which a legislator can be held personally liable. See, eg., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111 (1979).
281. See Kaye, CongressionalPapers and JudicialSubpoenas, 23 UCLA L. REv. 57, 61-68, 7071, 73-74 (1975).
282. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969); Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1881) (allowing actions to proceed against legislative functionaries despite the time and energy that
would have to be expended in their defense).
283. See infra notes 298-302 and accompanying text.
284. Id.
285. See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 26(c) & 30(d). At least one court has held that the
safeguards against unduly burdensome discovery in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure protect
legislators' time interests in a motivation analysis case. See May v. Cooperman, Civ. No. 83-89
(D.NJ. March 14, 1983) (denying plaintiffs' motion to compel answers to interrogatories and granting intervening defendants' motion to quash notice of depositions).
286. See, eg., Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686, 697 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[T1he speech or debate
clause is designed to protect against direct interference with the activities of legislators; it is not
intended to protect the mere confidentiality of their materials."); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587
F.2d 589, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 523 (3d Cir. 1978); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Ciantrani), 563 F.2d 577, 584 (3d Cir. 1977) ("The privilege is not one of
nondisclosure, like that of husband and wife, or lawyer and client, because in most instances the
legislative act or utterance is already a matter of public record easily introduced in a court."); In Re
Possible Violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F. Supp. 211 (D.D.C. 1980); cf.In re Grand Jury
Impaneled, 541 F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1976) (rejecting contention that state judiciary could withhold
records filed with it from federal grand jury scrutiny). But see United States v. Ehrlichman, 389 F.
Supp. 95, 95-97 (D.D.C. 1974) (disclosure of transcript of legislative deliberation barred by speech or
debate clause), aff'don other groundssub nom. United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977); Note, supra note 189, at 1286 n.30 (confidentiality should be
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realistically would not interfere with legislative independence, the clause should

not provide an absolute bar to their discovery and admissibility.28 7 When dis-

closure of confidential legislative documents would threaten legislative autonomy, the clause probably should protect against such disclosure, to the extent
that the legislative conduct revealed is not itself being reviewed by the court.2 88
The confidentiality of legislative deliberations, however, cannot be absolute
when the court is reviewing those deliberations to determine whether illicit motives affected their outcome. Therefore, legislative documents that expose Congress' deliberations should be disclosed to the extent necessary to review
properly those deliberations.2 89 A court should compel the disclosure of con-

gressional records more readily than the testimony of legislators, since the former involves only the inquiry into what the court is obligated to review, without
subjecting legislators to any additional intimidation from public cross-

examination.
The voluntary testimony of legislators or third parties as well as the comaspect of speech or debate clause). Rather than threatening the functioning of the legislature, disclosure, even if compelled in many instances, may help the legislature to fulfill its obligation to inform
the public about crucial aspects of government and national affairs. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d at 597 ("[T'o the extent that the Speech or Debate Clause creates a testimonial privilege as well as a use immunity,. . . [i]t is not designed to encourage confidences by maintaining
secrecy, for the legislative process in a democracy has only a limited toleration for secrecy."). For a
system of self-government to be viable, the people must be fully informed about their government so
that they may exercise meaningfully their right to vote and to "free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964).
287. See, eg., Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (documents "intimately related to a
Congressional investigation" were sought through a request to third parties pursuant to the Freedom
of Information Act, and were held not privileged under the speech or debate clause). In Paisley the
court concluded that because the suit did not involve an individual member of Congress and did not
threaten to interfere with ongoing legislative activity, the speech or debate clause was inapplicable.
The court, however, noted:
Even if this suit did present a direct challenge to the Congressional investigation into Paisley's death (which it does not), that fact alone would not shield Congress' action from
judicial scrutiny: "the Clause does not and was not intended to immunize congressional
investigatory actions from judicial review. Congress' investigatory power is not, itself, absolute." United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 567 F.2d 121, 129 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
Id. at 697 n.50.
288. See.supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
289. Whether congressional records are absolutely privileged from disclosure under the speech
or debate clause depends on the same general considerations that govern the scope of the testimonial
privilege. Although Congress frequently has asserted a privilege not to submit to subpoenas for
documents in its possession, in most cases Congress has authorized the disclosure.
Professor Kaye has made an excellent and exhaustive analysis of the issues involved in the
disclosure of congressional documents in two companion articles: Kaye, supra note 281, and Kaye,
supra note 85. Noting the virtual absence of judicial precedent on this question, Professor Kaye
suggests that the speech or debate clause creates an absolute privilege of nondisclosure of legislative
documents. Id. at 571. He derives this suggestion from the conclusion that the clause absolutely
protects legislators from compelled "questioning." Id. Although Kaye's conclusion is at odds with
that of this Article, he did not consider the applicibility of the speech or debate clause to cases in
which the court already had determined to review the constitutionality of legislative deliberation.
Thus, within the context of his limited inquiry, Professor Kaye is correct. As this Article demonstrates, however, when the court inquires into the validity of legislative deliberation, both testimony
and the disclosure of documents should be compelled by the court to the extent necessary for its
review. Furthermore, the differences between compelled disclosure of documents and compelled
testimony suggest that courts should be more willing to order production of the documents. See
infra note 412 and accompanying text.
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pelled testimony of legislators or disclosure of documents also may risk revealing

confidential congressional communications. 290 Although legislators have a legitimate interest in preventing the disclosure of such communications, 29 1 the
speech or debate clause never has protected that interest absolutely, nor should
it, when the court is reviewing the legislators' actions. A qualified privilege de-

rived either from the speech or debate clause or directly from the doctrine of
separation of powers, however, should protect the confidentiality of legislative
communications. 292 This privilege, like that recognized by the Supreme Court
for the executive branch in United States v. Nixon,293 should balance Congress'

need for secrecy against a litigant's particularized need for evidence. 294 Even
confidential inforcongressional records and third-party testimony that reveal295
mation should not be absolutely privileged from disclosure.
It is more difficult to determine whether and under what circumstances a
court properly might compel a legislator to testify about the motivations 296 un-

derlying a legislative action. Compelled testimony requires a greater expenditure of a legislator's time and potentially a greater exposure of legislative

deliberations than other modes of proof. Compelling testimony also may be sufficiently coercive to violate separation of powers principles. Moreover, subjecting legislators to cross-examination in court about the motives that prompted a
legislative act seems to contradict the literal prohibition of the clause. For the

same reasons underlying proper judicial inquiry into motive, however, testimony
of legislators should be compelled to the extent necessary for judicial review.

Judicial review of the motives of legislators threatens legislative independence tremendously. Determining the constitutionality of a controversial law by
an inquiry into the motives of the lawmakers who enacted it must have a marked
effect on legislative deliberations. Motivation analysis probably influences not
only legislators' debates but also their votes. For example, some legislators
surely will refrain from supporting a law that they otherwise would favor to
avoid the possibility of having their motives characterized by the courts as ra-

cially discriminatory. Such inquiry was prohibited for much of this country's
290. The applicability and scope of a privilege for confidential congressional communications is
beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, even if such communications were absolutely privileged
from disclosure, decisionmakers could continue to provide a broad range of probative evidence to
establish unconstitutional purpose. See infra notes 540-49, 577-81 and accompanying text.
291. See Note, supra note 189, at 1286 n.30.
292. See Kaye, supra note 85, at 576-79; supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
293. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
294. For example, when nonprivileged sources of evidence are available to litigants, a court
should not compel disclosure of confidential communications. See infra notes 606-19 and accompanying text. Conversely, when communications constitute state secrets, they should be protected
absolutely from disclosure, regardless of a litigant's need for the information. See, eg., United States
v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); see also infra note 357 and accompanying text (balancing need of the
litigant for information against harm that disclosure will cause government).
295. When a third party has heard an ostensibly confidential communication, the privilege for
confidentiality may have been waived. See infra note 404 and accompanying text.
296. No analytical differences exist under the speech or debate clause privilege among compelling a decisionmaker to testify about his own motivations, those of fellow decisionmakers, or those of
the decisionmaking body as a whole. Each type of testimony will have a different probative value
and resulting degree of intrusion that may affect the applicability of an implied privilege.
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history, in part because of its intrusive nature.2 97
The speech or debate clause arguably prohibits the compelled testimony of

legislators about motive because such testimony offends either or both of two
interests that the clause was intended to protect: freedom from time-consuming

distraction and freedom from intimidation. Freedom from distraction, however,
never has been considered sacrosanct under the speech or debate clause. Legislators have no general immunity from service of process, whether as a defendant
or witness. 298 Even when the clause is potentially applicable, legislators have
not been "absolved of the responsibility of filing a motion to dismiss," 299 or of
demonstrating that the privilege applies to the particular circumstances. More
importantly, the Supreme Court has not held that legislators or their aides are
protected against distraction from their official duties when review of the underlying conduct itself is proper,3° ° and the courts consistently have compelled the

testimony of close legislative aides not only when the activity was reviewable by
the courts, but also to assist the courts in determining whether the activity was
reviewable. 30 1 Only when the Court has determined that the requested review
of legislative action is prohibited by the clause (and thus, the doctrine of separation of powers) has the Court cited the threat to legislators' time as a rationale
for the prohibition. 30 2 It therefore is apparent that the clause does not protect
the time of legislators per se, but rather guards against the chilling effect on
legislative behavior that could result from judicially imposed distractions, which
297. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
298. The Supreme Court has stated that a member of Congress may be served with process as a
defendant in a civil action, Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 82-83 (1934), and as a defendant or witness
in a criminal case, Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 626 (1971). See supra note 85.
299. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 511 n.17 (1975). The Eastland
Court, however, noted that the interests underlying the clause require courts to treat such motions in
an expedited manner. Id.
300. See, eg., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606 (1971) (requiring senate aide to testify before grand jury); MeSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 438 U.S. 189 (1978); cf.United States v. Caldwell, 25 Fed. Cas. 238
(No. 14708) (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (Patterson, C.J.) (judges not immune from requirement that they
testify about events in their court); accord State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 489 (1943) (judge not
privileged from giving testimony in state certiorari proceeding); 8 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2372,
at 7458 (MeNaughton Rev. 1961) (testimonial privilege of certain government officials not to attend
court-ambassadors, consuls, judges, arbitrators). Contra Hale v. Wyatt, 78 N.H. 214, 216 (1916)
(voluntary testimony by judge may not be objected to on grounds that judge had right to refuse to
testify).
301. See, eg., United States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252, 1270 (D.C. Cir.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). In Eastland plaintiffs had moved in the trial
court to compel the Senate subcommittee counsel to give testimony. The Senate passed a resolution,
S. Res. 478, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. RIc. 36378 (1970), authorizing the counsel to testify
only about matters of public record. Plaintiffs moved to compel additional testimony and the district
court denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed, concluding that the trial court should consider the extent to which it should require the
counsel to testify about noniegislative conduct, which the court properly could review.
302. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975):
This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial interference may cause. A legislative inquiry has been frustrated for nearly five years, during which the Members and their
aide have been obliged to devote time to consultation with their counsel concerning the
litigation, and have been distracted from the purpose of their inquiry.
Id. at 511.
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conceivably might cause legislators to alter their behavior to avoid the possibility
of burdensome demands on their time.
The extent to which compelling testimony of members of Congress about

legislative purpose will chill legislative independence is debatable. As evidenced

by the reported decisions,3 03 nearly all the legislators and administrative deci-

sionmakers who have been subpoenaed to testify about the purpose for official
action have not claimed the privilege. 3° 4 Although decisionmakers might not

consider such testimony intrusive, 305 compelled testimony can seriously chill

legislative action and debate. It has the potential to be significantly more intru-

sive than the judicial inquiry into motive itself. Subjecting members of Congress
to cross-examination about the constitutionality and propriety of their reasons

for official action could be much more intimidating than using less confrontational sources of evidence.

When separation of powers principles require the courts to review the constitutionality of enacted legislation, however, any resulting threat to legislative
independence is subordinate to the necessity for review. The only reason not to
compel testimony is that it would pose an even greater threat to legislative autonomy. The courts, once having accepted their obligation to review legislation,

however, never have balanced their commitment against the possible threat to
legislative independence. 30 6 At that point, legislative activity is subject to "questioning" by the courts because the entire basis for the speech or debate clause
privilege-protection from the threat to legislative autonomy-has been consid-

ered as part of the court's initial decision to review. Thus, that one mode of
proving legislative purpose intimidates legislative freedom more than others will
not reverse the balance dictated by the Constitution's separation of powers. Indeed, the mode of proof most intimidating to legislators often is that which is
most probative in establishing unconstitutional purpose,30 7 but unquestionably
that intimidation does not justify prohibiting the most probative sources of evi303. The author has discussed this question with many attorneys who would have been likely to
have confronted it. They have confirmed that decisionmakers claim the privilege infrequently in

motive cases.
304. In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), Representative Henry Hyde was served with a
subpoena duces tecum in an effort to prove that a purpose of the Hyde Amendment, which drastically limited medical funding for abortions, was to establish a particular religious viewpoint in violation of the first amendment. Hyde did not move to quash the subpoena and allowed himself to be
cross-examined about the purposes of the amendment. It is doubtful that legislators do not invoke
the speech or debate clause because they are not aware of it or believe that it is inapplicable. It is
more likely that they welcome public exposure and believe that their own verbal and argumentative
skills will protect their personal and institutional interests.
305. Even if decisionmakers fail to claim the privilege because they fear appearing to have
"something to hide," allowing an absolute privilege to refuse to testify would not wholly alleviate
this issue. Because decisionmakers can waive their privileges, see infra notes 391-93 and accompanying text, such an appearance of impropriety still would exist. Thus, the nearly universal failure to
claim the privilege probably reflects, to some degree, legislators' belief that their independence is not
threatened.
306. To the extent that the compelled testimony of members of Congress would not intrude on
legislative independence, however, barring the testimony would not serve any purpose. Thus, when
the degree of interference with legislative autonomy is minimized, courts should be less willing to
recognize the privilege.
307. Legislators often probably would prefer compelled testimony to the evidentiary use of remarks made to third parties or in the heat of legislative debate. In addition, there will be many
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dence. 30 8 Nor should the additional intrusion resulting from compelled testimony override the courts' obligation to judge whether enacted laws violate the
Constitution. If the importance of conducting, and the obligation to conduct,
such review outweighs the resulting threat to legislative independence, it would
be arbitrary and wrong to conclude that the vitality of the court's burden is
exhausted precisely by the intrusiveness of the inquiry itself. The same separation of powers considerations that cause the necessity for judicial review to override any threats to legislative autonomy also require that evidence of legislative
30 9
purpose, including the testimony of legislators, not be absolutely prohibited.
instances in which legislators will welcome the opportunity to testify to rebut other evidence of
unconstitutional motive and, therefore, will not claim the privilege. See supra notes 303-04.
308. Numerous evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege or the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, exclude particular sources of proof but not other sources
for the same facts. Such prohibitions protect certain societal and constitutional interests that compelled disclosure would harm. In the context discussed in the text, however, the court already has
considered and overridden the interests underlying the privilege by determining that the actions and
motives in question are subject to judicial review. With these other privileges, the actions and motives of protected witnesses and parties also are subject to judicial review, but in finding that review
appropriate, the court does not consider the interests underlying the privileges. Thus, unlike the
situation in the text, it must consider those interests independently when a party raises any evidentiary privilege.
309. If the courts accepted the foregoing conclusion that the speech or debate clause does not
provide legislators an absolute privilege to refuse to testify about legislative purpose, and legislators
found that to be overly intrusive, Congress may well have the power to create its own evidentiary
privileges. See FED. R. EVID. 501 ("Except as otherwise required.. . Act of Congress. . . the
privileges of a witness. . . shall be governed by the principles of the common.
...) (emphasis
added). If Congress does have that power, the courts should feel less trepidation about compelling
members of Congress to testify about legislative acts and motives. As the Supreme Court noted
analogously in Brewster:
We. . . see no substantial increase in the power of the Executive and Judicial Branches
resulting from our holding [that a legislator's promise relating to a legislative act in return
for a bribe can be prosecuted]. If we underestimate the potential for harassment, the Congress, of course, is free to exempt its members from the ambit of federal bribery laws ....
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524 (1971). Exempting legislators from statutory requirements as in Brewster is quite different from creating a statutory privilege that realistically could foreclose judicial
review of the constitutionality of certain laws. Cf.Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, 89 N.M.
307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976) (under New Mexico Constitution, journalism privilege and other evidentiary rules cannot be imposed on courts by legislature); Rothstein, The ProposedAmendments to the
FederalRules ofEvidence, 62 GA. L. REv. 125, 167 (1973) (If Congress attempted to impose proposed amendments concerning judicial notice or to require adjudication according to evidentiary
rules deemed by the court to be unjust, it might be infringing on the constitutional grant of judicial
power.). Such a statutory privilege may conflict with the doctrine of separation of powers for much
the same reasons as would interpreting the speech or debate clause as an absolute evidentiary privilege.
Similarly, Congress might seek to exempt its members from the contempt power of the lower
federal court. The source of the judicial contempt power to punish persons who disobey process or
insult the courts is not entirely clear. It does stem, in part, from a practice employed by the English
Crown and court. Filtering its way into the American judicial system, the contempt power now
often is labelled an "inherent ability" of the courts and has been substantiated further through various legislative acts such as the Judiciary Act of 1789 (giving federal courts the power to punish by
fine and imprisonment) and the Federal Rules of Civil (FED. R. Civ. P. 45(f)) and Criminal Procedure. (FED. R. CRim P. 17(g)). See R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 20 (1963). Congress
perhaps could limit the scope of judicial contempt statutes to exclude members of Congress. State
legislatures have limited by statute the contempt power of courts. Id. at 37.
Alternatively, Congress arguably could remove the contempt power, against members of Congress, from the lower federal courts by limiting their jurisdiction. In that event even if a legislator
were ordered by the court to testify, the order would be unenforceable. See generally Gunther,
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing
Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
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The Supreme Court recognized the relevance of legislative purpose partly to
protect laws from being invalidated simply because of their effects. 310 One of
the reasons that the Court viewed motivation analysis as necessary is that legis-

lators have become sophisticated enough to obscure the true purposes underlying legislative action. 3 11 As motivation analysis becomes more common in
constitutional adjudication, legislators are even more likely to shape the legislative history of a statute to present an acceptable public appearance.3

12

This pro-

cess only serves to increase the importance of compelled testimony and
discovery as aids to the courts in determining motive.
Members of Congress, however, should not always be subjected to judicial

intrusion in motive cases. The courts' interference with legislative independence
is justified only to the limited extent necessary for the courts' review. Legislators

should be privileged to refuse to testify and submit to discovery about motive
except when other evidence of legislative purpose is unavailable and the evidence

3 13
from the compelled testimony or discovery significantly assists the plaintiff.
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. RaV. 1362 (1953). Congress derives this
power to limit the jurisdiction of lower federal courts from Article III § I of the Constitution, which
establishes Congress' ability to create these courts. Congress has sought to limit the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts over certain controversial issues such as busing and school prayer. See, e.g.,
Eisenberg, CongressionalAuthority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498
(1974); Griswold, Congress and the FederalCourts, 4 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 1 (1982). Although
this Congressional power to withdraw selectively jurisdiction from the federal courts has been upheld by the Supreme Court, see Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) (1868), this power is not
unlimited. See, eg., Hart, supra; Sager, The Supreme Court Term-ConstitutionalLimitations on
Congress'Authorityto Regulate the Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17 (1981);
Ratner, CongressionalPower over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REv. 157 (1960).
310. See, eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976); supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
311. See, eg., McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1261-62 (E.D. Ark. 1982);
supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
312. This process already has evolved with statutory construction. Knowing that the courts will
look to legislative history in interpreting a statute, it is common for legislators to "manufacture"
legislative history, not only in debate but by postdebate insertions into the CongressionalRecord.See
J. MOREHEAD, supra note 276, at 142-44. Because the chilling effect on legislative debate is far
greater in motivation-analysis cases than in statutory construction ones, legislators probably will
make great efforts to prevent the courts from finding illicit purpose. Not only will legislators with
illicit motives attempt to mask them, legislators with benign intent also may modify their debate for
fear of judicial misinterpretation.
313. If decisionmakers refuse to testify or produce records after the court orders them to do so,
the court has a number of options for persuading them to comply or punishing the continued disobeyance of its order. Courts have imposed issue-preclusive sanctions against the government when,
as a party, it has refused to obey an order for the production of relevant material. See, e.g., Smith v.
Schlesinger, 513 F.2d 462, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Similarly, when a court orders disclosure of the
identity of an informant over the prosecution's claim of privilege and the informant does not appear,
the court's decision whether to suppress evidence, when the issue is probable cause for an arrest or
search, or to dismiss the prosecution, depends on whether the government made reasonable efforts to
secure his attendance. See, eg., United States v. Nutile, 550 F.2d 701, 703-04 (1st Cir. 1977); United
States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 799-801 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977); United
States v. Cervantes, 542 F.2d 773, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1976). Such sanctions most often will be inappropriate when the court is considering the constitutionality of legislative and administrative decisions.
See infra note 410.
Although it is not settled, courts should be able to enforce their orders against decisionmakers
using contempt sanctions. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692 (1974) (noting that whether
President could be held in contempt was unresolved and "could engender . . . protracted litigation"). Presumably, administrative decisionmakers who may be sued directly for an injuncton have
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This balance can be best achieved through a qualified privilege that balances the
degree of intrusion into legislative independence against the need for and proba3 14
tive value of legislators' testimony.
B. Administrative Privileges
Courts also have recognized various privileges protecting administrative
decisionmakers from civil damage actions, compelled testimony, and the production of documents. The parameters of these privileges are beyond the scope
of this Article. 315 Even if these privileges create absolute immunity from suit for

administrative decisionmakers, the preceding analysis demonstrates that decisionmakers still could be compelled to testify and produce documents when such
evidence was critical for the courts' effective review of the constitutionality of
administrative decisions. The privileges available to administrative decisionmakers, however, probably provide less protection than the speech or debate
clause provides legislators. Therefore, courts should compel testimony or the
production of documents from an administrative decisionmaker when there is a
somewhat lesser need than that required to compel evidence from members of
Congress. Even if the speech or debate clause absolutely barred compelling testimony from members of Congress, administrative and lower-level legislative
decisionmakers should be entitled to only a qualified evidentiary privilege.
no claim of immunity from judicial contempt citations. These government officials are subject to
enforced compliance with the court's determination of the merits of the controversy and similarly
should not be immune from compelled obedience to court orders that control the process litigation.
Whether a member of Congress may be cited or jailed for contempt is a more difficult question.
Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517 (1969) ("We need express no opinion about the appropriateness of coercive relief in this case, for petitioners sought a declaratory judgment .... "). In
Gravel the Court held only that a member of Congress is not immune from "service of process as
a witness in a criminal case." Gravel, 408 U.S. at 614-15. The Court noted further, however,
that members of Congress have no immunity from the "obligations" of a subpoena in such cases. Id.
at 615. This language has led one commentator to suggest that the "logic of Gravel in narrowing the
protection of the immunity from arrest clause to freedom from arrest as a defendant in a civil suit
implies that even imprisonment for civil contempt is not constitutionally offensive." See Kaye, supra
note 85, at 545 n.97.
If a court concludes that a legislator's actions are nonlegislative and therefore unprotected by
the speech or debate clause, the legislator may be held civilly and criminally liable for that conduct.
In these circumstances, jailing a legislator convicted of bribery or disobeyance of a court order is
proper. Similarly, if a court decides that the clause does not prohibit legislators from testifying in a
specific case, there is no reason to insulate them from punishment if they continue to refuse to testify.
In neither case is the legislator being punished for legislative activities, but rather for conduct that,
although related to legislative activities, already has been held to be unprotected by the speech or
debate clause. Moreover, legislators do not have to risk contempt to challenge the court's order
requiring them to testify; such orders may be reviewed prior to enforcement of the subpoena. See,
e.g., Gravel, 408 U.S. at 608 n.1; In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 1978).
314. See infra notes 406-629 and accompanying text.
315. Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d 1020 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Berger, The Incarnation of
Executive Privilege, 22 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1974); Henkin, Executive Privileg" Mr. Nixon Loses But
The Presidency Largely Prevails, 22 UCLA L. REv. 40 (1974); Note, Executive Privilege-DemonstrationThat Documents Were Arguably Relevant andLikely to Lead to Admissible Evidence Was Sufficient to Overcome a Presumption That PresidentialCommunications are Privileged
from Discovery in Civil Cases, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 816 (1976); Note, The Supreme Court Under
Pressure: A ComparativeAnalysis of United States v. Nixon and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 57 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 750 (1983); Note, A New Perspective on Legislative Immunity in Section 1983 Actions, 28
UCLA L. REV. 1087 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, A New Perspective].
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Although members of Congress are protected by the speech or debate
clause, no explicit constitutional privilege protects administrative or executive

officials against suit. 3 16 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court consistently has
3 17
granted some form of immunity to executive officials from suits for damages.
The Court has recognized an implied constitutional immunity that absolutely
prohibits civil damage actions against the President for acts within the "outer

perimeter" of official presidential responsibility. 318 The Court also has extended

an absolute immunity from civil damage actions to federal and state executive
officials engaged in prosecutorial, 3 19 adjudicative, 320 or legislative 321 functions,
reasoning that officials who perform especially sensitive functions must be protected absolutely from threats to their independence. 322 The function performed

by the official, not his mere status, however, controls the quality of the immunity
granted. 323 Thus, the same official might be absolutely immune when performing some governmental actions but not others. 324 The Supreme Court has applied this functional approach generally and extended absolute immunity to

lower echelon officials engaging in actions deemed worthy of protection. 325 In
316. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the Supreme Court recognized a qualified
executive privilege protecting against the disclosure of presidential communications. The Court said
the privilege was "rooted in the [Constitutional doctrine of] separation of powers." Id. at 708.
Similarly, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982), the Court cited separation of powers
concerns in holding that the former President was absolutely immune from civil suits challenging his
official acts.
317. This immunity from damage actions includes suits for common-law torts, alleged violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), and direct constitutional torts. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 508-17 (1978).
318. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982). This absolute immunity from civil suit
challenging actions within the "outer perimeter" of presidential responsibility encompasses civil immunity beyond that which the speech or debate clause affords members of Congress. Legislators are
protected only for actions "essential to legislating," not those merely related to the legislative process. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
319. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (State prosecutors possess absolute immunity against challenges to the initiation and pursuit of prosecution.); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 508-12 (1978) (recognizing that absolute immunity applies to Agriculture Department officials
whose job responsibilities are very similar to those of criminal prosecutors).
320. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-17 (1978). The Supreme Court similarly has held
that state judges have absolute immunity for all judicial acts. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
364 (1978).
321. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405
(1979) (nonelected employees of bi-state agency have absolute immunity from federal damage action
for legislative functions). One commentator has criticized this extension of absolute immunity from
liability under § 1983 as unwarranted. See, eg., Note, A New Perspective,supra note 315. The Court
also has extended absolute immunity to state supreme court justices, acting in their legislative capacity in promulgating the state code of professional responsibility. See Supreme Court v. Consumers
Union, 446 U.S. 719, 734 (1980).
322. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-52 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
508, 511-17 (1978).
323. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), however, the Court recognized the President's
constitutional status as a factor requiring absolute immunity. Id. at 749-50; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) ("For officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit, we have recognized the defense of 'absolute immunity.' ").
324. See, eg., Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1214-15 (3d Cir. 1979) (prosecutor is not
absolutely immune when acting in capacity of administrator or investigative officer).
325. See, eg., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (federal hearing examiner); Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-74 (1959) (acting director of Office of Rent Stablization).
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Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, 326 however, the

Court explicitly left open the question whether government decisionmakers performing legislative functions at the local level should be afforded absolute immu327
nity from federal damage claims.
The Court has refused to extend absolute immunity to officials engaged in

less sensitive functions. It has granted only a qualified immunity328 from damage actions to cabinet officials, 32 9 presidential advisors, 330 governors, 33 1 and

other officials performing discretionary functions that the Court concluded did
not merit absolute immunity. Furthermore, the Court has not granted to any

executive or administrative official, including the President, immunity from injunctive or declaratory relief,332 and most executive or administrative officials
333
generally are not immune from criminal prosecution.

Even if local administrative decisionmakers acting in a legislative capacity,
such as members of municipal zoning boards or school boards, are immune from

damage suits, 334 they may be sued for equitable relief.335 Moreover, many decisionmakers whose motives are relevant in constitutional cases will not be acting

in a capacity that triggers absolute immunity from damage actions. 33 6 Thus, the
326. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
327. Id. at 404 n.26. Justice Marshall noted that the Court's functional approach to immunity
seemed to dictate that even local officials would receive absolute immunity if acting in a legislative
capacity. Id. at 407-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court also left open whether officials acting in
a legislative capacity would be immune from damage suits for the violation of state laws. Id. at 405.
Since Lake Country Estates, circuit courts of appeals uniformly have held that local decisionmakers
acting in a legislative capacity are entitled to absolute immunity from damage actions under the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See, eg., Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1983)
(municipal council members); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 952 (7th Cir. 1983) (local
liquor control commissioner); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (5th Cir.
1981) (mayor of city in vetoing ordinance), cert denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Bruce v. Riddle, 631
F.2d 272, 279 (4th Cir. 1980) (county council members).
328. This qualified or "good faith" immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). See Hyman, QualifiedImmunity Reconsidered, 27 WAYNE
L. REv. 1409 (1981).
329. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505-06 (1978).
330. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1982).
331. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
332. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 19192 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 58384, 589 (1952) (although President not a party, Secretary of Commerce enjoined from executing a
direct presidential order).
The Supreme Court also has ruled recently that judicial immunity does not bar prospective
injunctive relief or an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), against a judicial
officer acting in her judicial capacity. See Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1981-82 (1984).
333. See generally L. T uBE, supra note 184, § 4-13, at 200-02 (discussing scope and history of
executive privilege and immunity). Professor Tribe notes that although there is generally no executive immunity from criminal prosecution, it is uncertain whether an impeachable official, such as the
President, can be prosecuted prior to his removal. He concludes, however, that such prosecution
should not be permitted. Id. at 201-02.
334. See supra note 327.
335. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261
(1977) (equitable suit against municipal zoning board).
336. See, e.g., Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,280 (1977).
In Mount Healthy, plaintiff, an untenured teacher, sued a local school board for reinstatement and
damages alleging that the board's decision not to rehire him was in retaliation for his excercise of
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immunity afforded administrative decisionmakers is significantly less than the
absolute immunity that the speech or debate clause provides members of Con-

gress. This difference appropriately embodies separation of powers principles;
although enacted legislation may be challenged by suing enforcement officials,

administrative decisionmakers often are responsible both for "legislating" and
enforcing their decisions. Unless those decisionmakers could be sued, at least

for injunctive relief, the constitutionality of their official actions might be insu-

lated from judicial review. 337 To the extent that administrative officials can be

sued for injunctive relief or damages for the alleged violation of constitutional
rights, the absence of immunity must suggest that as defendants to the litigation
they generally are not privileged to refuse to give relevant testimony, submit to
discovery, or produce documents. In the absence of immunity from suit, it is
difficult to envision an evidentiary privilege that would protect absolutely administrative decisionmakers from testifying.
The Supreme Court has expressed a reluctance to inquire into the mental

339
processes of administrative decisionmakers.3 38 In United States v. Morgan

plaintiff challenged certain rate orders that the Secretary of Agriculture had is-

sued. At trial the Secretary was examined at length about the process by which
he made his decision, including the manner and extent of his study of the record

and his consultation with subordinates. The Supreme Court stated that the Secretary should not have been questioned because his deliberations were functionally equivalent to those in a judicial proceeding. 34 Even if this reluctance is
characterized as a privilege of administrative decisionmakers to refuse to testify
first amendment rights. The Court analyzed the school board's motives to determine whether plaintiff's exercise of first amendment rights affected the board's decision.
337. The Supreme Court has recognized explicitly that alternative remedies may check excesses
of otfcial power in its immunity cases. See, eg., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 757-58 (1982)
(noting that formal and informal remedies exist to protect public against abuse of absolute immunity
by President); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976) ("We emphasize that the immunity
of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.").
338. See, eg., United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,422 (1941); United States v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1381, 1387 (D.D.C. 1981). As the court noted in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 325-26 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd on opinion below sub noin.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967): "This
salutary rule forecloses investigation into the methods by which a decision is reached, the matters
considered, the contributing influences, or the role played by the work of others ..
339. 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
340. Id. at 422. The Court concluded:
The Secretary should never have been subjected to this examination. The proceeding
before the Secretary "has a quality resembling that of a judicial proceeding." Such an
examination of a judge would be destructive ofjudicial responsibility. . . . Just as a judge
cannot be subjected to such scrutiny, compare Fayerweatherv. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 306-07
[(1904)], so the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected. It will
bear repeating that although the administrative process has had a different development
and pursues somewhat different ways from those of courts, they are to be deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice and the appropriate independence of each should be
respected by the other.
Id. The Court, however, has stated that a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior by
administrative officials would justify inquiry into their mental processes even if administrative findings made at the same time as the decision are available to the court. See Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); see also United States ex rel. West v. Hitchcock,
205 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1907) (court cannot inquire into mental processes of Secretary of Interior);
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about their mental processes, 34 1 however, the Supreme Court has concluded

that decisionmakers may be examined about their deliberations when necessary

for effective judicial review. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Parkv. Volpe 3 42 the
Court held that the Secretary of Transportation could be compelled to explain
his actions in the absence of administrative findings that would disclose the manner in which he construed the evidence before him in authorizing the routing of
an interstate highway through a public park. 343 Since Overton Park, numerous
lower courts have compelled the testimony of administrative decisiomakers and
the production of administrative documents when the courts considered such
evidence necessary for an adequate review. 344 Because administrative deciChicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593 (1907) (cross-examination of governor and
other state officials acting in judicial capacity improper).
341. In practice, the courts have refrained from probing the deliberative processes of administrative decisionmakers only to the extent of a qualified privilege that "is but 'one facet of the general
presumption of regularity' which attaches to decisions of administrative bodies." Singer Sewing
Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 1964) (quoting 2 K. DAVIS, ADMimnSTRATIVE
LAW § 11.06, at 63 (1958)).
342. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
343. Id. at 420; cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280, 281-84 (1955)
(testimony regarding factors Board of Immigration Appeals considered in refusing to grant petitioner's application to suspend deportation).
344. The "policies supporting the privilege must be balanced by the Court's obligation to truthseeking and full disclosure, keeping in mind that the deliberative process privilege is a qualified
privilege, to be applied as narrowly as possible, consistent with efficient administrative operations."
Exxon Corp. v. Department of Energy, 91 F.R.D. 26,43 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Thus, lower courts have
permitted discovery and compelled testimony about mental processes of administrative agency decisionmakers in a number of circumstances. First, "[w]hen there is 'such a failure to explain administrative action as to frustrate effective judicial review,' the court may 'obtain from the agency, either
through affidavits or testimony, such additional explanations of the reasons for the agency decision
as may prove necessary....' " Public Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791, 793-94 (9th Cir.
1982) (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973) (per curiam)); see also Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275,285 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that court may look beyond
record to discover rationales for agency decisions if required for complete judicial review); Texas
Steel Co. v. Donovan, 93 F.R.D. 619, 621 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (even if complete record is before court,
plaintiff may conduct discovery beyond record if necessary to explain reasoning of agency's decision)
(dictum); In re Department of Energy Stripper Well Exemption, 520 F. Supp. 1232, 1269-70 (D.
Kan. 1981) (permitting depositions of primary decisionmakers to determine rationale for their decision).
Second, when it appears that the decisionmakers have relied on materials not in the administrative record, discovery, including depositions, has been permitted to ascertain all the information
actually considered by the administrative body. See, eg., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Train, 519 F.2d 287, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 507
(4th Cir. 1973); Exxon Corp. v. Department of Energy, 91 F.R.D. 26, 32-33 (N.D. Tex. 1981);
Tenneco Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 475 F. Supp. 299, 317 (D. Del. 1979). But see Virgo
Corp. v. Paiewonsky, 39 F.R.D. 911 (D.V.I. 1966); Union Sav. Bank v. Saxon, 209 F. Supp. 319,
319-20 (D.D.C. 1962).
Third, even if an administrative record appears to disclose the reasons for the challenged decision, the decisionmakers may be deposed if bad faith or improper motivation is shown. See, ag.,
Public Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1982) (deposition of decisionmaker
permitted on allegation of bad faith); Abbott Laboratories v. Harris, 481 F. Supp. 74, 78 (N.D. l.
1979) ("To conclude otherwise would be an abandonment of any meaningful judicial protection
against arbitrary administrative action."). Thus, in motive cases, perhaps a plaintiff, as a matter of
course, should be permitted to depose and call to the stand administrative decisionmakers who, the
plaintiff can demonstrate-through independent evidence--acted for an illicit purpose. See Brown
v. City of Newark, No. A-4958-82T4 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1982). In Brown plaintiffs sought to demonstrate that a municipal council had enacted an antipeddling ordinance for the improper purpose of
protecting local business interests from competition. See id. at 1-2. The court initially prohibited
deposing council members about their reasons for taking the challenged action, but ultimately per-
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sionmakers are protected from questioning only about deliberative processes,

when those processes themselves are the subject of the court's inquiry, there
should be no privilege.

The Arlington Heights Court also suggested that privilege will not always
bar the testimony of administrators and legislators about the purpose of official
action. 345 The Court's immediate reference to United States v. Nixon 346 may
indicate that competing interests should be balanced to determine whether a

government official must testify. 347 Therefore, as the preceding section concluded with regard to legislators, and as the Court has determined with regard

to administrative decisionmakers, when the acts of decisionmakers are subject to
judicial review and their motives are relevant to the court's inquiry, deci-

sionmakers are not absolutely privileged to refuse to testify about the purpose of
the challenged action. Rather, as with legislators, administrative officials should
be privileged to refuse to give evidence of motive only to the extent that such
evidence is unnecessary for the court's proper review. 348 Because the underlying

privilege or immunity for administrative decisionmakers is less absolute than the
speech or debate clause, 349 however, a lesser showing of need should be required
350
before the testimony is deemed necessary.

The Court has recognized additional privileges 351 that protect against the
mitted examination of council members at trial after plaintiffs established with other evidence the
possible improper motive underlying the ordinance. Of course, if the showing of impermissible purpose through independent evidence is strong enough, there conceivably would be no need for the
decisionmakers' testimony. See infra notes 615-19 and accompanying text.
345. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at, 268.
346. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
347. See infra notes 598-605 and accompanying text. In Nixon the Court concluded that
whether the President's qualified privilege to refuse to disclose confidential communications applies
is determined by balancing the need for the evidence against the threat of intruding on the function
of the executive branch. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-13. Although Nixon considered only a privilege
protecting against the disclosure of documents, Arlington Heights suggests an extension of the qualified privilege to testimonial evidence. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268. At least one lower court
has concluded that the plaintiffs could depose former President Nixon in a civil damage action
against him and other government officials for illegal wiretapping of plaintiffs' telephone. See
Halperin v. Kissinger, 401 F. Supp. 272,274 (D.D.C. 1975). Halperin was decided prior to Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), however, which held the former President to be immune from civil
damage suits for action taken within the "outer perimeter" of his official duties. Whether illegal
wiretapping constitutes official action for which the former President would be immune is another
question.
348. Overton Park's admonition that "such inquiry into the mental processes of administrative
decisionmakers is usually to be avoided," Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420, essentially states this principle. When such examination is unnecessary for the court's review, the privilege applies, and when it
is necessary, as for example in Overton Park, because no formal record existed, direct inquiry is
allowed.
349. See generally A. BicKEL, supra note 7, at 214 ("Considerations of regard for 'the station' so
strong when the Court reviews the work of the legislature, are surely not of the same intensity in the
relationship between the Court and administrative officials."). Professor Bickel also has suggested
that inquiry into the motives of administrative decisionmakers is more appropriate than the same
inquiry into legislative motivation because administrative purpose can be ascertained more readily.
See infra notes 622-24 and accompanying text.
350. It is impossible to set meaningful standards for the degree of necessity that is sufficient to
overcome a claim of privilege in the myriad potential factual circumstances in the abstract. Thus,
even if some decisionmakers are privileged less than others, the appropriate parameters should be
developed by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
351. This Article considers only federal documentary privileges. Numerous others have been
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disclosure of executive or administrative records containing state secrets, 35 2 law
enforcement and certain other investigatory files, 3 5 3 inter-354 and intra-agency
35 5
communications connected with policymaking and decisionmaking functions,
and confidential presidential communications. 356 Of these, only the state secrets
privilege is absolute. Whether the others apply is determined on a case-by-case
basis by balancing the needs of the litigant for the information against the harm
that disclosure will cause the government. 35 7 A pressing need for evidence may

override even the constitutionally based privilege protecting against the disclosure of confidential communications between the President and his senior
aides. 358 Although all of these privileges potentially may be claimed when liticreated by state statutes and recognized by the courts as a matter of state common law. See eg.,
Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176,445 A.2d 376 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 176 N.J. Super. 455, 423 A.2d 695 (Law Div. 1980); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 171 N.J. Super. 475, 410 A.2d 63 (App. Div. 1979); see also N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1984) (grants privilege to news media employees to refuse to disclose sources and other information "in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before an investigative
body").
352. The state secrets privilege protects military and diplomatic secrets of the government when
a reasonable danger exists that disclosure would reveal "military matters which, in the interest of
national security, should not be divulged." United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953). Once
recognized, the state secrets privilege is absolute, extending even to third parties whom the government may prevent from disclosing the secret. See id. at 7-8; see also Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (privilege belongs to United States and can be asserted by United States even when
United States not a party); Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D. Md. 1980) (Once it is established that a state secret exists, the government can prevent litigant from disclosing the secret.);
Aspin v. Department of Defense, 453 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (government met burden of
showing that information requested from Department of Defense fell within exemption from disclosure under Freedom of Information Act). See generally M. Larkin, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRmvILEGES § 5.02 (1984) (discussion of purpose and scope of executive privileges); C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 107, at 262 (3d ed. 1984) (discussion of common-law
privilege for military and diplomatic secrets); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE 509[1]-[4]
(1982) (discussion of Supreme Court Standard 509 concerning privilege for state secrets); 8 J. WIGMORE, supranote 300, § 2378, at 794-96 (discussion of privilege for state secrets and official information); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACCE AND PROCEDURE § 2019, at 158-60 (1970)
(discussion of privilege for state secrets). Although the Supreme Court in Reynolds explicitly left
open whether the state secrets privilege derived from the Constitution, the Court's recognition in
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), that the executive privilege is constitutionally based, see
infra note 358 and accompanying text, suggests that the state secrets privilege also is constitutionally
grounded.
353. See, eg., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Dos Santos v. O'Neill, 62
F.R.D. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The privilege
protects such records to the extent that disclosure would hinder law enforcement efforts.
354. See, eg., Jordan v. Department of Justice, 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Davis v. Braswell
Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1966); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss,
Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd on opinion below sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v.
Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (per curiam), cert denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
355. See, eg., Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1966); Smith
v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1015 (D. Del. 1975); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States,
157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
356. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d
1020 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (per curiam).
357. See, eg., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. Leggett & Platt,
Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1976) (investigatory files); Smith v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000,
1015 (D. Del. 1975) (intragovernmental opinions); Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 371 F. Supp.
97, 101-02 (D.D.C. 1974) (investigative materials).
358. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). In Nixon the Court concluded that, in the
context of a criminal trial, the constitutionally based interest in the availability of all relevant evidence, combined with the prosecutor's demonstrated specific need, overcame the President's quali-
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gants seek administrative records in motive cases, the privileges that protect in-

ter- and intra-agency deliberative communications almost always will be
implicated.
The privilege applying to inter- and intra-agency deliberative communica-

tions or official information protects "documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. ' 359 This privilege reflects two

concerns: encouragement "of open, frank discussion between subordinate and
chief concerning administrative action" 36° and protection from judicial interference with the executive branch. 3 61 It essentially is a documentary counterpart

to the testimonial privilege recognized in United States v. Morgan.362 Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, which basically exempts from the
Act's general requirements of disclosure those intragovernmental opinions and
recommendations protected by the common-law privilege, also reflects these
fled privilege. The Court noted that the President rarely will be required to disclose confidential
communications material to a criminal prosecution. Id. at 713. Nixon expressly left open whether
the qualified presidential privilege ever would yield to the need for relevant evidence in civil litigation. Id. at 712 n.19. Several lower courts, however, have determined that the privilege can be
overcome in civil suits, under some circumstances. For example, in Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242
(D.C. Cir. 1977), a civil damages action alleging a conspiracy to deny a class of citizens their civil
rights, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that plain.
tiffs had overcome former president Nixon's rebuttable presumption of privilege by demonstrating
both their substantial need for and the relevance of certain materials. Plaintiffs demonstrated the
requisite amount of need, in part by showing substantial violations of their constitutional rights and
that the materials could demonstrate defendants' possible involvement in those violations. Id. at
248-49. Similar conclusions have been reached by the other courts considering this issue. See, e.g.,
Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d 1020 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (per curiam); Halperin v. Kissinger, 401
F. Supp. 272 (D.D.C. 1975). In Sun Oil, however, the court suggested that the burden on the
litigant seeking discovery might be heavier in a civil rather than criminal case. Sun Oil, 514 F.2d at
1024; see infra note 412.
359. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324-26 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd
on opinion below sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (per curiam), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 952 (1967); see also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 153 (1975) (agency
opinions and interpretations must be disclosed); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Department of Air Force,
575 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (policy deliberative agency documents need not be disclosed); National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (portions of intraagency memorandum consisting of record summaries and expert and legal opinion would not be
made part of record on review); Cliff v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (IRS intra-agency
memorandum exempt from disclosure); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Coleman, 432 F. Supp. 1359
(N.D. Ohio 1976) (plaintiff failed to show need sufficient to overcome government's privilege to
shelter nonfinal administrative recommendations from disclosure).
360. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958);
see, ag., Merrill v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 565 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Grumman
Aircraft Eng'g Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S, 168
(1975); Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
361. See, eg., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 325-26 (D.D.C.
1967), aff'd on opinion below sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (per curiam),
cert denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967). The privileges have been stated to derive both from the separation
of powers doctrine, see, eg., Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 564 F.2d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1071 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and from the common law, see,
eg., Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710, 717-18 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
rev'd, 421 U.S. 168 (1975). It essentially is a documentary counterpart to the testimonial "privilege"
recognized in United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941); see supranotes 338-41 and accompanying text.
362. 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
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policies. 3 63
The courts have imposed three categorial limitations on the official information privilege, both for intergovernmental opinions and recommendations, and
exemption 5 .364 First, the privilege does not protect factual information that
can be redacted from deliberative materials. 3 65 Second, the privilege does not
cover administrative records created after, rather than before, an official decision
is made. 366 Last, when administrative records reveal the "working law" of the
agency-the reasons why administrative policy actually was adopted-the privilege does not protect them.3 67 Thus, the information in a great number of
records, from which the purpose for an administrative action reasonably could
be inferred, 368 should be subject to disclosure under existing law. Numerous
cases have concluded that the privilege protects against the disclosure of
predecisional advisory materials prepared "to assist an agency decisionmaker in
arriving at his decision."13 69 In those cases, however, the courts were not reviewing the deliberative processes of the administrative bodies to determine whether
illicit motives had affected the decisions. As the Supreme Court recognized in
Overton Park,370 when courts are obligated to inquire into the deliberative
processes of decisionmakers, those processes cannot remain shielded absolutely
363. These privileges, as well as those for state secrets and investigatory files, have been substantially affected by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). FOIA requires
disclosure, in one form or another, of virtually every document generated by a federal agency, unless
the document is within one of FOIA's nine exceptions. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
421 U.S. 132, 136 (1975). Although FOIA itself does not create or redefine any testimonial or
evidentiary privileges, the nine specified exceptions reflect congressional policy as to the commonlaw privileges paralleling the exceptions. In particular, exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5) (1982),
provides that the general disclosure requirement does not apply to "inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums [sic] or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency." Because this exemption essentially incorporates the common-law privilege for such information, cases interpreting the parameters of exemption 5 are instructive of the
reach of the common-law privilege. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 (1973).
364. In addition, courts also have concluded that administrative officials waive the protection of
exemption 5 by disclosing information within its scope to outsiders. See, e.g., Cooper v. Department
of Navy, 594 F.2d 484, 487-89 (5th Cir. 1979); North Dakota ex rel. Olson v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 177,
180-82 (8th Cir. 1978).
365. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (recognizing common-law limitation and applying it to exemption 5); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Brown v. United States, 58 F.R.D. 599, 602-03 (D.S.C. 1973).
366. See, e.g., Jordan v. Department of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 772-74 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
367. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151-54 (1975). The Sears Court also noted
that if any otherwise privileged information is incorporated expressly in a final administrative decision, it no longer is protected from disclosure. Id. at 161; see also Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC,
511 F.2d 815, 816-18 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (portions of agency minutes containing policy determinations
subject to disclosure); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (agency orders
and interpretations must be disclosed to prevent development of secret law).
368. See infra notes 509-54 and accompanying text.
369. Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975); see also
Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 249-52 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (consultant's
statements exempt from disclosure as part of deliberative process), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975);
Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600, 603-05 (5th Cir. 1966) (communications
between NLRB Regional Director and General Counsel were advisory opinions and exempt from
disclosure).
370. 401 U.S. 402 (1971); see also supra note 344 (judicial inquiry into decisionmaking process
necessary under some circumstances).
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from judicial scrutiny. Rather, they must be disclosed to the extent necessary
for effective judicial review.
C. Waiver
To the extent that privileges protect legislative and administrative officials
from being compelled to testify about the purpose for an official action, officials
should be free to waive those privileges. Decisionmaking bodies should not be
permitted to prevent their members from testifying voluntarily either about their
own motives or the motives of the body. The courts, however, should set a very
high standard for determining when a privilege has been waived voluntarily.
A number of commentators have assumed that individual decisionmakers
may testify voluntarily about the purpose for which a governmental decision was
made, 37 1 and numerous decisionmakers have done so 3 7 2 without formal objection from the bodies of which they were members. Presumably, the speech or
debate and corresponding administrative privileges may be waived to the same
extent as all other evidentiary privileges. 373 Generally, an evidentiary privilege
can be waived only by the holder of the privilege, or on the holder's behalf by
someone with express authority to do so, but never over the holder's objection.3 74 There is little consensus, however, on who holds the speech or debate
privilege. Congress, the courts, and commentators all have debated whether it
resides with the individual legislators or the institution as a whole; no one has
375
considered extensively who holds the analogous administrative privileges.
The purposes underlying the speech or debate and administrative privileges are
served most faithfully if both the individual decisionmakers and their respective
bodies hold the privileges to the extent that abrogation of the privileges would
threaten impermissibly the functional independence of either. In the context of
motivation analysis, however, a decisionmaking body generally should not be
allowed to prevent its members from testifying voluntarily.
Congressional members, following English precedent, 376 have argued that
the speech or debate privilege resides with both individual legislators and the
institution. 377 Under this view, the privilege could not be waived without the
371. See, e.g., Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the
ConstitutionalBan Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1041, 1106 (1978).
372. See supra note 303.
373. See, e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d

548, 551 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1978); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 352, § 83, at 198 (communicating spouse may waive privilege for marital communications), § 93, at 223 (attorney-client privilege may be waived by client); J. WiGMORE, supra note
300, § 2327 (waiver of marital privilege).

374. See supra note 373.
375. The following discussion therefore will center on the speech or debate clause. The principles set forth, however, apply equally to the administrative privileges discussed previously.
376. L. CUSHING, LEx PARLIAMENTARIS AMERICANA-ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRAC-

TiCE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 531, at 216 n.4, § 547,
at 223 (9th ed. 1874).
377. See, eg., 87 CONG. REc. 8933 (1962) (statement of Rep. Celler). Representative Fish was
served with a grand jury subpoena, which he presented to the House. In discussing the dual nature
of the privilege, Representative Celler stated:
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assent of both parties, and thus, an individual legislator could not disclose infor-

mation if the institution forbade it. Although the Supreme Court has implied
that the privilege is primarily personal, 378 it never has decided whether the privilege is held by the individual 379 or the institution. 380 Furthermore, the Court
never has had to decide whether an individual can waive the privilege over the
body's objection. The Court, however, has faced the opposite question whether
the institution can waive the privilege for individual legislators over their objec-

tions. This question has arisen several times in the context of indictments of
congressmen pursuant to section 201 of title 18 of the United States Code, which

makes it a criminal offense for public officials to accept bribes. 38 1 In each of
these cases the government has contended that Congress, in enacting the statute,

institutionally waived the speech or debate privilege for individual legislators
charged with bribery. Although the Court consistently has declined to resolve

this issue, 382 it has expressed its concern that institutional waiver would enable a
[T]here are two privileges involved: One the privilege of the House and one a personal
. If, after the House gives its consent or
privilege that is conferred upon the Member ...
authority for a Member to testify, then the question becomes one of personal privilege, in
contradistinction to the privilege of the House.
Id. at 8935; see also 4 CONG. REc. 1847 (1876); Kaye, supra note 280, at 59-61 (privilege may not be
waived without consent of House). Of course, a judicial determination of how this privilege can be
waived will prevail over Congress' view. See, eg., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
378. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507 (privilege was intended "to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators"); see also Coffin
v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808) (state legislative privilege analogous to speech or debate clause; "the
privilege secured by it is not so much the privilege of the house, as an organized body, as of each
individual member composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even against the declared will of
the house"); infra note 383.
379. The language of the speech or debate clause suggests that the privilege belongs to individual
members of Congress. The courts, however, always have given the clause a functional rather than a
literal interpretation. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
380. Two circuit courts have addressed this question in the context of criminal prosecutions of
state legislators. In United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, rev'dper curam, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.)
(en bane), cert denied,429 U.S. 999 (1976), a state congressman, indicted for violations of the Hobbs
Act, testified before the grand jury and gave statements to other government agencies. When he
later moved to suppress his testimony and statements, claiming that they were obtained in violation
of the federal and state speech or debate clauses, the government contended that the legislator had
waived any protection to which he was entitled. In resolving this issue, a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that because the legislature's independence derives
from the independence of its members, the privilege must belong to both the individual legislators
and the institution as a whole. Id. at 780. The court therefore concluded that an individual legislator can waive the privilege only to the extent that such a waiver will not threaten the independence
of other legislators or the body as a whole. On rehearing en banc, a majority of the full court
determined that neither the speech or debate clause nor common-law immunity protected a state
legislator being prosecuted for an alleged violation of federal law. United States v. Craig, 537 F.2d
957, 958 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976). In In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977), on the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the privilege belonged entirely to the individual legislator rather than to the institution. It thus recognized a personal privilege that individual legislators could claim to exclude evidence of their legislative acts from criminal proceedings. The court emphasized that individual
legislators, not the institution, are subject to criminal proceedings and consequently need this privilege to protect themselves in the exercise of their duties.
381. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501
(1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
382. The Court has held only that evidence of legislative acts may not be used against a legislator
being prosecuted under § 201. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 447 (1979).
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congressional majority to deprive unacceptably minority members of the privilege. 38 3 Commentators are divided on whether the institution can abrogate the
privilege against the will of the individual. Although several echo the Court's
concern and assume that Congress cannot strip individuals of the privilege, 38 4
others have advocated a circumscribed institutional waiver in particular
385
circumstances.
Whether the institution ever should be permitted to waive the privilege for
individual legislators is debatable. This issue need not be resolved, however, in

the context of motivation analysis. As a practical matter the question will not
arise because only the views of the majority of the decisionmaking body that
voted to take the challenged action are in issue, and it is highly unlikely that the
body would waive the privilege of one of its members who refuses to testify
about the purpose of the action. In motive cases the pertinent issue is whether

an individual decisionmaker can waive the privilege over the objections of the
body. This depends initially on whether the individual can waive the privilege at
all, even without objection from the decisionmaking body. The Supreme Court
expressly reserved this issue in United States v. Helstoski.3 86 Prior to his trial for
bribery, Congressman Helstoski testified at grand jury proceedings and produced documentary evidence about his actions. When he later moved to dismiss
the indictment against him, invoking the speech or debate privilege, the govern383. In United States v. Helstoski the Court stated:
We recognize that an argument can be made from precedent and history that Congress, as
a body, should not be free to strip individual Members of the protection guaranteed by the
Clause from being "questioned" by the Executive in the courts. The controversy over the
Alien and Sedition Acts reminds us how one political party in control of both the Legislative and the Executive Branches sought to use the courts to destroy political opponents.
Id. at 492-93; see also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 563 (1972) (White, J., dissenting)
(institutional waiver of speech or debate privilege violates separation of powers).
384. See, eg., Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 94, at 1166 ("Congress should not be able to
collectively circumscribe the constitutional rights of its individual members."); see also Celia, supra
note 94, at 41-42 (legislator who delivers speech inside halls of Congress entitled to legislative privilege); Note, Speech or Debate Clause, 9 SETON HALL L. REv. 861, 874 (1978) (speech or debate
privilege is personal, can only be waived by individual congressman); Note, supranote 189, at 1293
n.74 (concern for institutional integrity of legislative branch would limit permissible scope of statutory waiver by entire Congress of speech or debate clause rights). These commentators have viewed
the privilege as belonging to individual legislators.
385. Several commentators argue that Congress should be able to waive the speech or debate
privilege for legislators who abuse their office or violate the law. If the protection of an individual
legislator depends on the will of the institution, he well may be intimidated. See, e.g., Comment,
Brewster, Gravel and LegislativeImmunity, 73 COL. L. REV. 125, 151-52 (1973) (Congress should
be able to specify instances in which a representative can be punished in court for abuse of immunity.); Comment, supra note 94, at 816-19 (Congress should permit statutorily private suits against
legislators for damages for unconstitutional conduct.); Note, A Statutory Proposalfor Case-By-Case
Congressional Waiver of the Speech or Debate Privilege in Bribery Cases, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 465,
516 (1982) (After congressional investigation reveals that a legislator probably has accepted a bribe,
Congress should allow judicial prosecution.) [hereinafter cited as Note, A Statutory Proposal];Note,
The Bribed Congressman'sImmunity From Prosecution,75 YALE L. J. 335, 348-49 (1965) (Courts
should be allowed to prosecute Congressmen accused of bribery.) [hereinafter cited as Note, Immunity]. Justice Douglas has argued analogously that the speech or debate clause should not shield any
unconstitutional acts on the part of legislators. See, eg., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 518 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 327 (1973)
(Douglas, L, concurring); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 381-83 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
386. 442 U.S. 477, 490-96 (1979).

1985]

INQUIRY INTO DECISIONMAKER MOTIVE

ment contended that he had waived his right to protection. 3 87 The Supreme
Court held only that Helstoski's conduct was not a waiver, 3 88 and therefore
avoided having to decide whether an individual legislator constitutionally can
38 9
waive the privilege.
Whether an individual legislator should be able to waive the protections
provided by the speech or debate clause should depend on whether such a
waiver would support or hinder the fulfillment of the purposes underlying the
privilege. The primary function of the privilege is to safeguard legislative independence by preventing the intimidation of individual legislators. Therefore, if
legislators voluntarily waive the privilege and Congress does not object to their
testimony, the purpose for the privilege will not be infringed since neither the

individual legislators nor the institution will have felt sufficiently intimidated to
have claimed the privilege. 390 To the extent an individual's waiver threatens
impermissibly the functional independence of the institution, the decision should

not be made solely by the individual legislator. Rather, both the individual and
the institution should hold the privilege so that either can prevent the waiver

and its resulting chill. For example, if a member of Congress waived his own
immunity and allowed himself to be a defendant in a suit to enjoin ongoing
legislative activities of the body, the body still should be able to invoke its privilege and preclude injunctive relief.

In motive cases, however, a legislator's voluntary testimony about the purpose of an action will not impermissibly threaten 391 the institution, and thus an
individual legislator should be free to waive the privilege. When individuals seek
387. Id. at 490.
388. Id. at 492; see also infra notes 393-97 and accompanying text (standard governing waiver of
speech or debate privilege). The Court did not refer to an earlier hint in United States v. Gravel, 408
U.S. 606 (1972), that individual legislators might be able to waive the privilege. In Gravel, in determining that the privilege extends to a legislator's aide and can be invoked "by the Senator or by the
aide on the Senator's behalf," id. at 622, the Court had stated in a footnote: "It follows that an aide's
claim of privilege can be repudiated and thus waived by the Senator." Id. at 622 n.13. If the aide's
privilege is viewed as merely an extension of the senator's privilege, the legislator similarly should be
entitled to waive his own privileges.
389. Many commentators have argued or assumed that individual legislators, as holders of the
speech or debate privilege, can waive the clause's protections. See, eg., Reinstein & Silverglate,
supra note 94, at 1169-70; see also Oppenheim, CongressionalFreeSpeech, 8 LOYOLA L. REv. 1, 22
n.80 (1955-56) ("only reasonable" that individual legislator should be able to waive privilege); Note,
supra note 384, at 884-85 (speech or debate privilege is personal, can be waived only by individual
congressman); Note, supra note 189, at 1293 n.74 (waiver by individual congressman would seem
constitutional).
390. This point, however, must be tempered by two caveats. First, even though the majority of
either house of Congress might not vote to object to an individual legislator's waiver, there could be
numerous members of Congress who nevertheless would be intimidated by the individual's waiver
and subsequent testimony. In the context of motive analysis, however, not even the objections of the
entire insitution should prevent an individual's waiver. Second, legislators may feel more threatened
by public reaction to their invocation of the privilege than that from their testifying, see supra note
305, and therefore waive their privilege despite its intimidating effect. If legislators could claim that
it was impossible to waive, even though they wanted to waive, this pressure would not exist. In
reality, however, this pressure probably is quite small or nonexistent. More importantly, because
legislators are free, as guaranteed by the first amendment, to speak to the press about the purpose for
which an official action was taken, and because such statements would constitute nonlegislative acts
unprotected by the speech or debate privilege, see Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), the
same pressures also would exist with respect to public accountability.
391. Moreover, to the extent such testimony may threaten to disclose confidential congressional

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

to testify voluntarily about their own conduct and motives, the legislative body
should not be intimidated and should not be allowed to interfere. 392 The privi-

lege also will not be undermined by allowing legislators to testify about the institution's motivation. Nontestifying legislators have a legitimate speech or debate
clause interest only in being protected from the chill resulting from an inquiry
into legislative motivation. The Court, however, already has determined that

any chill to legislative autonomy resulting from such judicial inquiry is
subordinate to the necessity for effective review. Nonprivileged evidence of insti-

tutional purpose may not be precluded from use merely because of its chilling
effect on legislative behavior. Thus, there is no reason to treat the voluntary
testimony of a legislator any differently. Once the threat to the individual legislator who testifies is dispelled by a voluntary waiver, the body is not threatened
by this testimony any more than by other equally probative evidence of motive.
A legislative body, for example, should no more be able to prevent the voluntary
testimony of a legislator about what transpired in legislative debates, than that of
a third party who was present during the deliberations. 393 An individual deci-

sionmaker should be entitled to testify about the purpose of an official action
regardless of the objection of the decisionmaking body.
The Supreme Court already has determined what standard should govern
the validity of a waiver of the speech or debate privilege. In Helstoski the Court
held that if a waiver of the speech or debate privilege was allowable, it would

require "explicit and unequivocal renunciation of the protection." 394 Concerned

with possible judicial encroachment on legislative independence, the Court de-

termined that a more stringent standard of voluntariness than for other rights
must be satisfied to waive the speech or debate clause privilege. 395 Thus, a legiscommunications, other legislators may be able to prevent it. See infra notes 399-403 and accompanying text.
392. See United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, rev'd per curiam, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976) (individual can waive privilege to extent that his or her
conduct does not threaten independence of other members or of the institution); see also Note, supra
note 189, at 1293 n.74 (voluntary waiver should not pose threat to function of clause).
393. When little or no other evidence is available to prove legislative purpose, the voluntary
testimony of legislators will be more intimidating. That threat to the independence of the legislature,
however, would result from the use of any evidence of illicit motivation without which the court
could not properly review. Therefore, this additional threat would not overcome the Supreme
Court's implicit determination that a court's obligation to examine motive outweighs the resulting
intimidation.
394. Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 491; see also Greenburg v. Collier, 482 F. Supp. 200, 203-04 (E.D.
Va. 1979) ("strict" Hestoski standard requires explicit and unequivocal waiver).
395. The Court stated:
The ordinary rules for determining the appropriate standard of waiver do not apply in this
setting. See generally Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"); Garnerv. United States, 424 U.S.
648, 654 n.9, 657 (1976).
The Speech or Debate Clause was designed neither to assure fair trials nor to avoid
coercion. Rather, its purpose was to preserve the constitutional structure of separate, coequal, and independent branches of government. The English and American history of the
privilege suggests that any lesser standard would risk intrusion by the Executive and the
Judiciary into the sphere of protected legislative activities.
Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 491. But see United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 781 (because privilege does
not affect fairness of trial, lesser standard of voluntariness applies) (citing Schneckloth v. Bus-
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lator's statements to the press, for example, should not constitute a waiver.396
The court should recognize a waiver, however, once decisionmakers testify voluntarily about the purpose of a challenged action. 397 When decisionmakers testify for either the plaintiff or the government in a motive case, they should have

to submit to cross-examination by the opposing party. Moreover, each party
should be required in advance of trial to present a list of those legislators who

have agreed to testify so that the opposing party will have an opportunity to
depose them. When legislators intervene as defendants in an action, without
testifying, they should not be deemed to have waived the privilege, but should be
permitted to assist the court in adjudicating the constitutionality of an action

without putting their motives in issue. Intervenors should be free to argue, for
example, about the effect of a challenged action or plaintiffs' standing without
398
renouncing the privilege.
Finally, determining whether the privileges protecting against the disclosure of confidential legislative and administrative communications are waived
entails somewhat different considerations. Generally, evidentiary privileges that
protect confidential communications reside with the communicator of the confidence. 399 Thus, unlike with the speech or debate clause, individual legislators
should be able to object to the in-court disclosure of their confidential statements

by other legislators or third parties, since only the communicator can waive this
privilege. Similarly, only the creator of confidential documents, such as interlegislative and personal memoranda, should be able to waive any privilege
protecting them from disclosure. The privilege for documentary evidence generated by Congress as an institution should belong to the body, and Congress as a
whole should determine whether to waive it.4° °

Because waiver of this privilege does not implicate the same separation of
powers concerns as waiver of the speech or debate clause,4° 1 it need not be governed by the same demanding standard of explicit and unequivocal renunciation.
Instead, waiver of the privilege prohibiting the disclosure of confidential legislatamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242 (1973)), rev'd per curiam, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied,
429 U.S. 999 (1976).
396. The court should consider a legislator's willingness to speak publicly about the purpose of
an official action in measuring the degree of intrusion that will result from compelled testimony. See
infra notes 411-14 and accompanying text.
397. Cf. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (privilege against self incrimination cannot
be used to protect others); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1898) (same).
398. See, ag., May v. Cooperman, No. 83-89, slip op. at 40 (D.N.J., March 14, 1983) ("I do not
think [the legislators] entrance in the case constitutes a complete waiver from their immunity to
discovery, but they will be required to provide all discovery which will enable plaintiffs to prepare for
trial. If a legislator expects to testify at trial, he will be required to submit to deposition."); cf.
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (The government's consent to be sued, such as
under the federal tort claims act, does not implicitly waive any of its privileges.).
399. See supra note 373.
400. The executive branch possesses analogous governmental privileges protecting confidential
communications. See, eg., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (executive privilege belongs
to President and may be waived by head of agency or chief executive officer responsible for department in question); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (informant's identity privilege belongs to government); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953) (state secrets privilege
belongs to and only can be waived by the government).
401. See supra notes 394-98 and accompanying text.
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tive and administrative communications should be determined in the same man-

ner as the waivers of other govermental and individual privileges protecting
confidentiality of communications. Those privileges are waived either by the
holder's voluntary revelation or by his failure to object to his own or another
witness' disclosure when he has an opportunity to object. 4° 2 Thus, as long as

decisionmaking bodies and individual decisionmakers act reasonably to safeguard the confidentiality of their communications, they should not be considered
4 °3
to have waived their privilege.

Practically, however, legislators may be unable to prevent colleagues from
disclosing outside of court the legislators' confidential remarks. Generally,
when the nonholder of a privilege discloses the holder's confidential communications, the holder nevertheless can protect against evidentiary use of the privileged information. 4°4 This "use immunity," prohibiting further use against the
holder of the privilege of already disclosed information, ensures that communication within confidential relationships is not chilled. For example, if a client's
communication to his attorneys could be used against him after the attorney

revealed the information, clients undoubtedly would be less candid with their
attorneys. When disclosed confidences are used against a third party rather than

against the holder of the privilege, however, there would be no such chilling
effect. Once confidential information has been revealed, the holder will not be

harmed further or intimidated by its use in litigation in which he is not
involved.

4°5

402. See, eg., United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir. 1979) (attorney-client privilege waived when attorney, with client's consent, voluntarily discloses information); United States v.
Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1978) (spousal privilege waived when confidential communication
disclosed by holder); Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 460-61 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(attorney-client privilege waived by voluntary disclosure during discovery); see also Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 23-25 (9th Cir. 1981) (attorney-client
privilege waived by inadvertent disclosure during discovery); United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038,
1043-44 (2d Cir. 1979) (spousal communications privilege waived by failure to assert it during suppression hearing); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1972) (spousal privilege waived by failure to object to testimony violating privilege); C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 352,
§ 93, at 223-24 (client alone may waive attorney-client privilege).
403. Some courts have found waiver when a privilege holder negligently fails to keep a confidence. See, eg., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); In re
Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see United States v. Bigos, 459 F.2d 639, 643 (1st
Cir.) (although presence of third party ordinarily waives attorney-client privilege, presence of client's
father during interview did not waive privilege when parties intended communications to remain
confidential), cert denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972).
404. For example, the attorney-client privilege still exists even though an attorney voluntarily
discloses the client's confidences out of court. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 300, § 2325, at 632; see
also FED. R. EvID. 512 (proposed rule, Advisory Committee Note) ("Confidentiality, once destroyed, is not susceptible of restoration, yet some measure of repair may be accomplished by
preventing use of the evidence against the holder of the privilege. The remedy of exclusion is therefore made available when the earlier disclosure was compelled erroneously or without opportunity to
claim the privilege.").
405. J. WIGMORE, supra note 300, § 2374, at 766 (once informer's identity known, privilege
protecting identity is "merely an artificial obstacle to proof"); see also Cooper v. Department of
Navy, 594 F.2d 484, 487-89 (5th. Cir. 1979) (privilege is waived once general access to confidential
information has been permitted); North Dakota ex rel. Olson v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 177, 180-82 (8th
Cir. 1978) (government waived privilege by disclosing information to private party); Mead Data
Cent., Inc. v. Department of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253-58 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (once government
discloses to outsiders material that otherwise would be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act, government waives right to claim exemption).
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The use, however, is not harmless in suits challenging the constitutionality
of governmental actions. Regardless of whether administrators and legislators
are parties to the action, they have a strong interest in any challenge to the
legitimacy of their motives. Such an action not only may disclose evidence of
their motives, but that evidence may be a critical factor in the invalidation of
their conduct. Invalidation will be based on a finding of unconstitutional intent,
and thus the evidentiary use of confidential communications to show such motives, even though those communications already have been disclosed, is likely
to intimidate the holder further. Disclosure of confidential legislative and administrative communications by nonholders of the privilege therefore should not
waive the holder's privilege when those communications are sought to be used in
motive cases.
III.

DETERMINING THE CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE

To the extent that privileges protecting against compelled testimony of
decisionmakers and disclosure of confidential information are not absolute,
courts must use some mechanism to determine whether the privileges apply in
specific cases. The procedures employed to facilitate this determination should
be designed to expose and balance the competing interests favoring and opposing
application of a privilege. These privileges generally help to maintain the separation of powers by guaranteeing the functional independence of the decisionmaking bodies. 4° 6 In a specific case, however, the degree of intrusion on these
governmental interests varies with the type of evidence sought and the manner
in which it is presented or discovered.
On the other hand, these interests conflict with the litigants' need to present, and the courts' need to consider, all relevant facts when adjudicating the
constitutionality of government action. Thus, the need for the evidence, its relevance 4° 7 and probative value,408 and the importance of the proof must be balanced 4° 9 against the degree of harm that the goverment will suffer from the
406. See supra notes 84-370 and accompanying text
407. FED. R. EVID. 401 provides that "relevant" evidence is evidence "having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
408. The probative value of evidence is the extent to which the evidence actually proves the facts
sought to be proved; it is the degree to which evidence furnishes, establishes, or contributes toward
proof. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 352, § 185, at 542.
409. The claimant of the privilege generally bears the burden of persuasion that an absolute
privilege applies. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 697 F.2d 277, 279 (10th Cir.
1983); FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Landorf, 591 F.2d
36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978). Thus, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that confidential
communications between government officials are within the official information privileges, and thus
not subject to categorical exception. See, eg., Smith v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1016 (D. Del.
1975); United States v. Article of Drug, 43 F.R.D. 181, 190 (D. Del. 1967). Congress also allocated
this burden to the government in proceedings under FOIA. See, eg., National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Campbell, 593 F.2d 1023, 1025-26 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 119195 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Commentators have suggested that this allocation in the FOIA suggests that
the government should bear the burden even in non-FOIA cases.
It would make little sense to place upon the litigant, whose need for information is immediate and at least presumptively real, the burden of proving his entitlement to it, when Congress has directed that the government bear the converse burden of proving a matter to be
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intrusion into decisionmakers' independence or the disclosure of confidential
information.
Even if the compelled testimony of decisionmakers about the motive underlying an action will be very intimidating, their privilege to refuse to testify
4 10
If
should yield if such testimony is probative and critical to a litigant's case.
exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, where the need of the party seeking the information is not even a factor in his entitlement.
2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 231, at 760 (1978).
As with an absolute privilege, the party invoking a qualified privilege bears the initial burden of
demonstrating that the evidence is within the privilege. Thereafter, the opposing party bears the
burden of persuading the court that the litigant's need for the evidence should override the privilege.
Thus, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the Supreme Court held that when the President claims the privilege, the trial court should treat the material as presumptively privileged and
"require the Special Prosecutor to demonstrate that the Presidential material was 'essential to the
justice of the [pending criminal] case.'" Id. at 713. Similarly, the criminal defendant who seeks
disclosure of an informant's identity bears the burden of showing a specific need for the information.
See, eg., United States v. Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 911 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1004
(1981); United States v. Pantohan, 602 F.2d 855, 858-59 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Toombs,
497 F.2d 88, 93 (5th Cir. 1974).
The Supreme Court has not considered how to allocate burdens under a speech or debate clause
claim of privilege. At least one circuit court, however, has concluded that a legislator who invokes
the privilege as to information in his sole possession, which the court needs to determine whether his
acts are legislative, bears "the burden of going forward and of persuasion by a preponderance of the
evidence." In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1978); see also In re Possible
Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F. Supp. 211, 213 (D.D.C. 1980) (congressman required to
submit index of subpoenaed documents). Placing the burden on the legislators to establish that their
conduct was legislative and therefore within the speech or debate clause privilege is consistent with
the courts' allocation of burdens for other privileges.
If the courts permit a litigant's need for the evidence to overcome a decisionmaker's claim of
privilege, they should adopt such an allocation of burdens. Decisionmakers should bear the initial
burden of showing that they are entitled to a qualified privilege. The litigant seeking the evidence
then should bear the burden of persuasion that his need for the evidence overrides the privilege.
410. When the court upholds a decisionmaker's claim of privilege in an action alleging unconstitutional purpose, should it impose some sanction against the government's case? Courts frequently
have imposed such sanctions to accommodate the government's need for secrecy with litigants'
needs for relevant evidence. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 181-85 (1969);
Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923, 940-41 (E.D. Mich. 1981); United States v. Cotton Valley
Operators Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719, 720-21 (W.D. La. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 339
U.S. 940 (1950). Proposed FED. R. EVID. 509(e) provides:
If a claim of [official information] privilege is sustained in a proceeding to which the government is a party and it appears that another party is thereby deprived of material evidence, the judge shall make any further orders which the interests of justice require,
including striking the testimony of a witness, declaring a mistrial, finding against the government upon an issue as to which the evidence is relevant, or dismissing the action.
Courts have exercised each of these options at one time or another. See, e.g., United States v.
Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (when government was required to produce exculpatory
material, court noted that it could dismiss the action to ensure a fair trial), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1120 (1977); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 893-94 (where nondisclosure under the Jencks
Act would not result in harmless error, remedies such as striking testimony or calling a mistrial may
be invoked), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1974); Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d 462 (1975) (failure on
court order to produce documents claimed to be privileged resulted in issue preclusive sanctions
against government).
When the government is prosecuting a criminal action, it may not assert a claim of privilege to
prevent disclosure of materials relevant to the merits of the defense; it either must waive its privilege
or dismiss the prosecution. See, eg., United States v. O'Connor, 273 F.2d 358, 360-61 (2d Cir.
1959); United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v. Ehrlichman, 376
F. Supp. 29, 35-36 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1976).
One circuit also has applied this rule when the material claimed to be privileged was relevant for
impeachment but not the merits of the defense. See United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 583-84
(2d Cir. 1946). This procedure also has been followed in some civil cases in which the government
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decisionmakers will not be intimidated by public examination of the specific mowas the plaintiff. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513, 517-18 (8th Cir. 1958); Bank Line, Ltd. v.
United States, 76 F. Supp. 801, 803-04 (D.N.Y. 1948). But see Republic of China v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551, 557 (D. Md. 1956) (plaintiff United States not required to disclose
military secrets).
Courts occasionally have ruled against the government, as a civil defendant, when a privilege
properly prevented the disclosure of relevant evidence. See e.g., Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F.
Supp. 923, 940-41 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (ifprotection of privileged material deprives plaintiff of material evidence, government is liable on affected issues; hearing necessary to determine whether plaintiffs deprived of material evidence). When courts sustain a party's or witness' claim of privilege to
refuse to testify or answer particular questions, however, they virtually never impose sanctions, or
permit the trier of fact to draw an adverse evidentiary inference. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965) (fifth amendment privilege prevents prosecutor from commenting adversely on defendant's failure to testify); United States v. Tapia-Lopez, 521 F.2d 582, 584 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Black, 497 F.2d 1039, 1042 n.3 (5th Cir. 1974). But see United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601
F.2d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1979) (when party holding privilege to prevent witness from testifying
argues to jury that adversary failed to call witness, court can inform jury that privilege prevented
adversary from calling witness).
Three principles can be distilled from these cases to assist courts in determining the effect of
upholding a decisionmaker's claim of privilege. First, as with the initial determination whether a
claim of privilege should prevail, the court should balance the competing interests on an ad hoc
basis, while being guided by the remaining two rules.
Second, the courts correctly have been more willing to impose issue-preclusive sanctions when
the government instigates the litigation either as a plaintiff in a civil suit or as the complainant in a
criminal action. The government should not be permitted to institute criminal and civil suits while
simultaneously secreting away information needed by the defendants. Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 83 (1963) (holding that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process when the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment;
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"); United States v. Ramirez, 513 F.2d
72, 78 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting "abhorrence of the concealment of material arguing for innocence by
one arguing for guilt"). In criminal prosecutions, such activity even might violate statutory or constitutional rights. See e.g., The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982) (requiring disclosure of prosecution witness' pretrial statements after witness testifies); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1969); United States v. O'Connor, 273 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). When legislative or administrative
motivation is relevant, the decisionmakers either would be defendants or would not be parties at all.
See supra notes 143-76 and accompanying text. Thus, the named defendants may have no control
over a decisionmaker's choice to invoke the privilege. Under those circumstances, an individual
witness' decision to assert a privilege should not be imputed to the defendants. This distinction
generally will weigh against the imposition of sanctions when a decisionmaker's claim of privilege is
sustained.
Third, and most important, the courts properly have distinguished between the varying effects
that should follow from the assertion of vaiious privileges. When the privilege invoked prevents
disclosure of official information in criminal cases, courts routinely impose sanctions on the government in exchange for recognizing the privilege. In criminal cases in which the government successfully asserts the informant's privilege, however, courts do not impose such sanctions. This difference
in treatment arises from the different justifications for the respective privileges and variations in the
corresponding procedures for balancing the competing needs for and against disclosure. When the
government claims the privilege not to disclose official information, and it has a sufficient need for
confidentiality, the information should not be disclosed regardless of the litigant's need. See, e.g.,
Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S. 168 (1975) (advisory materials exempt from disclosure); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (state secrets privilege). In
contrast, the government's need to keep secret the identity of an informant always appears to succumb to a sufficient showing of need by the accused. See e.g., United States v. Ayala, 643 F.2d 244,
24647 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Silva, 580 F.2d 144, 14647 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Tucker, 552 F.2d 202, 206-09 (7th Cir. 1977). All cases that disallow disclosure of the informants'
identities do so because the accused has not shown sufficient need, not because the government's
interest in nondisclosure outweighs the accused's need. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 627
F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980) (informant not only eyewitness to transactions in issue); United States v. Garcia, 625 F.2d 162, 165-66 (7th Cir.) (need of accused for
informant's name "relatively slight"), cert denied, 449 U.S. 923 (1980); United States v. Webster,
606 F.2d 581, 584-85 (5th Cir. 1979) (informant was "mere tipster").
When the government's claim of privilege for official information or state secrets is upheld, the
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tive in question,4 11 or the procedures for eliciting the evidence are less intru-

sive,4 12 however, a less demanding demonstration of need should overcome the
court should consider imposing issue-preclusive sanctions, at least when the government is the plaintiff or complainant. The government should pay some price for inhibiting its opponents' ability to
prove their case. Cf. Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 220 n.60 (5th Cir. 1975) (successful invocation of congressional privilege to prevent disclosure of prior congressional testimony of criminal
prosecution witness perhaps may require government to dismiss case if accused is denied essential
evidence). On the other hand, when the government's assertion of the informant's privilege, or the
decisionmaker's privilege proposed by this Article, is sustained, the privilege is upheld precisely
because the information sought was not sufficiently necessary, probative, or important to the plaintiff's case. Thus, the government should not be penalized for invoking these privileges since nondisclosure should not have a significant adverse effect on the litigant or the court's decision.
Furthermore, it arguably is more important for the court to find the facts accurately in actions
adjudicating the constitutionality oflaws than in civil suits seeking damages. Thus, it may be appropriate in some circumstances to require the government to pay the price of secrecy by imposing civil
liability against it for damages. When determining the constitutionality of enacted legislation, however, the government should not be penalized for its successful claim of privilege because the law at
issue may be beneficial and valid. Furthermore, since decisionmakers either will be nonparty witnesses or defendants, rather than plaintiffs or prosecutors, sanctions for the successful assertion of
privilege are inappropriate.
411. Courts should be sensitive to the stigma attending the particular illicit motive. Proof that a
decisionmaker's racially prejudiced motive caused a governmental action could be severely intimidating. Proof that a city counsel restricted street vending to shield local businesses from competition, however, may be received tolerantly, if not approved, even though such motive might render
the restriction unconstitutional. Cf. Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 545, 154 A.2d 9,
18 (1959) (municipality's police power to regulate soliciting cannot be used to shield local businesses). Local decisionmaking bodies frequently have taken action for purposes, though unconstitutional, that reflect the desires of the community. See, e'g., McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F.
Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). In these circumstances, the exposure of the "illicit" purposes is hardly
intimidating. The most controversial purposes probably would be those that infringe fundamental
rights or discriminate against suspect classes. Thus, when the magnitude of the right is greater, the
heightened need for evidence may counterbalance a deeper intrusion. See infira note 605.
412. Requiring decisionmakers to testify probably is more intrusive than subjecting them to discovery. The scope of permissible questioning in discovery, however, is much broader than at trial.
The information sought in discovery need not be admissible at trial; it only must appear reasonably
calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Thus, discovery
may be more intrusive than in-court testimony, at least in the breadth of examination. The Supreme
Court has imposed the stricter requirement that materials subpoenaed prior to trial must be relevant
and admissible when the information is subject to a claim of presidential privilege. See, e.g., United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-15 (1974); see also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (President's conversations within scope of his official duties presumptively privileged; presumption fails if great need shown). If this standard applied to discovery of all evidence subject to a
qualified privilege, testimony in court almost always would be more intrusive. In Nixon, however,
this requirement seemed to derive from the Special Prosecutor's subpoena of the material under
FED. R. CriM. P. 17(c), which the courts have interpreted to require relevance and admissibility
before such evidence can be discovered. Cf. 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(Criminal) § 274 (1969) (party seeking pretrial production of materials under FED. R. CRIhi. P.
17(c) should bear burden of showing good cause). Although it is uncertain whether this standard
would apply in discovering presidential or executive communications in a civil case, see, e.g., Sun Oil
Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d 1020 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (per cliriam) (declining to do so), the Court in
Nixon implied that it might be appropriate by noting that the President's interest in confidentiality
should be accorded greater deference than that of ordinary individuals. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708-09,
715-16.
Although discovery should be restricted to some extent to accommodate the interests protected
by legislative and administrative privileges, it probably is not necessary to impose a hard and fast
requirement, such as admissibility. If decisionmakers' responses to discovery reasonably will lead
the plaintiff to other critical evidence, discovery should be permitted. As when determining whether
a decisionmaker should have to testify, the need, probative value, and importance of the information
sought should be balanced against the likely degree of intrusion on a case-by-case basis.
Decisionmakers probably will view giving deposition testimony as interfering more with their
independence than answering interrogatories. In many jurisdictions, however, interrogatories require the party answering them to obtain the necessary information from his agents, employees, and
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privilege. Similarly, when evidence subject to a qualified privilege goes toward

the motives of the institution as a whole rather than of particular decisionmaker
under examination, the lesser degree of intrusion should justify overriding the
4 14
privilege more readily. 4 13 In these circumstances, there is less interference
with the governmental interests that the decisionmakers' privilege protects.
The elements that a plaintiff must prove to be entitled to relief, and the
ways in which he may prove them, dictate the probative value of and need for
evidence of decisionmaker intent. One commentator has suggested that the im-

portant questions in motivation analysis now are all evidentiary. 4 15 The answers

attorneys. See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 33; N.J. Cr. R. 4:17-4. Thus, interrogatories may require more
time than depositions. In addition, most jurisdictions only allow interrogatories to be served on
parties to the litigation. See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 33; N.J. Cr. R. 4:17-4. Since legislators, unlike
administrators, cannot be named as defendants in actions challenging the consitutionality of laws
that they enacted, interrogatories only could be served on them in those rare instances that they
intervene as party-defendants. Cf. May v. Cooperman, Civ. No. 83-89, slip op. 40 (D.N.J. March 14,
1983).
The compelled production of documents generally should be the least intrusive means of eliciting evidence from decisionmakers, assuming that the information disclosed is otherwise comparable.
Courts have identified the factors to weigh in determining the government's need to protect the
confidentiality of documents when the government has claimed an offical information privilege. See
supra notes 351-69 and accompanying text. Those factors which measure the harm that the government will suffer from disclosing confidential materials generally should apply to legislative bodies as
well.
Finally, courts have many procedures at their disposal, such as protective orders and in camera
inspections and continuances, that in some instances can reduce the intrusion on governmental interests by accommodating decisionmakers' time and confidentiality. All of these variables can affect
both the amount of time decisionmakers must expend and the extent of intimidation they experience.
Whether a legislature is in session or an administrative body is active also can influence the
amount of interference resulting from compelled questioning or submission to discovery. Distracting decisionmakers from the deliberations of their institution can be more intrusive than distracting
them at other times. Thus, judicial inquiry of state legislators, whose responsibilities are only part
time, may be less intrusive than inquiry of federal legislators, who often engage in essential legislative
activity even when Congress is not in session.
413. It should not be very intimidating, for example, for a decisionmaker to have to testify about
the public debate of an action. Conversely, when an action was taken by a close vote, and the
motives of a single decisionmaker affected the outcome, compelling his testimony will be more intimidating. In that instance, however, there will be a high probative value to the evidence of the individual decisiomaker's motives. See infra text accompanying notes 484-85. Frequently, the plaintiff's
need for the evidence will correspond similarly with the strength of the applicable privilege; such
correspondence is common in the law of evidence. For example, in the area of other-crimes evidence, the similarity between the crime for which the accused currently is being tried and the prior
crimes the prosecution seeks to offer into evidence increases simultaneously both the probative value
and the prejudiciality of such evidence.
Between these extremes of proving purely institutional and proving purely individual motivation is a spectrum of encroachment on legislative and administrative independence. For example,
when a five-member decisionmaking body voted four to one to take a challenged action, focusing on
the motivations of one decisionmaker in the majority is probably less intimidating than if the vote
had been three to two, because the vote being examined would not constitute a "but for" cause of the
body's action.
414. Measurement of the degree of intrusion on governmental interests must take into account
both objective and subjective factors. To the extent that the court seeks to minimize distractions
from a decisionmaker's legislative duties, it should consider his particular circumstances and availability. On the other hand, when the court determines the degree to which its present decision to
compel testimony will intimidate decisionmakers in the future, and interfere with legislative independence, its determination should be objective. The court should decide whether its present actions
would intimidate "reasonably independent decisiomakers" into altering their legislative behavior to
avoid having to testify in the future. If the intrusion will not intimidate decisionmakers to that
degree, it will not harm significantly the interests underlying the privilege.
415. See Simon, supra note 371, at 1130.
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to some of these evidentiary questions, however, depend on the theoretical
framework of motivation analysis, which is not yet complete.
A. What is UnconstitutionalPurpose?
Not surprisingly, there is no consensus among either commentators or the
courts on what constitutes unconstitutional purpose. The definitions of unconstitutional purpose derive from the underlying theories of the role of motive in
constitutional analysis. No single theory has been accepted conclusively and the
Supreme Court has not articulated a complete and coherent theory of its own.
Differences in the various theories of how and why certain impermissible motives taint governmental action and inaction have generated a number of unresolved issues regarding the definition and proof of unconstitutional motive.
The manner in which these issues ultimately are resolved will affect profoundly
the probative value of and need for different kinds of evidence of unconstitutional purpose.
Three essential issues in defining unconstitutional motivation remain unresolved., First, what motives are impermissible? Second, what role did the impermissible motive play in the decisionmaking process? Resolution of this issue
will depend both on who harbored the motive and how it affected the decision.
Last, is the impermissible motive measured objectively or subjectively?
Although these issues are related, the courts and a number of commentators
have confused and distorted them in debating the distinction between motive
and purpose, which itself confuses what unconstitutional motive is with how it
can be proved.
In considering the constitutionality of governmental actions, the Supreme
Court repeatedly has distinguished between legislative purpose and legislative
motivation. In Washington v. Davis 4 1 6 the Court made such a distinction in an
ambiguous passage that has received considerable attention. 4 17 The Davis Court
discussed its refusal five years earlier, in Palmer v. Thompson, 4 18 to consider
whether a decision of the Jackson, Mississippi city council to close rather than
desegregate the public swimming pools was unconstitutional because it was motivated by racial animus. The Davis Court described Palmeras holding that "the
legitimate purposes of the ordinance-to preserve peace and avoid deficits-were
not open to impeachment by evidence that the councilmen were actually motivated by racial considerations. 4 1 9 Although the Court appeared to distinguish
between evidence of the motivation of an institution and that of individual decisionmakers, 420 the significance of that distinction is uncertain. 42 1 Was the
416. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
417. See, eg., Simon, supra note 371, at 1103-05; Comment, Reading the Mind of the School
Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 327 (1976).
418. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
419. Davis, 426 U.S. at 243.
420. Professor Simon also makes this point. See Simon, supra note 371, at 1103-05.
421. Many commentators have concluded correctly that, apart from whatever distinction the
Court is attempting to draw, the concepts of legislative or administrative intent and motivation are
functionally identical. Both tei-ms are used commonly and interchangeably to denote the objectives
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Court explaining what must be shown to establish a constitutional violation, how
or "goals that the decisionmakers seek to achieve by the operation of their decision." See, eg.,
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 106 n.321; cf. Clark, Legislative Motivation and FundamentalRights in
ConstitutionalLaw, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 953, 956-63 (1978) (comparing definitions and usages of
terms "motivation" and "purpose" and concluding that "legislative purpose" and "legislative motivation" are functionally identical although Supreme Court makes a distinction); Ely, supra note 2, at
1221 (difficult to distinguish between motive and purpose; even if distinction could be made motive
irrelevant); Note, Legislative Purposeand ConstitutionalAdjudication,83 HARV. L. REV. 1887, 1887
n.l (1970) ("Commentators have made much of the distinction between 'motive' and 'purpose.'...
It is probably fruitless to attempt a principled articulation of the distinction ....
") [hereinafter
cited as Note, ConstitutionalAdjudication].For example, the Court used "purpose" and "motive" as
functional equivalents in Arlington Heights:
[Washington v.] Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action
rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or
administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by
a single concern. . . . When there is proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a
motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified.
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66.
Some commentators have attempted to discern differences between the two terms, with motive
meaning the subjective volition or reason for an act, and purpose, in contrast, meaning the act's
foreseeable effect. Eg., A. BicKEL, supra note 7, at 209. Bickel noted:
Some of the difficulty [about resort to legislative motive] is due to confusion between, on
the one hand, a finding of motive properly speaking. . . and, on the other, a determination
of "purpose" which. . . is either the name given to the Court's objective assessment of the
effect of a statute or a conclusory term denoting the Court's independent judgment of the
constitutionally allowable end that the legislature could have had in view.
Id.; see also Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 106 n.321 (commentators distinguish between "motive" and
"purpose"); Ely, supranote 2, at 1217-21 (suggesting that legislator's "purpose" in passing law is his
immediate aim, while his "motive" is his more distant aim); Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial
Segregation, and The Friendly Critics,49 CALIF. L. REV. 104, 115-21 (1961) (distinguishing between
legislative motive and legislative intent in enacting segregation legislation); MacCallum, Legislative
Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 756-57 (1966) (distinguishing various meanings of term "legislative intent"); Note, ConstitutionalAdjudication, supra, at 1887-88 n.1 (commentators distinguish between
"motive" and "purpose"); Note, supra note 7, at 1091-92 (determination of legislators' purposes is
"objective"; determination of legislators' motives "involves going beyond these generally objective
criteria and attempting to discover the state of mind of the legislators when they enacted the measure"); Note, Making the ViolationFit the Remedy: The Intent Standardand EqualProtection Law,
92 YALE LJ. 328, 328 n.2 (1982) (commentators distinguish terms "intent," "purpose," and "motive") [hereinafter cited as Note, The Intent Standard].
The lower courts have been similarly confused and have applied the intent standard inconsistently. Compare Armstrong v. O'Connell, 451 F. Supp. 817, 821-23 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (defendants
acted with discriminatory purpose but were not necessarily motivated by discriminatory intent) with
Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 149-50 (D. Mass. 1978) (statute's purpose was promotion of veterans but intended to do so through subordination of women), rev'd sub nom. Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); compare Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 921-24 (4th
Cir. 1981) (circumstantial evidence of effect of vote dilution insufficient to demonstrate that at-large
election system was enacted or maintained for discriminatory purpose), cert, denied, 457 U.S. 1120
(1982) with Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 207-17 (8th Cir.) (circumstantial evidence
sufficient to establish that at-large voting system was maintained for illicit purpose), aff'd, 459 U.S.
801 (1982). See, ag., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 435 F. Supp. 53, 62 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Branch v.
DuBois, 418 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
The argument of Professor Eisenberg and others that nothing of constitutional significance
turns on the suggested distinction between these terms is persuasive. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 41;
Ely, supra note 2, at 1207 n.l, 1217-21. The Court has failed to distinguish explicitly between these
words. Brest, supra note 14, at 104 n.55; Clark, supra, at 955-62; Note, The Intent Standard,supra,
at 316 n.2.
Any shades of difference in the meaning of these terms (and thus of the necessary inquiry) may
affect substantially the resulting evidentiary issues. Since "purpose," as defined by these commentators, is determined primarily from the terms of a statute, its operation, and the legal and practical
context in which it was enacted, see Note, ConstitutionalAdjudication, supra, at 1887 n.1, a court
need not consider (and even may find irrelevant) evidence of the subject intent of legislators. A court
only need consider the language of the statute, its probable effects, prior law, accompanying legisla-
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such a showing may be made, or, more likely, was it confusing the two? 4 2 2
Moreover, the Court also confused who must share the illicit motive with
whether the motive must be measured objectively or subjectively. The Court
may have been attempting to state that for illicit motivation to invalidate an
official action, it must be shared by or be attributable to the decisionmaking
body as a whole. Under this view, a single decisionmaker's impermissible purpose, "but for" which the action would not have been taken, would not make
out a constitutional violation. Only evidence of illicit motives shared by the
entire institution would be admissible. 4 23 Even with that requirement of institutional intent, however, the motives of individual decisionmakers still would be
relevant, because at a minimum, if all the individual members of the body acted
because of illicit purpose, that would seem to establish the institution's illicit
424
purpose.
On the other hand, Davis' discussion of Palmermay be interpreted to mean
that in Palmer,because the council's decision did not have disproportionate racial consequences and did have an ostensibly legitimate purpose,425 the motivation of the council was irrelevant to the constitutionality of the challenged
action. 426 Under that interpretation the Court would not be intending to distin4 27
guish between individual and institutional intent.
tion, enacted statements of purpose, and formal public pronouncements. Id.; see also H. HART
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1413-16 (1958) (in inferring purpose courts should consider legislatures' probable reason for replacing old law with new, the context of the law, the post-enactment constructions of the law, and if
necessary, general policy presumptions); Note, supra note 7, at 1077, 1091 (in inferring purpose
courts "may properly consider not only the language of the statute but also general public knowledge
about the evil sought to be remedied, prior law, accompanying legislation, enacted statements of
purpose, formal public pronouncements, and internal legislative history").
422. Professor Clark has suggested that the Court's effort to distinguish between legislative "purpose" and legislative "motivation" "seems to mean that the Court disbelieves the possibility of
clearly demonstrating by direct evidence, such as legislative history, that a majority of individual
legislators intended unconstitutional goals." Clark, supra note 421, at 973-74. Clark apparently
believes that the Court was discussing how to prove legislative motivation and not what legislative
motivation is. Clark, however, also seems to be assuming that according to Davis legislative purpose
denotes the shared purpose of a majority of the individual decisionmakers, not just a purpose without which the legislature would not have acted. Thus, his views seems to support the position that
the Davis Court merged its views on what constitutes legislative purpose with how that purpose can
be proved.
423. See infra notes 487-90 and accompanying text.
424. See infra notes 467-72 and accompanying text.
425. Davis noted that, "[w]hatever dicta the [Palmer] opinion may contain, the decision did not
involve, much less invalidate, a statute or ordinance having neutral purposes but disproportionate
racial consequences." Davis, 426 U.S. at 243.
426. Professor Eisenberg has noted that, "[i]f the mere existence of a legitimate purpose for a
statute (as opposed to actual reliance on a legitimate purpose) precludes impeachment by evidence of
illicit legislative or administrative motive, discriminatory motive will never have a significant role in
constitutional adjudication because some legitimate purposes will almost always exist." Eisenberg,
supra note 2, at 112. Subsequent decisions by the Court, however, controvert, to some degree, his
pessimistic interpretation.
427. The ultimate issue in a motivation case is whether a decisionmaker or decisionmaking body
would have made a particular decision but for an unconstitutional motive. See infra notes 451-72
and accompanying text. The Supreme Court suggested a procedure for resolving this issue in Mount
Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). If the plaintiff can establish
that an illicit purpose "played a substantial part" in the challenged decision, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show "by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision," absent those impermissible considerations. Id. at 287; see Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.

1985]

INQUIRY INTO DECISIONMAKER MOTIVE

Finally, the Court probably was approaching the distinction that it ultimately drew in Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle428 between illicit purposes that played merely some role in the institution's action, and those purposes without which the action would not have been
taken. As Davis notes, the Palmer Court had accepted the finding that the city
council did close the pools for legitimate reasons. 42 9 Thus, that individual council members also may have had illicit motives was irrelevant, since the Court had
concluded tacitly that the council would have taken the action anyway "to pre430
serve peace and avoid deficits."
In a more recent case a plurality of the Court, rather cryptically appeared
to draw this same distinction, thereby bolstering this interpretation of Davis. In

MichaelM, v. Superior Court43 1 a male minor challenged California's "statutory

432
alleging in part that
rape" law, which imposed criminal liability only on men,
the "true" and impermissible purpose of the law "was to protect the virtue and

chastity of young women." The Court, citing Davis' discussion of Palmer,
stated that "even if. . .one of the motives of the [statutory rape law was] impermissible," the statute would not be struck down "on the basis of an alleged illicit
legislative motive." 4 33 Although the Court's pronouncement is less 'than per-

fectly clear,434 its citations to passages in several other cases imply that it again
853, 871 n.22 (1982). At least in equal protection clause cases, the defendant's failure to meet this
burden does not end the inquiry. The court still must apply its traditional strict scrutiny analysis to
determine whether any compelling state interest justifies the challenged classification. See Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 n.5 (1982).
Shaping an appropriate remedy in motivation cases presents both jurisprudential and evidentiary problems. The courts generally should try to put successful complainants in the position they
would have occupied had the illicit purposes not been considered. In some instances the court simply should vacate the challenged decision and remand the matter to the decisionmaker for possible
further action untainted by the illicit motivation. In other cases, such as Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), in which the challenged action was
in part a denial by the defendants of relief that the complainants sought, a court might consider a
more "activist" approach. In those circumstances when it can be determined from a decisionmaker's past and current practices that a different decision would have been reached absent the
constitutionally offensive considerations, a court could order the decisionmaker to make that particular decision. See Brest, Reflections on Motive Review, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1141, 1143 (1978).
Although such relief is intrusive, that in itself should not bar an essentially "make whole" remedy.
If complainants are unable to prove both discriminatory impact and illicit motivation, should
some remedy still be available? If it was proven that racial prejudice affected a legislature's decision,
but the decision had not had any discriminatory impact on the complainants other than the dignitary
harm from the deliberations themselves, perhaps some remedy, less than invalidation, could compensate the plaintiff for that dignitary injury. Similarly, if a legislature considered racially discriminatory factors in enacting a statute that disproportionately affects complainants, but the racial
animus was not a "but for" cause of its passage, perhaps the court could fashion a remedy to ameliorate both the dignitary harm from the illicit consideration of race and the injury from the disproportionate impact. The nature and availability of these remedies would dictate in part the relevance and
probative value of various categories of evidence that the plaintiffs could offer to establish a basis for
relief.
428. 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
429. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
430. Id. at 243.
431. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
432. Id. at 472 n.7.
433. Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)).
434. Since the Court decided Michael M. after it had articulated the "but for" causation concept
in Mount Healthy, Michael M.'s failure to cite Mount Healthy undercuts this interpretation of
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was distinguishing between one of many motives of a decisionmaking body and a
motive "but for" which the body would not have taken the challenged action.

The Court cited a footnote in Arlington Heights 4 35 and a portion of Justice Ste-

vens' concurring opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden,436 both of which distin-

guished explicitly between motives that "played some part" in a challenged
decision and those that affected the outcome of the decision. 4 37 As Arlington
MichaelM. MichaelM., however, presumably does not mean that even if the legislature enacted the
challenged statute with an impermissible purpose, that purpose is wholly irrelevant to the constitutionality of the law. The Court was not reversing, in Michael M. or subsequent cases, its numerous
holdings that impermissible purpose is a critical element of unconstitutionality in many contexts.
The Court may have been intentionally ambiguous in Michael M., as perhaps it was when it distinguished Palmer in Davis,because of its own confusion or internal disagreement about the proper role
of impermissible motivation in constitutional adjudication.
Given that uncertainty, Michael M. can be interpreted in two alternative ways. First, as in
Palmer, perhaps the challenged action did not have a discriminatory effect on the group against
which the alleged illicit purpose was directed. In Michael M., although there was a discriminatory
effect on men, the petitioner challenged the law's motive as an illicit paternalistic desire to protect
women. The petitioner, however, did not allege that the legislature intended to benefit women at the
expense of men. Thus, the Court may have concluded that the alleged discriminatory purpose was
unrelated to the discriminatory consequences.
Second, the Court noted that petitioner had conceded that the state had a "compelling interest"
in preventing teenage pregnancy, Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473 n.7, an interest that the Court found
was "at least one of the 'purposes' of the statute." Id. at 470. Thus, even if the legislature enacted
the law with discriminatory intent, the discrimination could be justified by its concededly compelling
interest. See supranote 427. To the extent the government has a legitimate compelling interest that
justifies discrimination, the action probably would be taken anyway even absent illicit purpose, especially when the Court finds that that was an actual purpose of the law. Furthermore, Michael M.
may suggest that, when the government has a compelling interest for its action, courts should not
attempt to determine the body's "true" motives, because even if the action would not have been
taken but for a discriminatory purpose the compelling interest outweighs the discrimination.
435. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21:
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory
purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such
proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same
decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered. If
this were established, the complaining party in a case of this kind no longer fairly could
attribute the injury complained of to improper consideration of a discriminatory purpose.
In such circumstances, there would be no justification for judicial interference with the
challenged decision. But in this case respondents failed to make the required threshold
showing.
Id. (citing Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 283).
436. 446 U.S. 55, 91 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring):
I am also persuaded that a political decision that affects group voting rights may be valid
even if it can be proved that irrational or invidious factors have played some part in its
enactment or retention. The standard for testing the acceptability of such a decision must
take into account the fact that the responsibility for drawing political boundaries is generally committed to the legislative process and that the process inevitably involves a series of
compromises among different group interests. If the process is to work, it must reflect an
awareness of group interests and it must tolerate some attempts to advantage or to disadvantage particular segments of the voting populace.
437. The Court's citation to United Staes v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) also is consistent with
this reading of MichaelM. O'Brien concluded that an otherwise constitutional statute should not be
voided "on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressman said about it." Id. at 384. Thus,
although O'Brien suggests that legislative purpose is irrelevant in equal protection analysis, see Arlington Heights,429 U.S. at 252, O'Brien also recognizes the difference between individuals' motives
that merely played some part in the decision and the purpose with which the body acted. The
citation to O'Brien probably meant no more than this, since O'Brien essentially denied, in what has
been called "gibberish," that official motivation ever is relevant. See J. ELY, supra note 8, at 140.
In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), which MichaelM. also cited, the Court made no attempt to
determine whether the challenged action was impermissibly motivated. Such an analysis was unnec-
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Heights noted, this distinction is dispositive of the propriety of judicial interference with the challenged decision. 4 38 Thus, if the government can demonstrate
from the outset that it would have made the same decision for legitimate reasons, the illicit motives of decisionmakers did not affect the decision and are
irrelevant.
In addition, Davis' discussion of Palmer apparently suggests that evidence
of the motives of individual decisionmakers is inappropriate to establish the purpose of the body. One commentator has noted that the Davis Court's failure to
distinguish between the probative value4 39 and the admissibility of evidence of
individual as opposed to institutional motivation has "create[d] what is probably
the mistaken impression that evidence of the motivation of individual members
is broadly inadmissible to prove institutional motivation, rather than, as is undoubtedly true, that such evidence may sometimes be beyond the plaintiff's
power to produce because government officers may be privileged not to
440
testify."
Similarly, many commentators have argued that the Court's distinction between motivation and purpose derives solely from its perception of whether
either is ascertainable: 44 1 "The difference between motivation and purpose in
terms of their meaning is therefore nonexistent; the difference is that the Court
uses 'motivation' to denote goals which it cannot identify with enough certainty
to act on and 'purpose' to denote goals which it can so identify." 442 Moreover,
it has been noted that within the context of this distinction, proof of legislative
443
or administrative "purpose" must be by objective evidence.
Whatever the purpose or motive of the Court in differentiating between the
two, the distinction is at best unproductive. Recent decisions appear to address
more cogently the important questions that Davis obscures in its motive-purpose
distinction. In these cases, although the Court has not retreated explicitly from
its previous discussions of motive and purpose, it has begun to build the framework for developing a sound definition of unconstitutional motivation.
essary because the government was unable to demonstrate that the objectives which the statute even
arguably served were substantially related to the achievement of important governmental goals. Id.
at 284
438. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
439. If the city council members in Palmer had decided unanimously to close the public pools,
proof of the motives of an individual decisionmaker would be little help in establishing that the
decision would not have been made but for an illicit purpose. See infra notes 547-48 and accompanying text.
440. Simon, supra note 371, at 1105.
441. See, eg., Clark, supra note 371, at 961-62.
442. Id. at 962 n.20.
443. See, eg., A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 209-10; Ely, supra note 2, at 1220 n.50. In fact, the
two concepts are interrelated because objective evidence of decisionmaker intent usually will be more
available than subjective evidence, and therefore "purpose" usually will be more readily ascertainable than "motivation." Professor Bickel's comment that because administrative intent can be
proven more easily, the courts should be more willing to inquire into administrative motivation,
reflects the fact that objective evidence of intent often is determined more easily for administrative
actions than legislative decisions. A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 217; see Ely, supra note 2, at 1285;
infra notes 622-25. If the court recognizes the decisionmaker's privilege to be only qualified, of
course, as Part III of this Article suggests, evidence of decisionmaker's subjective motives will be
obtained more easily.
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To determine whether a legislative enactment or administrative rule had an
unconstitutional purpose, the first step is to decide which motives are forbid-

den. 444 Motives are deemed forbidden because they infringe normative values
protected by corresponding constitutional commands. 44 5 For example, Professor Simon has described the motive of racial prejudice, a motive that the equal
protection clause prohibits, as "[a]n attitude or emotion composed of two essential characteristics: The group against which prejudice is directed is regarded
negatively, and this negative attitude is categorical-that is, it is directed against
44 6
anyone who is a member of the group simply because of his membership."
It is not always easy, however, to define an impermissible motive. 44 7 For

example, it is unclear whether unconstitutional purpose must consist of a desire
to harm the particular group in question or merely a willingness to permit the
group to suffer some adverse effect to promote a legitimate societal goal. In
PersonnelAdministratorv. Feeney44 8 the United States Supreme Court adopted
the former meaning. This decision properly generated severe criticism. 44 9

The manner inwhich various permissible and impermissible motives are
defined is one of the major determinants of the relevance of evidence offered to

prove them. The substantive elements of all causes of action determine the relevance of evidence offered to prove those elements. Therefore, although differ-

ences in the definitions of proscribed purposes will affect the probative value of
and need for different evidence, 4 50 this dynamic creates no difficult questions in
making these assessments.

It is considerably more difficult to determine what role an impermissible
motive must have played in a governmental action before a court can invalidate
444. Not all motive theories prohibit the consideration of unconstitutional purposes. Motive
theories instead or also may delineate certain motives that the decisionmaking body must consider in
reaching its decision. See Alexander, Introduction:Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN. DIEGO
L. REv. 925, 934-36 (1978).
445. See, eg., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). In Kassel a majority of the Court agreed that the "protectionist" purpose of promoting parochial state interests
violates the commerce clause. See id. at 678.
446. Simon, supra note 371, at 1047.
447. As Professor Brest commented, "Tihere is much room for debate about precisely what
motives are constitutionally proscribed under various circumstances." P. Brest, Reflections on Motive Review, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1141, 1141 (1978); see Clark, supra note 421; Eisenberg, supra
note 2, at 99-168; Ely, supra note 2.
448. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
449. See eg., Schnapper, Two Categoriesof DiscriminatoryIntent, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
31 (1982). In Professor Schnapper's view the Feeney Court erred by failing to recognize the difference between ends and means. In deciding that offering veterans a competitive edge was a legitimate
goal, the Court failed to consider "[w]hy the legislature was willing to accept that cost" (social cost
of harming women). Id. at 44; see Note, supra note 80.
450. Different kinds of governmental decisions therefore will require different methods of proving illicit purpose. For example, when the prescribed purpose of an action such as jury selection is to
produce random results, showing disparate impact may be more significant in proving a decisionmaking body's illegitimate purpose than if the body legitimately may pursue a broader range of
goals. Ifjury commissioners must create a juror pool of a random collection of the community, only
illicit motivations or the inability to achieve a random selection process would explain the commissioners' willingness to accept a nonrandom result. The government here, unlike in Feeney, could not
offer another permissible purpose that would justify its actions "in spite of" the foreseeable effect.
See infra note 496-97 and accompanying text; cf.Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 n.13, 496
n.17 (1977) (applying statistical analysis of jury pools).
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that action. Is one official's illicit motive, "but for" which the challenged action

would not have been taken, sufficient to warrant invalidation, or must the illicit
motive have been shared by some larger portion, presumably a majority, of the

body? The motive theorists are roughly divided between these
decisionmaking
51
4

two views.
To the extent that considerations of impermissible motive that are a "but
for" cause of the challenged enactment are sufficient to warrant invalidation, the
most minimal quantum of illicit motive of a single decisionmaker can render an

official action unconstitutional. Assume that a ninety-nine member legislature
voted to create an electoral structure that diminished minority voting strength,

and that the structure would be unconstitutional only if the legislature acted
because of discriminatory intent. 4 52 Assume further that the motives of every

legislator are known, and that the actions of ninety-eight of the decisionmakers,
who voted forty-nine for the law and forty-nine against it, were wholly unaf-

fected by racial prejudice. If the ninety-ninth legislator, who himself was torn
between supporting and opposing the enactment, decided to vote for the law

only because of a fraction of one percent of racial prejudice, that prejudice
would be a "but for" cause of the legislature's action. The law arguably should

be invalidated as unconstitutional because it would not have been enacted but
for racial prejudice. The same argument can be made about the principal propo-

nents of a governmental action and even the chief executive who signs a law into
effect: if the drafter or the sponsor of a law did so for an impermissible purpose,
the law never may have been introduced or enacted but for the illicit intent, and
453
the law thus should be invalidated.

Although this result may appear unjustified, it follows logically from a causation-based motivation theory. That theory in turn is the result of particular
views about the injury that results from a decisionmaking body's consideration

of unconstitutional purpose, the manner in which the illicit purpose caused the

4 54
plaintiff's injuries, and the appropriateness of various remedies.

Whether the "but for" motives of individual decisionmakers are sufficient
to invalidate an enactment or some "institutional purpose" must be shown ulti451. Even in a motivation theory requiring that the illicit motives have been shared by a majority
of the decisionmaking body, the motives presumably also would have to constitute a "but for" cause
of the challenged action. If the decisionmakers would have taken the same action in the absence of
illicit motivation, the consideration of such motives will have been harmless. See supra note 428 and
accompanying text. A number of Supreme Court justices have recognized explicitly this "same decision" test as a harmless error test. See, eg., Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 630 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A theory of unconstitutional motivation also might
deem any consideration of illicit motivations by the decisionmaking body as a constitutionally cognizable harm, regardless of its effect on the ultimate decision.
452. Cf. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65, 66 (1980) (municipal at-large electoral system
upheld).
453. The response that someone else might have drafted the law anyway is unconvincing. The
same argument can be made when the entire institution's intent was a "but for" cause of its actions,
since the same body or a future body might have enacted the same law in the future without illicit
intent. Thus, in both circumstances the court must determine whether the decisionmaking body
would have taken action on a particularoccasion but for an impermissible purpose. See Brest, supra
note 426, at 1142.
454. See supra note 427.
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mately should depend on the underlying substantive theories that mandate inquiry into motivation. Professor Alexander has correctly recognized that the
improper motive of one decisionmaker may be sufficient to invalidate an action,
despite the proper motives of all decisionmakers, "assuming it is the causal relation of certain motives to the passage, repeal, or failure to pass or repeal the rule
which is in issue."'455 Whether unconstitutionality requires only this mere
causal connection between illicit motives and the challenged action or something
more depends on the core values that invalidation would protect and the degree
to which decisionmakers' consideration of impermissible motives infringes those
values.
Consider the injury caused by a governmental decision that would not have
been made but for racial prejudice. Professor Simon has suggested that two
harms may result from a decisionmaking body's consideration of racial prejudice: a distortion of the democratic process and dignitary harm to the members
of the group discriminated against.4 5 6 Although the prejudice of a single decisionmaker may have little bearing on the manner in which the body deliberates
or may not be significantly insulting given the body's benign intent, it may control the body's ultimate action. Racial prejudice may be considered so intolerable that any consideration of it which affects a governmental action should
render the action invalid. When unconstitutional considerations are a "but for"
cause of an official action, the result of the democratic process will have been
distorted. Assuming that such distortion causes further harm, such as discrimination in hiring or segregated schools, invalidation of the action would appear to
4 57
be the proper remedy.
Most, if not all, motive theorists appear to agree that the crucial issue is
whether impermissible motives affected the outcome of the decisionmaking proCeSS.458 When illicit motives have such an effect, they taint the decisionmaking
process by producing a result that, by definition, would not have occurred in the
absence of the impermissible objectives. Thus, if impermissible motives affected
the action of any decisionmaker, 459 who in turn affected the outcome of the
decision, that decision is unconstitutional. Although a number of commentators
455. Alexander, supra note 444, at 938.
456. Simon, supra note 371, at 1049-59.

457. The availability of appropriate remedies also affects an analysis of the unconstitutionality of

illicit motivation. For example, if a legislature considers racial prejudice in enacting a law that it
would have passed anyway, perhaps some remedy nevertheless should compensate for the dignitary
harm that results from any consideration of prejudice. Similarly, some remedy should be available
when racial prejudice affects the outcome of the deliberative process, but the plaintiffs have suffered
no injury other than the dignitary harm from the institution's prejudiced actions. A court at least
could require the decisionmaking body to reconsider its action without considering the illicit purposes. Such a procedure, however, is potentially futile. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying
text. Thus, even after determining the underlying values implicated by a legislature's consideration
of impermissible motives, the practical absence of an appropriate remedy may influence an analysis
of how such illicit considerations offend the Constitution. See supra note 427; Simon, supra note

371, at 1056-59.
458. See, eg., Brest, supra note 14, at 120 n.124; Simon, supra note 371, at 1062.
459. The court's process for determining whether considerations of illicit motivation affected the
outcome of the deliberative process is the same, regardless of whether the relevant purpose is that of
an individual decisionmaker or the entire decisionmaking body. The court must decide whether the
decisionmakers, individually or collectively, would have made the same decision absent impermissi.
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have assumed this theoretical premise, 46° they have not addressed the resulting
evidentiary implications.
In a number of recent decisions the Supreme Court has come close to
adopting this view of causality in motivation analysis. 4 61 In Arlington Heights
the Court stated that discriminatory motivation did not have to be the sole or
dominant purpose of a decisionmaking body to constitute an impermissible purpose. Rather, "[p]roof that the decision. . . was motivated in part by a racially
discriminatory purpose" would shift to the defendants "the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered."'462 In Mount Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle, 463 decided on the same day as Arlington Heights, the Court
reaffirmed that the ultimate issue is whether the decisionmaking body would
464 The Court
have taken the same action but for an unconstitutional purpose.
indicated that if a plaintiff proves that an unconstitutional purpose played a substantial part 465 in the body's decision, the government must establish "by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision" absent
the improper motive. 4 66 If the government cannot meet this burden, its decision
will be held unconstitutional. The Court, however, has not addressed whether
the illicit motivations of one or a relatively small number of decisionmakers are
sufficient to invalidate a governmental action.
Although, under a causality-based theory, any consideration of illicit motivation that is a "but for" cause of the challenged action is sufficient to invalidate
the result, a number of commentators have argued that illicit motives, to be
467
actionable, must have been shared by a majority of the decisionmaking body.
For example, Professor Ely has suggested that "the only motivations on the
ble motives. When the court determines the purpose of a collective body, it merely "scales" this
process to a larger system.
460. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 14, at 120 n.124 ("The relevant question, again, is whether considerations of illicit motivation affected the outcome of the decisionmaking process. Thus, in theory,
it should suffice to show that the decisions of those members whose votes were necessary for enactment of the challenged law were improperly motivated."); see also infra text accompanying note 483
(court should invalidate upon showing but for causation).
461. But see infra notes 478-80 and accompanying text (showing of but for causation and substantiality of illicit purpose required).
462. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
463. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
464. Even if the decisionmaking body considered an illicit motivation unconsciously, the official
action theoretically should be invalidated if it would not have been taken absent the impermissible
motives. Unconscious as well as conscious motives can introduce illicit considerations, such as race,
into the deliberative process and thereby affect the outcome of legislative or administrative decisions.
See Simon, supra note 371, at 1060-62; cf. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972) C" 'The
result bespeaks discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious decision on the part of any individual [decisionmaker].' ") (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1975)); United States ex
rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 219 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir.) (speculation on effect of decisionmakers'
subconscious psychological pressures is insufficient justification for rejecting trial courts' findings of
fact as "clearly erroneous"), rev'd, 349 U.S. 280 (1955).
465. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
466. Id.
467. See, eg., Clark, supra note 421, at 973-78. Because much, if not most, of the available
evidence of improper motivation tends to apply equally to all members of the decisionmaking body,
the theoretical difficulties that this distinction creates often are minimized. See infra notes 540-49
and accompanying text.
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basis of which the Court would even consider [invalidating an official action]-or,

indeed, a litigant would have the temerity to suggest that it do so-are those
which can confidently be said to have been shared by a majority of the deci-

sionmakers. ' ' 468 Neither Professor Ely nor any other commentator has articulated in detail why the illicit motives of less than a majority of the
decisionmaking body should not be sufficient to invalidate the law. It appears,
however, that their view is based on a misplaced analogy to construing the legislative intent of a statute.4 69 In statutory construction, "legislative intent" means
what the majority of the legislature intended a law to achieve. 470 The majority

model of legislative intent is ill-adapted to motivation analysis, however, since
the issue is not what the legislature intended, 47 1 but whether illicit considerations affected the outcome of the decisionmaking process; it is unnecessary to
472
determine the consensus of the decisionmaking body in motivation analysis.
In an intermediate theory, impermissible motivations must have been a
"but for" cause of the legislature's action yet a substantial portion, although less
468. Ely, supra note 2, at 1219-20. To the extent that the issue is whether the illicit motives were
a "but for" cause of the action, Professor Ely appears to be mistaken. His later writing on this
subject indicates that he may no longer ascribe to the majority requirement:
The considerations that make motivation relevant argue not for the discovery of the "sole"
motivation (is there ever but one?) or even the "dominant" motivation (whatever that
might mean), but rather for asking whether an unconstitutional motivation appears materially to have influenced the choice: if one did, the procedure was illegitimate-"due process
of lawmaking" was denied-and its product should be invalidated.
J. ELY, supra note 8, at 138.
469. Professor Brest also makes this point. See Brest, supra note 14, at 120 n.124.
470. Cf. MacCallum, supra note 421, at 768-69, which Professor Ely has cited in support of his
"majority" view:
[W]e have found very few authors showing any unwillingness to accept [the] condition...
that a legislature should be acknowledged to have an intention vis-i-vis a statute in case
each of the majority who voted for the statute had that intention. Virtually all the persons
who have discussed the issue of legislative intent seem to assume that the fulfillment of this
last condition is sufficient to support claims about the intention of a legislature.
471. Determining legislative intent in statutory construction assumes additionally that the legislature had a primary purpose that, if it can be ascertained, will aid the court in interpreting the
statute. On the other hand, motive theorists and the courts apparently agree that in motivation
analysis, illicit motives need not be the primary or dominant purpose of the decisionmaking body.
See, eg., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 n.11 (" 'The search for legislative purpose is often elusive
enough [citing Palmer], without a requirement that primacy be ascertained. Legislation is frequently
multipurposed: the removal of even a "subordinate" purpose may shift altogether the consensus of
legislative judgment supporting the statute.' ") (quoting McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77
(1973)); Brest, supra note 14, at 119 ('[I]t is inappropriate to ask which of several possible objectives
was 'sole' or 'dominant' in the decisionmaker's mind."). The motives need only be a purpose without which the action would not have been taken. Thus, whether that quantum of purpose that acts
as a "but for" cause is concentrated in one decisionmaker, or dispersed throughout the entire body,
should be irrelevant.
472. Professor Brest has suggested that this issue is largely academic because, "[w]hether the
relevant class is a majority of the legislators or only those legislators whose votes are necessary for
the enactment, neither head-count usually is feasible-or necessary." Brest, supra note 14, at 120
n.124. Professor Brest probably has overstated his case, however, because in many instances evidence of the motives of the decisionmaking body as a whole will be lacking, yet the motives of those
decisionmakers whose votes were necessary for the enactment will be ascertainable. When the decisionmaking body is small or the vote is very close or both, evidence of individual decisionmakers'
motives can be extremely probative of the role that illicit motivation played in the deliberative process. See infra notes 580-81 and accompanying text.
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than a majority, of the decisionmakers must have shared the motivations. 473 In
a number of opinions, the Supreme Court has used language appearing to suggest such a theory. The Court alternatively has asked whether illicit motivation
"has influenced the legislative choice,"' 4 7 4 or was a "substantial" 475 or "motivating factor" 4 76 in the challenged decision. These standards, however, merely describe what a plaintiff must show to shift the burden to defendants to prove that
the improper influence was not a "but for" cause of the action. Plaintiffs therefore must establish initially that illicit motivation may have had some influence
on the deliberative processes of a decisionmaking body. Moreover, the Court's
language seems to imply that the impermissible motives must be more than a de
minimis influence to shift the burden to the government. These cases do not
indicate, however, that illicit motivation must have been shared in some way to

be an institutional purpose.4 77 Rather, apparently the plaintiff need only establish a probability or presumption, subject to rebuttal by the government, that
impermissible motives were a "but for" cause of the administrative or legislative

decision.
In Board of Education v. Pico,478 however, the Court embraced an intermediate standard requiring "but for" causation and "substantiality" of illicit purpose. Pico held that whether the removal of books from public school libraries
by the board of education was constitutional would depend on the motivation
for the board's action. A plurality of the Court concluded that "[i]f [the board]

intended by their removal decision to deny respondents access to ideas with
which [the board] disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in [the

board's] decision, then [the board has] exercised [its] discretion in violation of
the Constitution." 479 The Court defined "decisive factor" as "a 'substantial fac'480
tor' in the absence of which the opposite decision would have been reached.
473. Another model of legislative intent could be based on the type of evidence that could be
used to prove decisionmakers' motives. If courts considered only objective evidence of motive, such
as a law's foreseeable discriminatory impact, which would apply equally to all members who voted
for the law, the portion of the body that must have shared illicit motives would be irrelevant. All
evidence of illicit motivation would be probative of each decisionmaker's objectives to the same
degree.
474. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 US. 256, 277 (1979).
475. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
476. Id.; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270.
477. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), Justice Stevens stated that it was "unrealistic
.to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in the decisional process. A law conscripting clerics should not be invalidated
because an atheist voted for it." Id. at 253 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). One writer has construed this
remark to mean that "a significant portion of the decsionmakers [must have been] at least 'partially
motivated' by illicit considerations" to constitute unconstitutional purpose. Note, supra note 80, at
1405. Justice Stevens, however, may have been suggesting nothing more than that the motive of a
single decisionmaker may not affect the outcome of the institution's action. To the extent that he
meant that a large portion of the decisionmaking body must share the illicit motives, even when an
individual's illicit motive was a "but for" cause of the action, he seems to contradict other Supreme
Court decisions and to be theoretically incorrect. Furthermore, his reference to atheists and clerics
confuses the issue of what unconstitutional motivation is with whether evidence of the character of
decisionmakers can establish such motivation. See infra note 534.
478. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
479. Id. at 871.
480. Id. at 871 n.22.
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Thus, the Court required something more than mere "but for" causation; the

impermissible intent also must be a "substantial factor" in the challenged action.
This "substantial factor" requirement suffers from both theoretical and

practical deficiencies. First, it would be inappropriate to require that illicit motives were shared by some arbitrary portion of the decisionmaking body, for the

same reasons that the majority model of intent is inapt. When the touchstone of
unconstitutionality is causality, requiring that the illicit motivations which affected the outcome of the decisionmaking process also be in some sense "institutional" is superfluous. 48 1 Second, even if there were a sound theoretical basis for
such a requirement, it would be difficult to define the requisite degree of shared
intent. 4 82 Other than requiring that a majority of the decisionmakers shared the
illicit motives, it is not easy to draw the line of substantiality.
The crucial question, then, is whether illicit motivations influenced the decisionmaking process, and if so, whether that influence was harmless or decisive.
The action should be invalidated if the impermissible motivation, regardless of

who shared it, was a "but for" cause of the legislative enactment or administrative decision. Thus, in a three-to-two vote of a decisionmaking body, the influence of illicit motives, without which the challenged action would not have been
taken, would be sufficient to invalidate the action whether they were wholly attributable to only one of the three-member majority, or to a portion
or a major83
4
ity of the five, or were distributed evenly among all of them.

Professor Alexander has suggested that the "major issues here are evidentiary, not conceptual, because each theory of which motives are important and
why they are important should generate its own answers to the conceptual
problems surrounding rules produced by collective bodies."' 484 Although Alex-

ander is correct that evidentiary questions exist within the context of each theory, those theories that dictate the resolution of the evidentiary issues are
themselves shaped by concerns about the substantive values involved. The un481. Professor Eisenberg suggests to the contrary that "a particular motive may be properly
ignored because it was not shared by enough legislators to warrant judicial recognition." Eisenberg,
supra note 2, at 152. Professor Eisenberg probably has erred in the same manner as Professor Ely by
suggesting that illicit motives are not actionable unless shared by a majority of the decisionmaking
body. See supranotes 467-72 and accompanying text. Both writers appear to be borrowing inappropriately the concept of institutional intent from statutory construction cases. This conclusion is
evidenced by Eisenberg's citation to P. BREsr, supra note 447, at 139-40, which discusses the methodological problems presented by inquiring into the intent of the Framers. Such inquiries, like those
into the intent of legislators in the statutory construction context justifiably seek the institutional or
majority intent of the decisionmakers.
482. One decisionmaker's illicit motives that were a "but for" cause of his actions would be a
dispositive factor in a one-member decisionmaking body, and presumably a "substantial" factor in a
two or three-member decisionmaking body assuming that "substantiality" refers to less than a majority. At some point, however, which undoubtedly will differ among courts, the dividing line between substantial and insubstantial influence, or the number of decisionmakers that must have
shared the improper motives, will become unclear. Furthermore, the court also may have to consider the strength of impermissible intent in individual decisionmakers. Thus, even if the court could
determine the motives of every decisionmaker, which is the major problem in ascertaining legislative
or administrative purpose under any standard, defining the requisite degree of influence would be
haphazard.
483. But see infra notes 581-82 and accompanying text (erstwhile supporters may vote against
measure to counter supporters with illicit motives).
484. Alexander, supra note 444, at 938.
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derlying motivation theory determines what must be proven; following from this
is the evidentiary issue of how to prove it. Therefore, the relevance and probative value of different types of evidence, such as that of individual decisionmakers' motives, will vary with the underlying substantive theory of why

such motives are important.
To the extent that considerations of illicit motivation which affect the outcome of the decisionmaking process are sufficient to require invalidation of the
challenged action, the motives of individual decisionmakers will be of greater
probative value. If invalidation requires a sharing of impermissible motive by

the institution, however, evidence of individual decisionmakers' motives will be
less important. Even if a court were to rule as Professor Ely suggests, that a
majority of the decisionmakers must share improper motives to mandate invalidation, the motives of a single decisionmaker still would be relevant and might
be highly probative if the body was small. Individuals' motives would be irrelevant only if a court held that the institutional motive only could be proven by
evidence equally applicable to all members of the institution, such as evidence of

a law's foreseeable discriminatory effect. Furthermore, decisionmakers can testify not only about their own individual motives but about those of the
institution.
A final question with regard to what must be proven to warrant invalidation of an official action is whether the official's objective or subjective intent is
at issue. This question should be resolved by the theoretical foundation of each
motivation theory.48 5 Since no single theory has been accepted universally,
however, the lower courts have diverged on whether unconstitutional motivation must be objective or subjective 48 6 and have developed various tests for proving unconstitutional motive that reflect their respective answers to this question.
Some courts have developed an objective test for unconstitutional motivation, 48 7 focusing on evidence such as the reasonably foreseeable effects of a gov485. Similarly, whether legislative or administrative purpose should be measured objectively or
subjectively sometimes will depend on the context of the particular impermissible motives. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court has recognized that injury selection cases,
for example, evidence of a statistically significant exclusion of minorities may be sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent, "because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to
explain on nonracial grounds." Id. at 242; cf. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (statistical
disparities in jury selection established prima facie case); Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington
Heights andBeyond: DiscriminatoryPurpose in Equal ProtectionLitigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961,
1040 ("Castanedareinforces the notion that what constitutes proof of discriminatory purpose will
vary in different contexts."). In Davis, however, the Court considered such objective evidence of
discriminatory impact insufficient to establish discriminatory purpose, in part because of alternate
explanations of the disparate employment impact were available.
486. See Comment, supra note 417, at 321-22; Note, Proofof Racially DiscriminatoryPurpose
Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and
Williamsburgh, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 725, 732-37 (1977).
487. See, eg., United States v. City of Birmingham, 727 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1984); Hope, Inc. v.
County of DuPage, 717 F.2d 1061, 1069 (7th Cir. 1983); Tanner v. McCall, 625 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 387-89 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded
per curiam sub nom. Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Hart v.
Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975); Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215,
222 (6th Cir. 1973), aff'd in relevantpart,418 U.S. 717, 738 n.18 (1974). Both the common law and
numerous statutes long have inferred intent from the foreseeable consequences of an action. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187
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ernmental decision. 48 8 To the extent that a court focuses only on objective
evidence of decisionmakers' intent, all evidence of motivation would apply
equally to each member of the decisionmaking body; the individual-institutional
distinction would be irrelevant. Evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the
action would not have been taken but for illicit motives would establish the institution's intent. There would be no need to ascertain which or how many decisionmakers shared that intent. Objectively defined institutional intent, however,
is a fiction.48 9 Although evidence such as the reasonably foreseeable consequences of an action may imply the institution's intent, some decisionmakers
probably will have voted for the action because of those foreseeable conse490
quences, and some will have voted for it in spite of those consequences.
Therefore, defining unconstitutional motivation by restricting the kinds of evidence that may prove it is circular. That definition dervies from a pretense that
the decisionmaking body is of one mind; that pretense is supported by an evidentiary rule that admits only evidence from which that inference can be drawn.
Some lower courts have defined unconstitutional motivation as the decisionmakers' subjective intent49 1 and others have developed various hybrid tests
containing both objective and subjective elements. 4 92 Commentators have iden(1961) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8 (4th ed. 1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, comment b (1965).
488. Under such an "objective" test, an official action might be deemed unconstitutional if it
appeared intentionally discriminatory, even though the decisionmakers harbored no discriminatory
motive. Conversely, when the decisionmakers actually intended to discriminate, their action could
be deemed constitutional as long as it did not appear objectively to have resulted from impermissible
motives. Alternatively, a theory of unconstitutional motivation could encompass both objective and
subjective factors. An official action that objectively appeared to have been enacted for racially
discriminatory reasons could be considered unconstitutional as an official insult or stigmatization. If
the same action actually had been motivated, subjectively, by racial discrimination, it also would be
unconstitutional, and the subjective motivation perhaps would justify a stronger remedy or changes
in the applicable burdens of proof. Such a theory in part would be analogous to the negligence/
intentional tort distinction, whereby a defendant can be held negligent and liable for damages despite
his subjective intent to be careful, and may be subject to even greater liability if he actually intended
to harm.
489. Institutional or legislative intent itself often is regarded as a fiction. MacCallum, supranote
421, at 768-69.
490. This is the distinction that the Supreme Court ultimately draws in Personnel Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); see also Tanner v. McCall, 625 F.2d 1183, 1192-93 (5th Cir. 1980)
(circumstantial evidence may be used to infer infringement of constitutional rights; however, decisionmaker's motive and intent are controlling).
491. See, eg., United States v. Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir. 1977); Bronson v. Board of
Educ., 525 F.2d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Soria v. Oxnard School
Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 488 F.2d 579, 585-86 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974); Blake
v. City of Los Angeles, 435 F. Supp. 55 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
492. See generally Comment, supra note 417, at 321-37 (discussion of courts' use of subjective
intent, objective intent, and what the author terms "institutional intent"); Note, supra note 486, at
731-37 (discussion of various methods of proof of discriminatory purpose). Courts have established
a "pattern and practice" test for unconstitutional motivation, see, eg., Armstrong v. Brennan, 539
F.2d 625, 637 (7th Cir. 1976) (pattern of segregative intent), vacated per curiam, 433 U.S. 672
(1977), and have held that showing that the action had a reasonably foreseeable discriminatory effect
shifts the burden to the government to establish that illicit motivations were not a "but for" cause of
the action. See United States v. School Dist. (Omaha 1), 521 F.2d 530, 536-37 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 541 F.2d 708 (Omaha 11) (en bane), vacated per
curiam, 433 U.S. 667 (1977), aff'dper curiam, 565 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1977) (Omaha III) (en bane);
Note, supra note 486, at 735. The author of Comment, supra note 417, at 332-43, has suggested
inferring institutional intent from the decisionmaking body's policies and institutional actions. See,
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tified two major problems with a subjective approach to unconstitutional intent.
The first is that already discussed with regard to the effect of illicit motives on
the decisionmaking process 93-must the illicit motivation have been held by a
majority, plurality, or by individual decisionmakers whose motives were a "but
for" cause of the challenged action? The second is the potentially greater difficulty of proving subjective motivation. 494 Nevertheless, a subjective test of unconstitutional motivation flows necessarily from the same motive theories that
dictate the "but for" causal definition of unconstitutional motivation.4 9 5 To the
extent that any decisionmakers' illicit motives which affect the outcome of the
deliberative process are sufficient for invalidation, the subjective intent of those
decisionmakers-in effect, why they supported the action-is the crucial question.
The Supreme Court seems to have articulated a subjective standard of intent. In PersonnelAdministratorv. Feeney4 96 the Court concluded that unconstitutional motive must be subjective in the context of an equal protection
challenge. The Court noted that discriminatory purpose "implies that the decisionmaker. . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group."4 97 Thus, Feeney appears to state that evidence of the improper objective
intent of a decisionmaking body may be insufficient to demonstrate unconstitutionality. The plurality opinion also focused on the decisionmakers' subjective
motivation in City of Mobile v. Bolden,4 9 8 a racial vote-dilution case.4 99
Although the Court has stated that the decisionmakers' subjective intent
controls, it has recognized correctly that objective factors may prove subjective
ag., Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981); Oliver v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
493. See supra notes 451-84 and accompanying text.
494. See, eg., Comment, supra note 417, at 325-26. That article suggests that crucial evidentiary
problems arise in attempting to discern subjective motivation. The biggest problem is that subjective
intent generally must be gleaned from circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, several distinct motivations may contribute to any one act, leaving the judge much discretion in determining intent.
495. If a decisionmaker's action results in improper discrimination, the fact that the decisionmaker subjectively intended to benefit those individuals whom the law is harming will not stop
its invalidation. Therefore, in most circumstances a decisionmaker's subjective intent will not operate as a defense. A law prohibiting abortion that the legislators enacted because they believed that
the women affected ultimately would benefit more from giving birth, nevertheless would be unconstitutional. Those situations differ significantly, however, from a law, neutral on its face, that effectuates a constitutionally prohibited purpose. In that case, knowledge of the decisionmakers' motives is
crucial in determining the law's validity.
496. 442 U.S. 256 (1979); see also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201 (1973) (Actions
of school authorities which tended to show racial motivations were collectively sufficient to prove
that the school authorities subjectively "carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a
substantial portion of the students, teachers, and facilities within the school system.").
497. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
498. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
499. Justice Stevens, however, has argued that the Court's focus on subjective intent in the context of racial vote-dilution was misplaced. Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Rogers
v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 637 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens instead has suggested an
"objective" test of unconstitutionality. This debate, which has been treated extensively, se. eg.,
Hartman, Racial Vote Dilution and SeparationofPowers An Explorationofthe ConflictBetween the
Judicial "Intent" and the Legislative "Results" Standards, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 689 (1982), is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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motivation. 50° As some courts 50 1 and commentators50 2 have noted, however,
such proof is not always easy to establish. When courts are reluctant to infer
decisionmakers' subjective intent circumstantially, there will be a greater need
for evidence, such as decisionmakers' testimony, that can establish directly subjective intent. 50 3 Even when courts do not require direct evidence of decisionmakers' motives, such evidence may be so much more probative of
subjective intent than other available evidence that it should be admitted over a
claim of privilege. For example, the foreseeable discriminatory impact of a law
may tend to expose circumstantially the motives of those who enacted it. As
Feeney noted, however, decisionmakers may enact a law "in spite of" rather
than "because of" that foreseeable impact. Thus, by itself, the probative value of
such evidence may be minimal. On the other hand, direct evidence of decisionmakers' subjective intent, such as their credible admissions, may not only
have greater probative value by itself, but also may elucidate the extent to which
circumstantial evidence, such as foreseeable consequences, is probative of subjective intent.
Until the Supreme Court clearly articulates the definition of unconstitutional motivation in the various relevant contexts or until a unified theory of
motivation is accepted, the courts will remain confused about what unconstitutional motivation is and how it may be proved. Regardless of how the courts
ultimately interpret unconstitutional motivation, the calculus for balancing the
decisionmakers' privilege against the probative value of and need for evidence of
their motives will be the same. The only elements that will vary with the theories will be the probative value of and need for certain types of evidence. Thus,
500. Objective evidence of decisionmaker intent, such as the foreseeability of discriminatory consequences, can raise a strong inference that the consequences were intended. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979). In fact,
discriminatory intent usually is proven by objective factors, several of which were outlined in Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68.
501. See, eg., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977); Perkins v. City of West Helena,
675 F.2d 201, 207 (8th Cir.), aff'd mem., 459 U.S. 801 (1982); Lee v. Board of Educ., 639 F.2d 1243,
1268-69 (5th Cir. 1981); Tanner v. McCall, 625 F.2d 1183, 1192-93 (5th Cir. 1980); Nevett v. Sides,
571 F.2d 209, 222 (5th Cir. 1978); Stinson v. Tennessee Dep't of Mental Health, 553 F. Supp. 454,
470 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
502. See, eg., Hartman, supra note 499, at 713 ("All the standard techniques for establishing
legislative purpose in the absence of a decisionmaker's admission of racial motivation are fraught
with inadequacies.").
503. This Article is presented in the context of a plaintiff's need for evidence to prove unconstitutional motivation as balanced against a decisionmaker's privilege to refuse to give such evidence.
The defendants in a suit challenging the constitutionality of government action, however, also frequently will require the testimony of decisionmakers. In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977),
a case challenging a Texas grand jury selection process, the Court determined that the selection
process was unconstitutional because the state did not rebut plaintiff's prima facie case of intentional
discrimination. The Court noted that the jury commissioners were "the only ones in a position to
explain the apparent substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans and to provide information on the actual operation of the selection process." Id. at 491. When decisionmakers are called to
testify for the defendants about the purposes underlying their official actions, they rarely are likely to
claim a privilege, since the defendants will be seeking to uphold both the decisionmakers' actions and
their motives. In many instances the defendants will be the decisionmakers themselves. Because
testifying for the government about their motives will subject decisionmakers to cross-examination
by the plaintiff, see supra note 397 and accompanying text, however, they may attempt to assert the
privilege. In that event, the court should balance the defendants' need for the evidence against the
decisionmakers' need for the privilege, in the manner suggested by this Article.
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in a ninety-nine member legislature voting fifty to forty-nine to enact a law,
evidence of an individual decisionmaker's impermissible motives would be more
probative when a court focused on subjective motivation or "but for" causation,
and less probative when a court employed an objective or "majority" test. The
equation for balancing the interests competing against a privilege, however, will
yield the correct results within the framework of each theory.
B.

Proofof a Decisionmaking Body's UnconstitutionalMotivation

Virtually all of the motivation theorists have addressed, to some extent, the
process of and the difficulties inherent in ascertaining the motives of a collective
body. 5 4 The arduousness of the task was one of the classic objections to judicial
review of decisionmakers' motivation. 50 5 When certain categories of evidence
are used to prove the motives of a decisionmaking body, however, the inquiry is
no more difficult than determining the motives of an individual. Moreover, it is
generally these same categories of evidence that most often will be available and
probative of impermissible purpose.
Nevertheless, even when "but for" motives are sufficient for invalidation, it
frequently will be necessary to examine the motives of the institution as a whole,
for several reasons. First, at times it may be impossible to prove any individual
decisionmaker's motives. Second, when the decisionmaking body is large and
the vote is not close, it may be impractical or impossible to establish, without
other evidence, the motives of a sufficient number of individuals to prove that
those motives affected the outcome of the deliberative process. Last, most of the
types of evidence available to establish illicit motivation apply to the institution
as a body and not to specific individuals. Thus, evidence that a school board
continually adopted policies that increased segregation when other alternatives
would have eliminated or lessened it,50 6 would suggest that all board members
supporting the action may have had some discriminatory purpose. 50 7 This evidence alone, however, reveals nothing about the motives of any individual
decisionmaker.5 08
504. See eg., Brest, supra note 14, at 119-24; Simon, supra note 371, at 1097-107.
505. See, e-g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968).
506. See Penick v. Board of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 240 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d 787
(6th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).

507. See infra notes 512-14 and accompanying text.
508. This statement may respond to a question that Professor Alexander posed in his article,
Alexander, supranote 444, at 947, about Professor Simon's observations on determining the motives
of collective bodies. Alexander noted:
As I read Simon, he solves the evidentiary difficulties which attend attributing motives to
institutions by asking what the probabilities of racial prejudice would be if the institution
were but one person. He then says that the probability of racial prejudice attributable to
one-person institutions can be attributed to each member of multi-member institutions
quod erat demonstrandum.
One difficulty, which I believe can be surmounted, exists in such an approach. Suppose the
probability of racial prejudice behind a five-member school board's action is one-third,
insufficient to invalidate the action. Suppose, in addition, the action was approved by a
three-to-two vote. Suppose, finally, that when the probability that a certain motive accom-
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There are essentially two ways to prove an institution's motivation. 50 9
First, evidence of the institution's actions and the circumstances that may have

affected those actions may establish an institution's motivation.5 10 This evidence is probative of the institution's motivation because it substantiates the

same inference of the motives of every decisionmaker who voted for a decision.51 I For example, one way to establish illicit institutional intent is with evi5 12
dence that a governmental action had a foreseeable discriminatory impact.
Such evidence is equally probative of the institution's intent as it would be pro-

bative of an individual's intent because any actor may be considered to have

intended the foreseeable consequences of his actions. Because a decisionmaking
body may act "in spite of" rather than "because of" the foreseeable consequences of its actions, however,5 13 such evidence is not dispositive, and at times
may not be very probative.5 14 The inference of intent from foreseeability, howpanies the action of three persons is one-third, it means that it is probable that one of the
three members acted with this motive and that the other two did not so act. Therefore,
where the vote was three to two, and the probability of the forbidden motive was one-third,
the action would probably not have been taken but for that motive. Using Simon's
method, however, the action would be upheld.
Id. at 947.
One response to this objection is that the probability of racial prejudice attributable to the whole
decisionmaking body cannot be translated meaningfully to the intent of particular individuals. Using Alexander's hypothetical, the one-third probability of the school board's racial prejudice means
that, although certain evidence indicates that some prejudice influenced the body, there nonetheless
was a two-thirds possibility that the action would have been taken anyway. Evidence that implies
these probabilities about an institution's intent implies nothing about the probabilities of an individual decisionmaker's intent. It is certain only that the racial prejudice of the body taken collectively
was not a "but for" cause of the challenged action. Thus, there is no justification for reshuffling the
probability of the collective intent, dealing it all to one individual, and assuming that his motive was
a "but for" cause of his vote that in turn affected the body's decision. To do so would twist the
evidence from showing that it was probable that the prejudice did not affect the vote to showing
instead that it was likely that the prejudice did affect the vote. The evidence not only fails to justify
that inference but negates it. Thus, although an individual decisionmaker's illicit motives can be a
"but for" cause of an official action, all of the fractional percentages of illicit motive of each decisionmaker cannot be added up and attributed to one of them.
This analysis assumes that when the probability of racial prejudice was valued as one-third,
there was only a one-third chance that the decisionmakers would not have acted butfor racial prejudice. The illicit motive still might have been a "but for" cause of the action if the one-third percentage tipped the otherwise undecided group towards action. If each of the three members who voted
for the law was one-third racially prejudiced and two-thirds not, and the two-thirds nonprejudiced
motives of each were divided one-third in favor of the law and one-third against, the racially
prejudiced one-third would affect the outcome.
509. See, eg., Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977); Armstrong v.
O'Connell, 451 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wis. 1978). The commentators and courts also have identified a
third method of proof, known as "generic institutional behavior." See, e.g., Simon, supra note 371,
at 1097. Generic institutional behavior refers to the acts or conduct of the same institution at a prior
point in time with different members. Courts have inferred the present body's intent from such past
actions by viewing the institution over time as a single entity. See, e-g., Amos v. Board of School
Directors, 408 F. Supp. 765, 819 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
510. See, eg., Wattleton v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 686 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1982).
511. Professor Simon also makes this point. Simon, supra note 371, at 1097.
512. See eg., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977);
NOW v. Waterfront Comm'n, 460 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
513. See eg., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 255 (1979).
514. See Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1468 (11th Cir. 1983); Tanner v. McCall, 625 F.2d
1183, 1192 (5th Cir. 1980); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 222 (5th Cir. 1978).
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ever, will be of the same magnitude for all of the individual decisionmakers who
supported an action as it would be if a single decisionmaker had acted alone.
Second, evidence of the intent of individual decisionmakers may prove the
motives of a decisionmaking body. This evidence is relevant in two distinct but
related ways: it may establish that one or more individuals who acted because of
illicit motivation constituted a "but for" 5 15 cause of the enactment, or the motives of the individual decisionmakers can be aggregated to establish the motives
of the institution, or at least a majority of the institution, when such a showing is
required. When decisionmakers admit that they acted for unconstitutional reasons, it makes it more likely that the institution acted for those reasons. Ultimately, the intent of the institution can be derived from the individual motives
of its members. 5 16 If a majority of the members of a decisionmaking body
would not have voted for a law but for their belief that the law would cause
segregation, it is difficult to argue that it was not the purpose of the decisionmaking body to cause segregation.5 17 If other sources of evidence demonstrate that
the entire body had an illicit purpose, the need for evidence of the motives of
individual decisionmakers might diminish, 5 18 but the probative value of such
evidence will not.
It is important to recognize from the outset that individual decisionmakers
can testify not only about their own individual motives, but also about the purposes of the collective decisionmaking body. Decisionmakers can be questioned,
in court and in discovery, about the alleged "permissible" purposes for their
actions, the information on which the decisionmaking body acted, knowledge of
less harmful alternatives, deviations from the procedural and substantive considerations that the body normally uses in making decisions, and any other facts
that might be probative of the decisionmaking body's purpose.5 1 9 For evidence
of the motives of both the individual and the body, the probative value of, need
for, and importance of the evidence will vary widely, as will the degree of intrusion on governmental interests. In many instances, the importance of using both
types of evidence will outweigh the importance of the decisionmaker's privilege
not to be questioned.
C. Probative Value
Courts will face a threshold procedural problem in ascertaining the proba515. See supra notes 451-83 and accompanying text.

516. Professor Bickel even has maintained that the "only possibility of a solution" to the problem of determining legislative purpose "is cross-examination of each individual legislator." A.
BICKEL, supra note 7, at 215 (emphasis added).
517. But see Comment, supra note 417, at 332-37 (institutional intent of decisionmaking body
should be inferred solely from actions of body as a unit); Note, supra note 486, at 733
("[Mjultimember decision-makers, by their nature, cannot have a subjective intent; only their members can.").
518. See infra notes 606-12 and accompanying text.
519. This point seems to have been overlooked by a number of commentators, who have considered the decisionmaker's privilege to refuse to testify solely as it related to the compelled testimony
of individual decisionmakers' personal motives. See, eg., Brest, supra note 14, at 124; Simon, supra
note 371, at 1105.
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tive value of the decisionmaker's testimony, before weighing it against a qualified
privilege. When the relevance or probative value of a witness' proposed testimony is challenged, the proponent of that witness usually is able to make an
offer of proof of what the witness will testify to, if permitted. Such an offer is
520
possible because witnesses generally cooperate with the attorney calling them.
521
With decisionmakers who claim a privilege and refuse to testify voluntarily,
however, the attorneys calling them frequently will be unable to predict accurately what the witness will say, and thus, cannot evaluate the importance of the
proposed testimony. To the extent that attorneys may depose prospective decisionmaker witnesses, 522 of course, they will be better able to anticipate the decisionmakers' testimony.
Alternatively, courts could conduct in camera examinations of decisionmakers to determine in advance the weight of their potential testimony.
Although that procedure initially would subject the decisionmaker to a less public and therefore perhaps less intimidating procedure, some of the protection of
the privilege still would be lost. Even this limited intrusion can outweigh the
plaintiff's need for the testimony in a particular case. Nevertheless, in camera
examination of decisionmakers often will be appropriate to assist the court in
523
determining the probative value of and need for their testimony.
Courts also frequently could determine the weight of potential testimony by
520. In practice witnesses often align themselves with the side that they believe their testimony
will aid, and cooperate with that attorney.
521. The decisionmaking body may not assert a privilege to prevent individual decisionmakers
from testifying voluntarily. See supra notes 390-93 and accompanying text.
522. See supra note 412.
523. Courts frequently use in camera examination to assess the need for information subject to a
qualified privilege and the degree of harm that the government likely will suffer from disclosure. See,
eg., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 404-06 (1976); Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d
462, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Sirmans v. City of South Miami, 86 F.R.D. 492, 495-96 (S.D. Fla.
1980). See generally Note, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official Information Privilege, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 142, 168-70 (1976) (general discussion of use of in camera examination of
government documents when official information privilege is claimed). Courts have employed in
camera examination of records and witnesses subject to a claim of official information privilege, see,
eg., Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d 462, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1975); informants' privilege, see, e.g.,
United States v. Rawlinson, 487 F.2d 5, 7 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974); presidential communications privileges, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-18 (1974); and even
state secrets privilege, see, eg., Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1980); American Civil
Liberties Union v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (7th Cir. 1980). But see Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v.
Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1369 (4th Cir.) (judge may find information, claimed privileged for national
security reasons, classified on basis of testimony or affidavits alone), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992
(1975).
The greater the showing of necessity by the party seeking the information, the more thoroughly
the court will examine whether disclosure is appropriate. See, eg., United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (state secrets privilege). When in camera inspection might defeat the purpose of
the privilege by disclosing the confidential matters sought to be protected, however, the procedure
should not be used. Id. at 10. The trial court has discretion to exclude parties or their counsel from
the in camera review, when their presence might compromise the confidentiality of the information.
See, eg., United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1974) (informant's privilege),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975). Many courts, however, have noted the importance of allowing
litigants, who are in the best position to recognize and advocate their need for particular items of
evidence, to participate in the examination. See, eg., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 n.21
(1974) ("[I]t lies within the discretion of [the trial] court to seek the aid of the Special Prosecutor and
the President's counsel for in camera consideration [of the materials in issue]."); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969); cf.Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (court
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assessing what the plaintiff hopes it will prove. Even that simple process will
prohibit the use of much evidence that, if successfully elicited, either is available
through nonprivileged sources 524 or not sufficiently important to overcome the
privilege. When the examination proceeds but is not fruitful, the testimony can
be stricken, but not before the decisionmakers have been exposed to public crossexamination of their allegedly illicit motives. Any other standard would require
the court to assess the likelihood of the success of the cross-examination.
Although sometimes there may be reliable indicators of such success, the decision more often would be speculative.
There also may be some question about the efficacy of allowing plaintiffs to
cross-examine adverse decisionmakers. 525 Commentators have noted the facility
526
with which decisionmakers can camouflage their impermissible motives.
Although motives sometimes can be disguised more easily than other objective
5 27
facts, such criticism probably underestimates the value of cross-examination.
Litigants in numerous cases have elicited devastating admissions of illicit motivation, which have established the unconstitutionality of official actions. In
assumed that adverse party would not be allowed to participate in in camera review of documents
sought under FOIA), cert denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
Courts also have conducted in camera hearings, with participation by adverse parties, to determine whether materials subpoenaed from members of Congress were within the speech or debate
privilege. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1978); In re
Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F. Supp. 211, 213-14 (D.D.C. 1980)
In camerahearings would be an appropriate tool whenever it otherwise was impossible to ascertain accurately the probative value of and need for the testimony of decisionmakers or the documents in their possession. Although decisionmakers sometimes would be questioned under
circumstances that ultimately did not warrant overcoming a claim of privilege, this minimal intrusion also would allow the court occasionally to uphold the claim of privilege when, in the absence of
an in camera hearing, it might have overruled the claim. On balance, the assistance that in camera
consideration can render to a court determining whether a claim of privilege should be overruled
justifies the slight intrusion from inspecting records and even the greater intrusion from examining
legislators. Moreover, courts also should allow counsel to participate in this procedure when it is
necessary to measure effectively the importance of the evidence to the litigant's case.
524. See infra notes 606-12 and accompanying text.
525. FED. R. EviD. 611(c) provides that leading questions may be used in federal court on crossexamination but not on direct, except to the extent necessary for the attorney to develop the testimony of the witness. See, eg., United States v. Tsui, 646 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234, 1242 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 858 (1980); Morvant v.
Construction Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 1978). Many states have analogous
provisions in their evidentiary codes. See, eg., COLO. R. EvID., 611(c); FLA. STAT. § 90.612(3)
(1979).
Under FED. R. EVID. 611(c) leading questions also may be asked of a hostile witness-one whose
testimony would evidence hostility, bias, or content that legitimately surprises the calling party, see,
e.g., United States v. Shursen, 649 F.2d 1250, 1254 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d
1022, 1026 (Ist Cir. 1979); United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 1970), and of
an adverse party or a witness identified with (normally testifying on behalf of) an adverse party. See,
e.g., Perkins v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 596 F.2d 681, 682 (5th Cir. 1979); see also C. MCCORMICK,
supranote 352, § 25, at 57-58 (party may ask leading questions of an adverse party called as a hostile
witness "'as upon cross-examination' ").
Legislators testifying about legislative intent, called by a party attempting to prove unconstitutional motive, generally should be considered hostile within these rules. Legislators alleged to have
harbored discriminatory motives are not likely to be friendly witnesses; their close association with
the government officials who are defendants and their interest in the outcome of the suit generally
will justify permitting cross-examination by plaintiff.
526. See, eg., Brest, supra note 14, at 124.
527. As Professor Wigmore noted, "[cross-examination] is beyond doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 300, at 32-33.
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Mieth v. Dothard528 the court concluded that minimum height and weight requirements for state troopers were purposefully discriminatory against women,
relying in large part on the testimony of the Director of the Department of Public Safety, who testified that he believed women should not be state troopers.529
Later, in Armstrong v. O'Connell 530 the court found the testimony of the Super-

intendent and Assistant Superintendent of Education very probative of intent.
Those officials testified that the school board was "unalterably opposed to any
form of forced integration and, from an educational point5 31of view, [did] not
believe in any substantial racial integration in the schools."

The difficulty in a particular case of eliciting helpful material from decisionmakers on cross-examination certainly will affect whether the attorney decides to subpoena them. Experienced attorneys will attempt to prove their cases

through hostile or adverse witnesses only when absolutely necessary. 532 When
other evidence is lacking or when such testimony will be unusually probative,

the difficulty that the examiner may encounter is not a sufficient reason to pro-

hibit the testimony. Furthermore, this difficulty is far less pronounced in discovery when the examiner normally is not required to demonstrate the probative
value or admissibility of the information sought. 533 Despite these problems in-

herent in eliciting and ascertaining the weight of decisionmakers' testimony,
5 34
when such evidence is adduced, it may have considerable probative value.
528. 418 F. Supp. 1169 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
529. Id. at 1180.
530. 451 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
531. Id. at 826-27; see also Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 214 (8th Cir.) ("direct
evidence of discriminatory intent" in testimony of two city alderman tended to show city's electoral
system was maintained for a discriminatory purpose), aff'd mem. 459 U.S. 801 (1982).
532. Therefore, when a friendly witness can provide the same information-for example, of the
arguments made in deliberation-an attorney is not likely to call decisionmakers against their will. In
some circumstances, however, only a hostile witness can provide necessary testimony, as at times
when the plaintiff is attempting to prove the illicit motives of the individual decisionmakers who
voted for the challenged action or rule.
533. But see supra note 412 (discussing possible restrictions on normal course of discovery to
accommodate interests protected by legislative and administrative privileges).
534. The balancing of probative value and need against the degree of harm likely to be suffered
should govern not only whether to compel decisionmakers to participate in discovery or to testify,
but also the permissible scope of discovery and examination. Courts must be careful to limit crossexamination to questions likely to elicit necessary and probative evidence of the decisionmaker's
purpose for supporting the challenged action. Many of the preceding observations of the probative
value of and need for evidence of illicit motivation apply equally to the permissible scope of the
examination of decisionmakers. In addition, a number ofissues are peculiar to the scope of examination, concerning the propriety of questioning a decisionmaker about a particular character trait from
which illicit motivations can be inferred. For example, in an action alleging that a law was enacted
for a racially discriminatory purpose, should a plaintiff be permitted to examine a decisionmaker
about whether he is generally racist, or has made racist remarks unrelated to this law, or has voted
for other laws with a foreseeable racially discriminatory effect?
All of the above examples of evidence would be offered to demonstrate that the decisionmaker
was prejudiced, and therefore more likely to have supported the challenged enactment for racially
discriminatory reasons. Evidence of a person's character offered circumstantially to prove that he
acted in conformity with that character on a particular occasion generally is prohibited in both
criminal and civil cases. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (to the extent
character evidence is relevant, probative value outweighed by risks of prejudice, confusion, and
waste of time); FED. It EviD. 404; C. MCCoRMICK, supra note 352, § 188, at 553-54; 2 D. LouiSELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 142, at 151 (1978) ("character evidence considered
irrelevant as circumstantial proof of conduct" in civil cases). Evidence of a person's character, in-
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cluding his other acts, frequently is admitted in civil cases, however, when offered to prove intent or
knowledge. See, eg., Bohannon v. Pegelow, 652 F.2d 729, 733-34 (7th Cir. 1981); Doe v. New York
City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 147 (2d Cir. 1981) (In civil rights actions in which foster
child alleged agency's failure properly to supervise placement, excluding evidence of abuse of plaintiff's foster sister was error, since such evidence was "relevant to the agency's notice and knowledge
of risk of harm" to plaintiff.).
Arguably, the intent that courts are determining when they accept character evidence differs in
most cases from the intent in motivation analysis. In criminal cases, evidence of other crimes or bad
acts often is admitted to prove the defendant's intent when defendant concedes committing the act
but claims it was an accident or mistake. Intent in those cases denotes purposeful rather than accidental conduct. Since Feeney concluded that proof of purposefulness does not warrant invalidation,
more must be shown than that the decisionmakers knew that their actions would have discriminatory effects. Rather, the decisionmakers must have desired to bring about those particular results.
Courts apparently also have admitted character evidence to prove that a person desired his actions to
have particular effects. For example, evidence of prior and subsequent incidents of racial discrimination often is admissible in civil rights actions to show a pattern of discriminatory intent. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 320 (3d Cir. 1981); Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting
Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1300-1301 (9th Cir. 1981).
Similarly, evidence that decisionmakers engaged in prior incidents of racial discrimination or
have decidedly racist attitudes should be probative of whether they intended to discriminate. Evidence that a school board member was an officer in the Ku Klux Klan surely could assist the
factflnder in determining whether the board member supported segregative school policies "because
of" or "in spite of" their discriminatory effect. This evidence---that a decisionmaker was a member
of the Ku Klux Klan-offered to prove that the decisionmaker was more likely to have acted with
racially descriminatory motives on a particular occasion comes dangerously close to evidence of
propensity, rather than intent. Evidence that the accused, on trial for one crime, has committed
other crimes or bad acts is universally inadmissible in criminal cases, when the evidence is relevant
only to establish that the accused had a propensity to commit crimes. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
This rule of exclusion applies equally to civil cases, although the issue arises less frequently.
Nevertheless, evidence that a decisionmaker is an avowed racist, for example, logically suggests
more than that he must have acted badly on the occasion in question because he is a "bad person."
A racist, by definition, regards members of other races negatively, simply because of their race. Cf
Simon, supra note 371, at 1047 ("Racial (or ethnic) prejudice is an attitude. . . composed of two
essential characteristics: The group against which prejudice is directed is regarded negatively, and
this negative attitude is categorical-that is, it is directed against anyone who is a member of the
group simply because of his membership."). Evidence of racism, therefore, can have a powerful
tendency, rooted both in logic and history, to prove the intent behind an action that adversely affects
racial minorities. In fact, the credo of many racists is to strive to bring about such adverse effects.
Moreover, unlike some character traits, racial prejudice tends to differ less over time and in varying
circumstances. When decisionmakers' racist attitudes can be demonstrated clearly-for example, by
a history of apparently prejudiced actions-courts should allow such proof. There was little question, from the series of actions taken by officials in cases such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886), that those decisionmakers were prejudiced against racial minorities. Other character traits
may have a greater or lesser tendency to prove that illicit intent existed on a particular occasion.
The probative value of such evidence therefore will vary greatly and at times may be outweighed by
the traditional countervailing factors of prejudiciality, confusion, and waste of time. When that is
not the case, however, character evidence tending to prove decisionmakers' intent often should be
admissible through nonprivileged sources.
Privilege usually should prohibit seeking such evidence of a decisionmaker's character through
the testimony of the decisionmakers themselves. First, this evidence frequently will be available
from nonprivileged sources. Since the examiner must have a good faith basis for asking these disparaging questions, he often will have discovered that basis from another source, through which the
evidence could be presented. Second, even if the character evidence is not available through nonprivileged sources, legislative or administrative privilege generally should prohibit accusations by the
examiner of invidious character traits that are likely to intimidate severely the decisionmaker on the
stand. Conversely, when an examiner can elicit character evidence from the decisionmaker in a less
accusatory manner, and when the evidence is particularly probative, a court should be more inclined
to admit it. Thus, evidence that a decisionmaker supported a series of similar actions with foreseeable racially discriminatory effects should be more readily admissible than the fact that the decisionmaker told several racist jokes. The former evidence is both more probative of the
decisionmaker's intent in the challenged action and less personally damning, since the decisionmaker
may be able to offer some benign purpose for his actions. When the probative value of character
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The Supreme Court in Arlington Heights5 35 stated that even when the testimony of decisiornakers is not barred by privilege, it should be permitted only
"in some extraordinary instances." Because the Court was not considering privilege, it presumably based its miserly view of when officials could be compelled
to testify on a determination that admissibility will be rare because the probative
value of such evidence is characteristically too low, or the traditionally recognized countervailing factors associated with the evidence,5 36 other than those
underlying the decisionmakers' privileges, are too high. The Court, however,
did not indicate that the broad spectrum of decisionmaker testimony will pose
unusually grave dangers of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time or that such
testimony consistently is of negligible probative value.
Arlington Heights simply may reflect the Court's confusion, previously
shown in Davis, over the distinction between the probative value and privilege
issues. 537 When the Arlington Heights Court stated that decisionmakers might

be called to testify only in extraordinary instances, it probably was concerned
with "intrusion into the working of other branches of government" that "judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent. '5 38 These interests, however, are precisely those that legislative and administrative privileges
protect. If there were no privilege, decisionmakers probably would be called to
testify and subjected to discovery on a routine basis. Unless such testimony generally was irrelevant or traditional countervailing factors normally outweighed
its probative value, it often would be both admissible and helpful. Thus, the
Arlington Heights Court probably weighed the interests underlying the privileges
twice. It appears to consider those interests both in determining whether decisionmakers should be privileged to refuse to testify, and in noting that even if
there is no privilege, decisionmakers should testify only on rare occasions. Alternatively, the Court may be grossly underestimating the potential probative
value of the testimony of executive and legislative officials.
In either case, the Court's admonition is overly protective. Although in
many instances decisionmakers will be privileged to refuse to testify or submit to
discovery, if a decisionmaker's claim of privilege is overruled, he should testify.
Only privilege considerations should determine when to compel a decisionmaker's testimony, not whether other extraordinary circumstances exist.
Moreover, it will be shown that to overcome a claim of legislative or administrative privilege, plaintiffs will have to demonstrate that the information they seek
evidence does not clearly outweigh the risk of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time, however, the
interests underlying the decisionmaker's privilege always should militate against admissibility.
535. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.
536. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."). This rule vests the judge with broad discretion to exclude evidence, no matter how
probative, when the counterfactors are more likely to interfere with the factfinder's determinations,
The basic policy of the rules of evidence, however, favors the introduction of relevant evidence. See
FED. R. EVID. 402.

537. The Court also confused these issues in Davis. See supra notes 416-43 and accompanying

text.
538. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 n.18.
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539
Thus, when a court
is necessary, probative, and important to their cases.
will be deciding
simultaneously
it
of
privilege,
claim
a
decisionmaker's
rejects
that the specific circumstances of the case mandate use of the evidence.

1. Individual Decisionmakers' Testimony About Institutional Intent
Courts and commentators continue to seek an appropriate methodology for
ascertaining whether impermissible purposes affected the outcome of a govern-

ment decision.5 4 In Arlington Heights the Supreme Court suggested a nonex-

clusive list of the kinds of evidence that are probative of a decisionmaking body's
discriminatory purpose.5 41 The list included the impact of the official action, the
historical background of the decision, the specific sequence of events preceding
the challenged decision, the departures from normal procedural and substantive
considerations, the legislative or administrative history of the decision, and the
testimony of the decisionmakers themselves about the purpose of the official ac-

tion. Courts presently consider all of these factors in determining a legislative or
administrative body's purpose.5 42 Professor Simon has catalogued more specifi539. The probative value of, necessity for, and importance of a decisioumaker's testimony-presumably the factors that should determine, under Arlington Heights, whether extraordinary circumstances exist-also will determine in large part whether the legislative or administrative
privilege applies in a specific case. The interests that these privileges protect, however, play no role
in defining the appropriate conditions under which decisionmakers should testify when the court
overrules the claim of privilege. Failing to recognize this lack of symmetry may have been a source
of the Court's confusion in Arlington Heights.
Arlington Heights' reluctance to permit decisionmakers' testimony also may reflect its view that
judicial inquiries into legislative or high executive motivation always represent a substantial intrusion, and that the integrity of other branches of government should be impugned only when absolutely necessary. The necessity for inquiring into the motives of a decisionmaking body, however,
depends on the substantive rights at issue and the propriety of review under separation of powers
principles. Once the court decides that examination of the decisionmaking body's motives is appropriate, any evidence, including decisionmaker testimony, that does not pose risks substantially outweighing its probative value should be admitted absent a valid claim of privilege.
540. See, eg., Simon, supra note 371, at 1045-46; Note, supra note 80.
541. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68.

542. See, eg., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 416 (1977) (departures from
normal procedures); United States v. City of Birmingham, 727 F.2d 560, 564 (6th Cir. 1984) (departure from normal procedural sequence); Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 210, 209 (8th Cir.)
(all factors), aff'd mem. 459 U.S 801 (1982); Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 931 (4th
Cir. 1981) (same), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982); United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562,
575 (6th Cir. 1981) (departure from normal procedural sequence), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1972
(1982); Pico v. Board of Educ., 683 F.2d 404, 417-19 (2d Cir. 1980) (same), aff'd, 457 U.S. 853
(1982); Tanner v. McCall, 625 F.2d 1183, 1192 (5th Cir. 1980) (sequence of events, substantive and
procedural departures, testimony of decisionmaker), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1981); Greene v.
City of Memphis, 610 F.2d 355, 401 (6th Cir. 1979) (discriminatory impact), rev'd, 451 U.S. 100
(1981); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 141 (3d Cir. 1977) (all factors except testimony of decisionmakers), cert denied,435 U.S. 908 (1978); Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist.,
554 F.2d 1353, 1357 (5th Cir. 1977) (discriminatory impact, historical background, sequence of
events), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 166
(5th Cir. 1977) (discriminatory impact), reh'g denied, 579 F.2d 910, 914 (5th Cir. 1978) (historical
background), cert denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979); McClean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp.
1255, 1264 (E.D.Ark. 1982) (legislative or administrative history); Armstrong v. O'Connell, 451 F.
Supp. 817, 826-27 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (testimony of decisionmakers themselves about purpose of official action); Arthur v. Nyquist, 429 F. Supp. 206, 207 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (substantive and procedural
departures), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 573.F.2d 134, 143-45 (2d Cir.) (discriminatory impact
and historical background), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169,
1180 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (testimony of decisionmakers themselves about purpose of official action),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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cally the most prevalent categories of evidence of institutional purpose and has
discussed why and the extent to which they are probative.5 43 Courts also con-

sider these types of evidence, which overlap somewhat with those identified in
Arlington Heights, in discerning the intent of decisionmaking bodies. 544 The
facts within each of these categories necessary to establish the decisionmaking

body's illicit purpose can be elicited from individual decisionmakers. In fact
decisionmaker testimony frequently will be the most credible and sometimes the
only source 545 of such proof. For example, whenever a decisionmaking body
fails to keep a verbatim record of its proceedings, evidence of the information on
which the institution acted often will have to be elicited from the decisionmakers
themselves.54 6 Even when such a record exists, however, it may not include
critical data and arguments presented to the decisionmaking body outside the

official recorded deliberative processes. Most importantly, examination of decisionmakers about the institution's reasoning for acting on the information that it
considered, its awareness of less discriminatory alternatives, the bona fides of the
body's asserted purpose, or most other facts probative of institutional intent,
presents a nearly unparalleled manner of determining the body's true
543. See Simon, supra note 371, at 1097-99. As noted by Professor Simon, id., the factors are:
(1) overtly racial rules or regulations that may (a) be symptomatic of prejudice, (b) single out a
minority racial group or groups for clear disadvantage, or (c) have neither of these racial characteristics, or share one or the other to some incomplete extent; (2) evidence that the action significantly
disadvantages a member or members of a minority racial group compared to others within the relevant population (eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)); (3) an explanation of the purportedly innocent goals of the challenged action that is sufficiently peculiar within the context to warrant
disbelief (ag., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037
(10th Cir. 1970)); (4) evidence that the action's purportedly innocent goals could have been accomplished by reasonably available alternative means with a significantly less racially disproportionate
effect (eg., United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 538 n.13, 540 n.20, 542-43 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975)); (5) judicial or administrative decisions that assign race as one of the
grounds of decision; (6) an institutional admission; for example, a legislative preamble that states a
racial purpose, or an admission by the counsel of the institution that took the challenged action (e.g.,
Hawkins v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 745 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 31,
1966); cf Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (discrimination against aliens apparent on face of
legislation)); (7) evidence of a contextual peculiarity in the process leading to the challenged actions,
such as the omission of a required or customary hearing (see Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267); (8)
evidence that the specific membership of the institution previously has engaged in racially prejudiced
actions (The courts do not seem to distinguish cases on the basis of whether the same or different
members took the prior official action. In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), twentyone different individuals had served on the seven-member school board during the period at issue);
(9) evidence of a social-political background or context suggestive of racial prejudice (e.g., Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964)); and (10) evidence of the data and arguments presented to the institution, whether by outsiders or members,
during the information-gathering and deliberative processes that led to the action (see Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 268).
544. See supra cases cited note 543.
545. See infra notes 622-29 and accompanying text.
546. See, eg., Right to Choose v. Byrne, 165 N.J. Super. 443, 398 A.2d 587 (Ch. Div. 1979),
aff'd in relevant part, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982). In Right to Choose plaintiffs challenged
guidelines for medicaid funding for abortion as interfering with the establishment clause of the Constitution because "the only legislative purpose which may be hypothesized . . . is to adopt and
further a religious belief by impeding abortions as the equivalent of infanticides ..... Id. at 45859, 398 A.2d at 595. Because New Jersey is one of many states that does not keep any legislative
history, the decisionmakers were called to testify on the tenor of the debates prior to the law's
passage to aid in ascertaining legislative motivation.
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Because this evidence demonstrates the purpose of all members of a decisionmaking body who supported an action, it usually will be more probative

than proof of individual decisionmakers' purposes in determining whether illicit
motives were a "but for" cause of the challenged action. Furthermore, as the

size of the decisionmaking body 548 and the disparity of the vote increases, the
probative value of evidence of the body's motive increasingly will exceed the

probative value of evidence of individuals' motives. As the body grows larger
and the vote more lopsided, the illicit motivations of one or even a small number
of decisionmakers will be less likely to constitute a "but for" cause of the challenged action. Assume an eleven-member school board votes ten to one for a

plan that results in segregated schools, claiming to be promoting a "neighborhood" school policy. The illicit motives of one, two, or three members will not

have affected the outcome of the deliberative process; 549 evidence of their individual motives will not reveal much about the institution's purposes. Evidence
of the information on which the body acted, the body's debates, or evidence that
the board knew it could have accomplished its purported purpose with a less
discriminatory impact, however, may be much more probative of whether the

illicit motive was a "but for" cause of the action.
Among the various categories of evidence of institutional intent, some will

have greater probative value than others. After Feeney, in which the Court held
that unconstitutional purpose may be found only when a decision was made

"because of" rather than "in spite of" its foreseeable consequences, an action's
disproportionate impact may not be significant 550 absent other evidence of un547. For example, in City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981), Justice Marshall noted
that the testimony of the responsible decisionmakers "strongly suggest[ed] that the city deviated
from its usual procedures" in reaching its decision. Id. at 142 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
548. The largest decisionmaking body is the electorate. Although the Supreme Court, in Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1969), held that a decision approved by the electorate may be
judicially reviewed, at least one lower court has concluded that the first amendment protects voters
from revealing the motives for their actions. Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir.

1981).
549. This is true at least for their votes alone. The illicit motivation of one member might affect
the institution more substantially through his lobbying for or sponsoring of the legislation. But see
infra notes 555-67 and accompanying text (discussing practice of ascribing individuals' intentions to
entire decisionmaking body).
550. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Feeney, most courts that had considered the issue
concluded that the foreseeable discriminatory impact of a challenged policy was highly probative
and even created a presumption of discriminatory purpose. See, e-g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d
134, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d
1042, 1046-48 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532
F.2d 380, 388-89 (5th Cir.), remandedfor consideration in light of Washington v. Davis sub nom.
Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), reaff'd sub nom. United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied, 579 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), cert
denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979); Armstrong v. O'Connell, 451 F. Supp. 817, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1978). See
generally Comment, supra note 417, at 328-32 (discussion of foreseeable discriminatory impact as
probative of intent).
It continues to be true, however, "that the discriminatory impact. . . may for all practical
purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is
very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds." Davis, 426 U.S. at 242; see also Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482, 493-94 (1977) (same).
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constitutional purpose. 55 1 Other types of evidence are more probative of unconstitutional purpose because they tend to establish not only that unconstitutional

motives played a role in the decisionmaking body's decision, but that they were a
"but for" cause of it. For example, evidence that the decisionmaking body could

have pursued its asserted goals by alternative, reasonably available means comparable in cost and political acceptability, and with a less disparate impact, sugfor" cause of the decision.5 52

gests that the discriminatory intent was a "but
Similarly, Professor Simon has noted that proof of an action's racially disproportionate effects coupled with evidence disproving the government's claim of innocent purpose, such as the availability of less discriminatory alternatives, is

sufficient to establish an inference that the action would not have been taken but
for prejudiced motivation.5 53 Disproving the government's justifications for a

challenged action is particularly powerful because it leaves unrebutted the inference that the illicit motives, which initially were established to have played some
role in the deliberative process, were a "but for" cause of the actions. 55 4 The
probative value of decisionmakers' testimony therefore will depend on considerations such as these that dictate the weight of various evidentiary items.
Some kinds of evidence that in some contexts traditionally have been considered probative of a decisionmaking body's intent will have far less probative
value in motivation analysis. The Supreme Court suggested in Arlington Heights
that contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body may be

highly relevant to prove the body's impermissible purpose. Such statements
551. See, eg., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979) ("[D]isparate impact
and foreseeable consequences, without more, do not establish a constitutional violation."). In Columbus the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding of segregative purpose, which was based
largely on the foreseeability of discriminatory consequences. As one commentator has noted, however, the trial court had far more probative evidence of segregative intent before it. See Note, supra
note 80, at 1392-95; see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979) ("We
have never held that as a general proposition the foreseeability of segregative consequences makes
out a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination. .. ").
552. Professor Simon discusses this issue in greater detail. See Simon, supra note 371, at 10971107.
553. Id. at 1099.
554. Cf. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 683-85 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (rationale for truck length regulation was not safety but impermissible economic protectionism); Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 214 (8th Cir.) ("Not one single alderman
advanced the [rationale asserted in the litigation] for retaining [the challenged voting scheme] at the
. . .council meeting [in question]."), aff'd mem. 459 U.S. 801 (1982); May v. Cooperman, 572 F.
Supp. 1561, 1571 (D.N.J. 1983) ("The purpose of the Bill, urged at the trial, to provide a transition
from non-school life to school work is an after-the-fact rationalization and not the real purpose of
the Bill.").
Evidence, such as the availability of reasonable alternatives, which tends to disprove the government's claim of benign purpose, almost always will be that which applies to the decisionmaking body
as an entity. Because the illicit motives of an individual decisionmaker are only one of potentially
many factors contributing to the body's purposeproof of such motives usually will indicate only that
illicit considerations had some influence on the body's decision, and not that they caused it. Nonetheless, evidence of individual decisionmakers' impermissible purposes still may be extremely probative of causation. When a relatively large percentage of the decisionmaking body can be shown to
have supported the challenged action because of their illicit motives, that evidence even may be
conclusive. Moreover, a single decisionmaker's impermissible purpose may constitute a "but for"
cause of the challenged action, or an individual decisionmaker's motives, in combination with other
evidence of the institution's impermissible purposes, may demonstrate that the action would not
have been taken "but for" an illicit purpose.
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made during deliberation can be quite probative, by disclosing such things as the
tenor and substance of that process and the information on which the body ac-

ted. Naked admissions of illicit motivation and individual arguments admittedly
based on illicit motivation, however, may not operate in the same way.
Although such admissions clearly would reveal individual motives, they would

not tend to establish the body's motives.
Courts frequently interpret statutes by considering statements made in the
process of decisionmaking.55 5 For that purpose, such statements have been considered very probative of the decisionmaking body's objectives.5 56 That practice, which ascribes individuals' intentions to the entire body, has been criticized
as unwarranted on the theory of agency or adoption by silence. 557 Nevertheless,
in many instances statements made in debate are probative of the institution's

intent. When the draftsman of a law or a committee chairman comments on the
objectives or details of proposed legislation, the failure to contradict him often
can be interpreted properly as acquiescence. The body frequently recognizes the
expertise that various persons develop about a particular statute and accedes to
their explanations of the intended operation of the legislation.5 58 Moreover,

since legislators know that courts will consider individuals' unchallenged comments as probative of the body's intentions, silence in response to such statements in fact may constitute true adoption.5 59
This practice of inferring the institution's purpose from remarks of individual decisionmakers made during or near the place and time of a decisionmaking
5 60
body's deliberations also has been advocated and used in motivation analysis.
Courts frequently have admitted these statements as relevant to and highly probative of the decisionmaking body's purpose. In Resident Advisory Board v.
Rizzo, 56 1 a challenge to the City of Philadelphia's failure to permit construction
of a planned low-income housing project, the court accorded great weight to the
555. See, ag., Symons v. Chrysler Corp. Loan Guarantee Bd., 670 F.2d 238, 242-43 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Rocky Ford Hous. Auth. v. Department of Agriculture, 427 F. Supp. 118, 130 (D.D.C.
1977).
556. Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564-65 (1976); In re Grand
Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24, 34 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1520
(1983); Church of Scientology v. Department of Justice, 612 F.2d 417, 423-24 (9th Cir. 1979).
557. See, eg., Brest, supra note 14, at 124; cf MacCallum, supra note 421, at 777-84 (discussing
majority and agency models of legislative intent).
558. See, eg., Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1218 (1984); National Woodwork
Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 640 (1967); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964); National As'n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624,
648 n.34 (3d Cir. 1983).
559. See MacCallum, supra note 421, at 784-85.
560. See, eg., May v. Cooperman 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1564-65 (D.N.J. 1983); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd mer. per curiam, 389 U.S.
571 (1968).
Professor Brest has suggested that because "the uncontested avowals of illicit motivation by the
sponsors of a measure [often] are in fact typical of the views of many others who vote for the mea"
[s]uch statements thus lend some support to an inference of illicit motivation ....
sure ...
Brest, supra note 14, at 124. Professor Simon also has emphasized that statements of illicit motive
made by a decisionmaker near the place and time of the decision or during the institution's deliberations would be circumstantial evidence of that motive's role in the institution's actions.
561. 564 F.2d 126, 142, 144 (3d Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
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mayor's public statements in determining that the City had acted with racially
discriminatory intent. Mayor Rizzo, while exploring possibilities of preventing
the project's construction, had equated public housing with "Black housing"
and railed "against placing such housing in White neighborhoods."' 62 The
court determined that these remarks were relevant as part of the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision. 563 Similarly, in Armstrong v. O'Connel1564 the court considered, as probative of the discriminatory
purpose of the school board and administration, numerous statements made by
school board or administrative officials during or around the same time and
place as their deliberations, that suggested such improper motivations. 565
These statements by individual decisionmakers are evidence of the historical milieu in which a decision was made and of the information or arguments on
which the institution acted; they may be probative of the institution's purpose in
the same way they would be probative for statutory construction. The circumstances surrounding the individual's statements of intent may suggest that the
institution's behavior, at least in part, was responsive to those statements. Nonetheless, such statements generally will be less useful in discerning the decisionmaking body's intent in motivation analysis than in statutory construction. The
inference that other members of the decisionmaking body deferred to a detailed
explanation of the law is stronger than the parallel inference that the body deferred to a member's admission of illicit motive such as racial prejudice. The
agency model of legislative intent,5 66 which offers some justification for inferring
the institution's deference to individuals' expertise, 567 is largely inapplicable to
motivation analysis. Although an individual's admission of illicit motive may
affect the actions of other members, the body's deference to such statements
generally should not be assumed,5 68 particularly since the courts' practice of
deducing illicit motive is not yet entrenched. Unlike statutory interpretation in
which the courts' established practice itself lends probative value to an individual's statements, in motivation analysis there is much less reason to impute the
remarks of members to the body. If the courts began regularly to make such
deductions in motivation analysis cases, the assignment of probative weight
would become self-fulfilling. In those circumstances members of the majority
voting to take an action would feel compelled to contradict statements of illicit
motive, regardless whether they shared the motive, since failure to do so would
imply acquiescence.
Nevertheless, decisionmakers' unchallenged statements of illicit purpose
even today should be considered probative to some extent of the institution's
562. Id. at 142.
563. Id. at 144. This factor had been specified in Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
564. 451 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
565. See also Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 213-14 (8th Cir.) (statements of
aldermen during or around same time and place as deliberations concerning at-large elections), aff'd

mem. 459 U.S. 801 (1982).
566. Cf. MaeCallum, supra note 421, at 780-84 (discussing agency model of legislative intent).
567. Id.
568. See, eg., Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting
"the injustice of ascribing collective will to articulate remarks of particular bigots").
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motives. A decisionmaker supporting an action for innocent reasons arguably
should contradict on the record public assertions by other decisionmakers of

to
improper purposes for the action. In some circumstances, it may bejustifiable569
infer the institution's deference to the purposes of pivotal decisionmakers.

The effect on the decisionmaking body of the motives and arguments of legislative sponsors or committee chairmen will vary, as with other members, with
their general influence and persuasiveness. At times there will be little reason
for finding that a decisionmaking body gave greater deference to the unconstitu570

tional motives of key members than to the motives of other decisionmakers.

Nevertheless, in some circumstances the statements of a particular decisionmaker made during or prior to deliberations should be accorded greater

weight than statements of other decisionmakers,57 1 because as a matter of political reality, decisionmakers sometimes will accede to the wishes of a more powerful member of the body. In such a case, deference to the motives of the key
member should be inferred, at least when it appears that the body would not
have reached the same decision absent the key member's support. A few courts,
without explicitly stating their rationale, have focused on the statements and

motives of key personnel in determining the purpose of a governmental action. 572 Admissions of impermissible purpose by key decisionmakers, however,
569. See infra notes 571-74 and accompanying text. Members of the decisionmaking body may
defer to the desires of influential decisionmakers for a number of reasons. The decisionmaker may
persuade some that his illicit purpose should be fulfilled. Others may mindlessly follow the "party
line," and still others may desire only to gain favor with the key decisionmaker. In all of these
instances inferring deference to illicit motives is justified, as long as the same action would not have
been taken absent the illicit motivation. Thus, when the institution blindly follows a single decisionmaker, if it would not have made the same decision absent his illicit motives, the decision should
be ruled unconstitutional.
570. Professor Brest has observed that some decisionmakers who otherwise would support an
action for proper purposes might reverse their position in response to others' illicit motives. See
infra notes 581-82 and accompanying text. This may be particularly true when the legislation was
initially written or introduced for unconstitutional objectives. In some circumstances such a reaction might be so probable that a factfinder would be justified in finding that any decisionmaker who
voted for the challenged action must have shared the illicit intent of the drafter or sponsor.
571. See, eg., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). In Grosjean a statement
signed by two key political figures that indicated their illicit motives for supporting the bill was
circulated to the legislature during its deliberations. As Professor Ely has noted, "Grosjean is [the]
unusual case. . . in which reference to the remarks of two (critical) persons seems sufficient to seal
an already plausible inference of unconstitutional legislative motivation." Ely, supra note 8, at 144.
572. See, eg., Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184, 186-89 (7th Cir. 1982);
McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1245 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated in part, 688 F.2d 960
(5th Cir. 1982), vacatedper curiam, 104 S.Ct. 1577 (1984); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564
F.2d 126, 142, 144 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978) (statements by mayor); McLean
v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). In McLean a state statute requiring
public schools to teach both "creation science" and evolution was challenged as establishing religion.
The court considered the publicly proclaimed views of the drafter of the law, who was not even a
legislator, to be highly probative of the legislature's illicit purpose. The court concluded that the
state legislature deferred to or adopted the drafter's purpose since the law was enacted with virtually
no modification, the legislative findings of fact were identical to those of the drafter even though "no
meaningful fact-finding process was employed by the [legislature]," and a state senator who described himself as a "'born again' Christian Fundamentalist" had introduced the law after receiving
it from an evangelical group. Id. at 1261-63.
When a body is somewhat disinterested in whether it takes a particular action, and does so only
after strong urging by an individual decisionmaker, the body's deference to that individual decisionmaker's purposes may be inferred. The actions and thus the motives of that individual decisionmaker properly may be interpreted as having had a significant impact on the deliberations.
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if made at trial or in other circumstances when they could not have influenced

the body, should not be deemed more representative or more probative of the
body's purpose 573 than similar remarks of other members.5 74 When other evidence indicates that the body knew of these motives prior to its decision, deference to these motives may be inferred more justifiably.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that when evidence of individual

decisionmakers' admissions of unconstitutional purpose is offered to show the
effect of such admissions on the behavior of other members of the decisionmaking body, the probative value of such statements may vary greatly. In addition,
such evidence merely suggests that the institution may have considered constitu-

tionally impermissible factors.5 75 Although ultimately it may not overcome the
government's proof of benign intent and prove that the illicit motivation was a
"but for" cause of the decision, this evidence may play a significant role in shifting the burden to the government to demonstrate that the action would have

been taken anyway absent the illicit motives.5 76 Without other evidence showing that considerations of illicit motivation were a "but for" cause of the challenged decision, evidence sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the
government is critically important.

An exhaustive discussion of the gradations in probative value of all the categories of evidence relevant to a decisionmaking body's purpose is not within the
scope of this Article. As courts continue generally to refine their understanding
of this issue, the specific probative value of such evidence will vary greatly
among cases. This evidence will not always be of sufficient weight to overcome a
decisionmaker's claim of privilege. When these items create a strong inference
of the institution's purpose and are unavailable through nonprivileged sources,
their presentation through the compelled testimony of decisionmakers or the
subpoena of legislative or administrative documents should be permitted.
Given the nature of the constitutional interests at stake, however, decisionmakers are not likely to be
indifferent in the types of cases that mandate motive analysis.
573. In some instances, however, the illicit purpose of a pivotal decisionmaker can be a "but for"
cause of the challenged action, and thus, the decisionmaker's admissions of impermissible motivation
can be dispositive. See infra note 583 and accompanying text.
574. Statements of permissible purpose made by sponsors of legislation or other key decisionmakers are no more probative when offered by defendants on behalfof the constitutionality of a
government action. Interesting problems would arise, however, if a decisionmaker was assigned by
the body, or purported on is own, to testify about the permissible motives on behalf of some portion
or all of the institution. Although the testimony of a true agent of the body who is authorized to
speak for other members may be entitled to greater weight than that of an individual speaking on his
own, such testimony would make adequate cross-examination about the body's intent very difficult.
When the defendants' attorney claims an innocent purpose, cross-examination is foreclosed altogether, unless the plaintiff calls hostile decisionmakers to the stand for questioning. After a plaintiff
makes a sufficient showing to shift the burden of proof to the government, however, the defendants
no longer can rely on the representations of their attorney that the action would have been taken
absent illicit purpose. Such representations by counsel are not evidentiary in nature.
575. See Simon, supra note 371, at 1127-30.
576. See Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (after
plaintiff has shown that the impermissible consideration was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor,
the government must demonstrate "by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached
the same decision ... even in the absence of the [illicit consideration]").
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2.

Evidence of Individual Decisionmakers' Motives

Evidence of the motives of individual decisionmakers 577 may be relevant in
two ways: as a "but for" cause of the challenged enactment or as a portion of
the body's motives that may be aggregated with other motives to determine the
majority's objectives. In the latter, a decisionmaker's testimony of individual
impermissible motives can be probative because proof of the illicit objectives of
each member incrementally increases the probability that the institution's actions were motivated similarly. 578 Some courts have aggregated the motives of
579
individual decisionmakers to deduce the purpose of the decisionmaking body.
When invalidation requires a showing merely that decisionmakers' illicit
motives were a "but for" cause of the action, generally there will be a greater
probative value to evidence of individual decisionmakers' motives. When the
action was taken by a close vote, such proof can be enormously probative. Consider the adoption by a five-member school board of policies that increase school
segregation. If the board voted three to two in favor of the policies, it is clear
that if all three board members who voted for the policies, a majority of the
entire body, had a discriminatory purpose, the policies should be invalidated
whether the required showing is either "but for" causation or institutional purpose. Even if two of the three board members who voted for the law had impermissible motives, that would seem sufficient for invalidation under a majority
580
model of legislative purpose.
If the illicit motives need only be a "but for" cause to require invalidation of
the action, the motives of each of the three members voting for the challenged
action are crucial. If only one of the three who voted for the law did so for illicit
purposes, the law would not have been enacted but for the effects of these illicit
purposes. Even if the applicable standard combines "but for" causality and substantiality of illicit purpose, as suggested by Pico, one decisionmaker's motives
may be dispositive as both a "but for" cause and a "substantial factor"; his motives would represent one-third of the majority's purpose. Professor Brest has
noted that "[t]his [result] should be qualified by the possibility that some [decisionmakers], who otherwise would support a measure for legitimate reasons,
might vote against it because others were supporting it for avowedly illicit reasons." 581 Thus, even if two members of the three-member majority were proven
to have acted for impermissible purposes, the two-member minority otherwise
577. The illicit motive of either an individual decisionmaker or the body need not be the sole or
dominant objective to be relevant; it need only be a "but for" cause of the action.
578. See supra text accompanying notes 515-17.
579. See, eg., Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 213-14 (8th Cir.), aff'd mem. 459
U.S. 801 (1982); Armstrong v. O'Connell, 451 F. Supp. 817, 833-34 (E.D. Wis. 1978). In Perkinsthe
court inferred illicit motivation from the remarks of all three alderman who had opposed efforts to
modify the city's allegedly discriminatory at-large system of electing alderman.
580. But see infra notes 581-82 and accompanying text (noting counterargument that illicit motives would not affect result if decisionmakers, who otherwise would support a decision for permissible purposes, voted against it in response to other members' support for admittedly illicit reasons).
581. Brest, supra note 14, at 120 n.124. Even if the decisionmakers with impermissible motives
did not admit them prior to the vote or action, other members of the body might reverse their
support because they perceived that others' motives were illicit.
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might have voted for the policies, and therefore the illicit motives would not
have affected the result. This qualification, however, diminishes only the conclusiveness of such evidence; it demonstrates that the illicit motives of enough
members who, if they had voted for the opposite result, would have prevented a
majority, do not necessarily affect the outcome of the body's action. Nevertheless, that qualification does not diminish the high probative value of such evidence. The illicit motivation of those members whose support was necessary to
comprise the majority may have dictated the result. When the impermissible
purposes of that number of decisionmakers can be proven, the government action should be invalidated absent rebutting evidence that minority decisionmakers actually had switched their votes to counter the unconstitutional
aims of those in the majority. This is particularly true when a majority or more
of those who voted for the action can be shown to have acted on impermissible
considerations.
Professor Brest's suggestion 582 that this issue is largely academic because
head-count is neither feasible nor necessary probably is overstated. When the
decisionmaking body has relatively few members, plaintiffs often will be able to
adduce 583 through cross-examination 5 84 or extra-judicial admissions 585 the illicit motives of decisionmakers whose votes were necessary for the action. In the
school board hypothetical, proof of the improper purposes of only one of the
three members who voted to adopt the policies in question might be sufficient to
warrant invalidation either by itself, absent contrary evidence, or together with
other direct or circumstantial evidence of institutional intent.5 86 Such proof certainly should satisfy the plaintiff's initial burden of proving that the illicit con5 87
sideration was a "substantial" or "motivating" influence.
Similarly, if invalidation requires only "but for" or "substantial" causation,
the motives of pivotal decisionmakers, such as the draftsman or sponsor of a
582. Id.
583. See, eg., Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 213-14 (8th Cir. 1982) aff'd mein.
459 U.S. 801 (1982); May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1564 (D.N.J. 1983); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1263 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (primary sponsor admitted in court that
his purpose was religious); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982).
584. To the extent that Professor Brest assesses head-count as infeasible because of a deci-

sionmaker's privilege not to testify, this Article already has addressed that issue. Moreover, it often
is not overwhelmingly difficult to elicit the impermissible motives of a decisionmaker on cross-examination. See supra notes 527-31 and accompanying text.
585. Professor Brest noted that decisionmakers occasionally will concede their impermissible

objectives in a judicial proceeding without having been cross-examined. Brest, supranote 14, at 124
(citing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 253-54 (1971)); United States v. Morehouse Parish, Civ.
No. 14429 (W.D. La. 1969) (purpose of abandoning coeducation was to prevent white flight); Banks
v. St. James Parish, Civ. No. 16173 (E.D. La. 1969) (purpose of abandoning coeducation was to
retain public support for desegregation)).
586. See, eg., Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 214 (8th Cir.), aff'd ,nem. 459 U.S.
801 (1982).
The testimony of two of West Helena's white aldermen [of three who supported the challenged inaction] does not necessarily "condemn" the city's at-large voting scheme. It is,
however, an important fact, in the totality of facts and circumstances, tending to prove that
the at-large electoral system was maintained for a discriminatory purpose.

Id.
587. See Mount Healthy City School Dist Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
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challenged law, may be dispositive of the law's purpose. If those key members
had not acted on considerations of illicit purpose, the law presumably would not

have been enacted, because it never would have been written or sponsored, at
least at that time.588 In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.589 the
Supreme Court appeared to recognize the great significance of the motives of a
key decisionmaker whose actions may have affected the outcome of a challenged

decision. A plurality of the Court invalidated an Iowa statute limiting truck
length, at least in part because the State was motivated by impermissible protectionist purposes. 590 Although the legislature had passed a bill that would have
extended the permissible truck length, the Governor of Iowa vetoed the bill and

thus preserved the prior challenged restriction while expressing an illicit purpose
for his veto. 59 1 Neither the plurality nor the concurring opinion went so far as
to conclude that the Governor's illicit motivations were a "but for" cause of the
restriction, but both opinions found nearly conclusive his articulated purpose
592
and the legislature's accession to it by not overriding the veto.

The courts may not conclude that the illicit purposes of pivotal deci-

sionmakers, such as a governor who vetoes a law or the sponsor of a bill, in
themselves can constitute a sufficient "but for" cause of a challenged action to

warrant invalidating it. Courts have recognized, however, that the motives of3
59
key decisionmakers sometimes can be very probative of the body's purpose.

Moreover, the impermissible motives of leading proponents of an action most
often will be a "substantial" or "motivating" factor that justifies shifting the
burden of persuasion onto the government,594 and also should satisfy the "sub588. See supra note 453.
589. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
590. The concurring opinion of Justices Brennan and Marshall relied exclusively on the state's
impermissible considerations, noting:
[A]lthough [the] plurality opinion does not give as much weight to the illegitimacy of
Iowa's actual purpose as I do,.. . both that opinion and this concurrence have found the
actual motivation of the Iowa lawmakers in maintaining the truck-length regulation highly
relevant to, if not dispositive of, the case.
Id. at 683 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
591. The Governor stated:
I find sympathy with those who are doing business in our state and whose enterprises could
gain from increased cargo carrying ability by trucks. However, with this bill, the Legislature has pursued a course that would benefit only a few Iowa-based companies while providing a great advantage for out-of-state trucking firms and competitors at the expense of
our Iowa citizens.
Id. at 677.
592. See id.at 677-78. The plurality commented:
The dissenting opinion insists that we defer to Iowa's truck-length limitations because they
represent the collective judgment of the Iowa Legislature. . . .This position is curious
because, as noted above, the Iowa Legislature approved a bill legalizing [larger trucks].
The bill was vetoed by the Governor, primarily for parochial rather than legitimate safety
reasons. The dissenting opinion is at a loss to explain the Governor's interest in deflecting
interstate truck traffic around Iowa.
Id. at 677 n.24; see also id. at 684-86 (Brennan, J.,concurring) (governor's admitted purpose of
curtailing interstate truck traffic to which legislature acceded was protectionist purpose impermissible under commerce clause).
593. See supra note 572 and accompanying text.
594. See, eg., NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983). The Transportation Management Court determined that illicit motives of the supervisor who made the initial
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stantial factor" test under the Pico substantial causality standard.
D.

Need for the Evidence

Courts traditionally have recognized the need for relevant evidence to be a
factor in determining generally the admissibility of evidence, 595 and more specifically, in delineating the scope of qualified privileges. 596 To some extent, a litigant's need for particular evidence encompasses the relevancy of that
evidence,5 97 as well as indicating the availability of nonprivileged sources of evidence, and the importance of the evidence, or issue for which it is offered, to the
case. If the proffered evidence is irrelevant or immaterial, the litigant does not

need it; a party has less need for evidence of lesser probative value and greater
need for evidence of higher probative value.
In weighing the importance of a privilege against the need for evidence, the
courts have focused on two different aspects of that need. First, in deciding
whether a privilege should be absolute or qualified, courts have balanced the
interests underlying the privilege against the general needs of the judiciary and
the parties for relevant evidence in litigation.598 In United States v. Nixon5 9 9 the
Supreme Court addressed the conflict between the President's assertion of a gendecision to discharge plaintiff were probative of the fact that antiunion animus was a substantial or
motivating factor of the challenged action. This finding was sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer, and was a critical factor in the Court's conclusion that plaintiff would not have
been fired absent the employer's illicit motivation. Id. at 2475-76.
595. In many contexts, a litigant's need for relevant evidence is important in determining admissibility. Courts determining whether to admit evidence of other crimes regularly assess the necessity
of such evidence to the prosecution's case. See, eg., United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Baldarrama, 566 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1978); cf Note, The Admissibility of
Other Crimes in Texas, 50 TEx. L. REv. 1409 (1972) (Texas considers only those factors relevant to
the defense.). Similarly, in exercising their considerable discretion over the admissibility of circumstantial evidence, courts frequently weigh a party's need for the evidence. Certain exceptions to the
hearsay rule, most notably the unavailability exceptions, are based on necessity. Cf. J. WIOMORn,
supra note 300, § 144, at 253 ("Since we shall lose the benefit of the evidence entirely unless we
accept it untested, there is thus a greater or less necessity for receiving it.").
596. See, eg., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-14 (1974) (executive privilege balanced
against need for evidence in criminal trial); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (informant
identity privilege balanced against needs of accused for evidence); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700
(D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Article of Drug, 43 F.R.D. 181 (D. Del. 1967) (identities of
government employees who tested product being investigated not protected); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v.
Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967) (additional disclosure
not required when discovery party failed to show that materials previously disclosed did not contain
information sought); Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (executive
privilege balanced against civil litigant's need for evidence); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (since contracts are discoverable, need for documents
concerning negotiation of contracts insufficient to overcome privilege).
597. Some courts determining admissibility also have considered need an aspect of probative
value. See eg., United States v. Frick, 588 F.2d 531, 538 (5th Cir. 1979).
598. In balancing these competing general needs, courts almost always consider the need to
ascertain the truth, which always conflicts to some degree with the privilege. Moreover, courts often
also consider this generic search for the truth in determining whether a qualified privilege should
prevail in a particular case. See, eg., Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (D.D.C. 1973);
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S, 952
(1967).
599. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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eralized privilege of confidentiality and the generalized need for relevant evidence in criminal trials. 60° The Court concluded that the legitimate needs of the
judicial process may outweigh the President's interest in confidentiality and
therefore held that the executive privilege was only qualified. 6° 1 This balancing,
which considers only the general need for evidence, however, does not help determine whether the qualified privilege should apply in a particular case. The
same generalized needs for evidence and the privilege will exist in every case;
these conflicting constitutional interests already have been discussed, leading to
the recommendation that a decisionmaker's privilege not to testify should be
6 °2
qualified.
Once the courts have established that the privilege in question is qualified,
they should balance the likely degree of harm from nonrecognition of the privilege against the litigants' particular need for the evidence. 6° 3 In United States v.
Nixon, for example, once the Court had determined that the President's privilege was qualified, it required a demonstration of a specific need for the evidence
in a pending criminal trial.6° 4 These courts logically have required that the proponent of the evidence that is sought to be discovered or admitted demonstrate
that it was unavailable from nonprivileged sources and important to that party's
proof. 605 This requirement protects the interests underlying the privilege from
needless intrusion.
Numerous decisions have held correctly that if nonprivileged sources can
reveal the same evidence, a court should be less inclined to allow production or
600. Id. at 713-14. It appears, however, that the Nixon Court also included a general need for
evidence in the interests balanced against the qualified executive privilege. Having addressed that
issue, id. at 707, the Court concluded that the qualified executive privilege protecting against the
disclosure of confidential presidential communications succumbed to the need to develop all relevant
facts in the adversary system of criminal justice, the importance of such development to the public
confidence in the judicial system, and the criminal defendant's rights to confrontation, compulsory
process, and due process of law. Id. at 709-11. Several commentators have discussed the implications of Nixon's articulation of "need." See, eg., Henkin, Executive Privilege: Mr.Nixon Loses But
the Presidency Largely Prevails, 22 UCLA L. REv. 40, 42 (1974); Ratner, Executive Privilege Self
Incrimination, and the Separationof PowerIllusion, 22 UCLA L. REv. 92, 97-98 (1974).
601. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.
602. See supra notes 247-314 and accompanying text.
603. See, eg., McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1290-91 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Smith v. FTC,
403 F. Supp. 1000, 1015 (D. Del. 1975); United States v. Article of Drug, 43 F.R.D. 181 (D. Del.
1967) (identities of government employees who tested product being investigated not protected);
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966) (additional disclosure
not required when discovery party failed to show that materials previously disclosed did not contain
information sought), aff'd sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157
F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (since contracts are discoverable, need for documents concerning negotiation of contracts insufficient to overcome privilege).
604. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707-10.
605. The magnitude of the rights that the challenged action allegedly infringed also might be
considered in determining need. The court certainly should consider this factor in initially balancing
the general need for evidence against the policies favoring a privilege to determine whether a particular privilege should be absolute or qualified. The court also should consider it with other specific
needs of a litigant, in determing whether a qualified privilege should bar discovery or admission of
evidence in a particular case. Perhaps an equal protection challenge alleging infringement of fundamental rights should weigh more heavily against the decisionmakers' privilege than an equal protection action alleging the abuse of discretion in distributing benefits.
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presentation through privileged ones. 6° 6 For example, cases balancing an accused's need for the identity of an informant against the government's privilege
of nondisclosure often have upheld the privilege when the informant was not the
only nonparty eyewitness. 60 7 This aspect of the litigant's need for evidence
should be viewed primarily as a test for whether ultimately to exclude the evidence. Standing alone, the unavailability of nonprivileged sources of evidence of
improper purpose should not overcome the decisionmakers' qualified privilege.
The absence of nonprivileged evidence of illicit motivation even may indicate a
frivolous claim6" 8 that should not be pursued at the expense of the interests
underlying a privilege, particularly if the evidence subject to the qualified privilege is of low probative value.6° 9 Therefore, when nonprivileged sources of evidence are unavailable, the degree of harm that the government likely will suffer
should be balanced against the other factors favoring admissibility: the relevancy, probative value, and importance of the evidence to the plaintiff's case.610
The privilege, however, should not be overruled merely because the evidence
cannot be obtained or presented through nonprivileged sources. Thus, when an
informant was neither an eyewitness nor a participant, courts generally have
upheld the government's claim of privilege despite a lack of nonprivileged evidence. 611 To the extent that the evidence subject to the qualified privilege is
relevant, probative, and important to a party's case, however, the absence of
other nonprivileged evidence should encourage the court to admit the privileged
612
evidence.

In weighing a litigant's need for evidence, courts also should consider the
606. See, e.g., id. at 703 (special prosecutor demonstrated that presumptively privileged materials not available from any other source); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (aircraft
accident report, though relevant, nevertheless privileged because discovering party could have obtained information elsewhere); United States v. Anderson, 627 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 659 (6th Cir. 1976); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 71718 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (ordered disclosure after finding disputed materials essential to pending grand
jury investigation and only adequate source); United States v. DeStefano, 476 F.2d 324, 330-31 (7th
Cir. 1973).
607. See, eg., United States v. Anderson, 627 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
DeStefano, 476 F.2d 324, 330-31 (7th Cir. 1973).
608. If there is no evidence of a particular fact, in circumstances suggesting that if the fact were
true evidence of it probably would exist, the absence of evidence implies that the fact is not true.
609. One commentator has suggested that a close connection exists between relevance and necessity, and has concluded that evidence of low probative value usually is unnecessary. "Excluded
evidence is rarely very probative of the issues on which it is inadmissible. When it does have probative value, if the hypothesis for which it is offered is true, there is almost always other available
evidence that supports it better." Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021, 1031 n.35
(1977).
610. Proof of the purpose underlying a decisionmaking body's action always will be critical in a
motive case.
611. See eg., United States v. Garcia, 625 F.2d 162, 165-66 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 923
(1980); United States v. Moreno, 588 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Connolly, 479
F.2d 930, 933-34 (9th Cir. 1973), cert dismissed, 414 U.S. 897 (1973).
612. A plaintiff is likely to call unfriendly decisionmakers to the stand only when he greatly
needs their testimony; an experienced trial attorney rarely will attempt to prove her case by crossexamining hostile witnesses if other evidence is available. Discovery, however, is another matter.
Litigants routinely would seek discovery from decisionmakers if they could. Since nonparties are
subject only to depositions and not interrogatories in most jurisdictions, however, the relatively high
expense of taking depositions also will discourage many litigants from pursuing needless inquiries.
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quantity and quality of evidence subject to a qualified privilege that already has
been admitted. Whether evidence admitted is privileged or not, there may come
a point when enough evidence has been presented that additional evidence
would be only cumulative. 613 The trial judge in such circumstances has broad
discretion to exclude the additional evidence without resort to a privilege. The
decisionmaker's privilege, however, to the extent that it applies, justifiably imposes a stricter standard than mere accumulation. Applying that stricter standard probably would exclude such evidence before it actually became
cumulative.
Despite the logic of a balancing process that accounts for the availability of
nonprivileged sources of evidence, the process cannot be applied mechanically
because different modes of proof often are not fungible. Different sources of
evidence will vary both in their logical implications and their persuasive appeal
to different factfinders. Because these qualities can be measured only imprecisely, one source of evidence rarely makes another clearly unnecessary. This
difficulty of substitution exists for the closest evidentiary equivalents such as
credible admissions in a legislative record substituting for admissions made during cross-examination. When different modes of proof are more dissimilar but
create the same ultimate inference, it is much harder to equate them. The foreseeable discriminatory impact of a government action, for example, implies the
same improper purpose as admissions of illicit motivation made by individual
decisionmakers-both tend to prove that improper purpose was among the factors that caused the body to take a challenged action. The two forms of evidence, however, may be of vastly different probative value or importance to the
case, both quantitatively and qualitatively; the first tends to prove only that illicit motive was involved in the decisionmaking process to some degree, 614 the
latter, depending on the number and content of admissions and the size of the
decisionmaking body, may show conclusively that illicit purposes caused the ac615
tion to be taken.
Nevertheless, nonprivileged alternate sources of evidence that will be
equally or more probative often will exist; in those instances, the privilege should
prevail. 616 When an accurate record of legislative or administrative proceedings
613. See, eg., FED. R. EVID. 403. Evidence ordinarily may be excluded as cumulative when
"the fact finder has considered all of its relevant informational content in his weighing of other
evidence." Lempert, supra note 609, at 1050.
614. See supra notes 551-54 and accompanying text.
615. See supra notes 548-49, 580-82 and accompanying text. On the other hand, if the decisionmaking body is relatively large compared with the number of individual admissions of illicit intent,
evidence of the foreseeable impact may be more probative.
616. The principles discussed in the text refer to presenting evidence at trial, but apply more or
less to discovery as well. A central factual question in every case involving motives of a decisionmaking body will be whether a challenged action was taken for an unconstitutional purpose. The
ability to obtain through discovery facts relevant to that question is as important as the ability to
present the facts at trial. In addition, the discovery process also may be less intrusive. See supra
note 412. Because discovery is more often less predictable than presenting evidence at trial, however, and because at the discovery stage litigants may be unaware of available alternative sources of
evidence, it may be more difficult for a judge to assess the equivalence of privileged and nonprivileged sources. Nevertheless, reasonable efforts can be taken that would protect the interests underlying the privilege when nonprivileged sources appear available. Litigants could be required to
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is available, litigants should be precluded from proving the content of the debates through compelled testimony, despite possible tactical advantages of doing
so. 617 Similarly, when plaintiffs can find a decisionmaker who will testify voluntarily about the deliberative process, they should be foreclosed from compelling
similar testimony from an unwilling decisionmaker. 6 18 The decisionmakers'
privilege also should restrict litigants' normal prerogative to select the evidence
they deem most probative, when nonprivileged sources of evidence seem roughly
equivalent. Thus, a plaintiff probably should be precluded from compelling a
decisionmaker to testify about his personal intent in supporting a decision when
there are credible extra-judicial admissions of his illicit intent.
On the other hand, when the privileged and nonprivileged sources of evidence tend to prove the same ultimate fact through different intermediate inferences, the privileged source should not be deemed unnecessary automatically.
Assume that a plaintiff seeks to prove through two pieces of evidence that illicit
intent played a part in the government's decision. The first is the information on
which the body acted, which indicates a foreseeable discriminatory impact. The
second is the decisionmaking body's failure to hold a required public hearing
prior to its action. If the former evidence could be adduced only through compelled testimony, a court should not exclude it as unnecessary on the ground
that the latter unprivileged evidence also suggests unconstitutional considerations. Furthermore, to the extent that privileged evidence is probative of a different matter, it should not be excluded merely because it overlaps with available
nonprivileged evidence. 6 19 The decision not to exclude potentially privileged
evidence as unnecessary does not mean that the claim of privilege is inapplicable;
the remaining factors favoring and opposing the privilege still must be balanced.
Evidence of illicit motivation will be more important to a plaintiff's case
when it tends to establish that the motivation was a "but for" cause of the challenged action rather than an influence of unknown strength, because the question that the court ultimately must decide is whether the motivation was a "but
for" cause of the action. Thus, when evidence is highly probative on that issue,620 it more readily should outweigh a claim of privilege. Even when evidence suggests that illicit purposes were a motivating factor of unknown
strength, it still may be very important because it will be sufficient to shift the
exhaust nonprivileged channels of discovery before seeking discovery against unwilling dccisionmakers. When some information apparently may be obtained only through privileged sources,
however, the need for discovery should be balanced against the decisionmaker's privilege in the same
manner as for testimony. When the party seeking discovery appears to be searching for particular
information or admissions, he should be required to show that such information is relevant and
admissible at trial, rather than merely that it is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
617. When litigants reasonably could challenge the record as inaccurate, however, privilege
should not preclude such a challenge.
618. See supra note 532. When the unwilling witness can testify about other matters for which
there is no friendly witness, or when no amicable witness is available because the challenged action
was unanimous, compelled testimony can be necessary and crucial.
619. Cf. Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744, 745-46 (5th Cir. 1975) (Court erred in excluding
evidence that overlapped with that of prior witness.).
620. See supra notes 552-54 and accompanying text.
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burden to the government to establish that the illicit motivations were not a "but
for" cause.
Given the infinite potential combinations of evidence with which to prove

unconstitutional motivation and the need for an individualized balance of competing interests in each case, it is impossible to foresee accurately which items of

evidence the plaintiff is most likely to need to introduce. Nevertheless, some
useful general principles emerge. First, the need for various evidence will fluctuate with the court's standard of what unconstitutional purpose is and how it may
be proved. 621 Thus, depending on the court and the category of illicit motiva-

tion, different evidentiary sources will be of greater or lesser significance. Second, nonprivileged evidence of decisionmaker intent is more often available for

administrative decisions than legislative enactments because an administrative
body is more likely to reveal its purpose through a series of actions leading up to

its decision than a legislature enacting a law on an isolated occasion. 622 Decisionmakers engaging in a series of actions over time often establish a pattern that
is difficult to explain, except by impermissible purposes. 623 It can be more difficult, on the other hand, to discern the motives of legislators, both because there

generally is less history from which
to do so and because of the broader range of
624
potential legitimate purposes.

621. Case law thus far has been an inconsistent guide of what unconstitutional purpose is and
how it may be proved. Schnapper, supra note 449, at 36. For example, "[d]isparate impact, described as an 'important starting point' in Arlington Heights, was the keystone of the lower court
opinions overturned in Feeney and City of Mobile. A history of 'a series of official actions taken for
invidious purposes,' cited as a significant 'evidentiary source' in Arlington Heights, was dismissed in
City of Mobile as 'of limited help."' Id.
622. Commentators have noted that administrative intent generally is easier to ascertain that
legislative intent. See, e.g., A. BicKEL, supranote 7, at 217. Moreover, some have cited the different
status of administrators' in addition to the court's ability to determine administrative motive as
justification for judicial inquiry into administrative motive. Id. Ironically, however, although there
usually will be a greater need for qualified-privilege evidence to prove illicit legislative rather than
administrative intent, the privilege protecting legislators probably is stronger than that for adminstrators. See supra notes 328-50 and accompanying text. Thus, in balancing these competing interests, the results, on average, may be more or less the same for both administrative and legislative
decisionmakers.
623. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (school desegregation);
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (school desegregation); Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-39 (1977) (employment discrimination); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,
591-99 (1935) (juror selection); United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 412 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied,439 U.S. 824 (1978) (school desegregation; "Even if no individual act carries unmistakable signs of racial purpose, a clear pattern is sufficient to give rise to a permissible inference of
segregative intent."); Armstrong v. O'Connell, 451 F. Supp. 817, 827 (E.D. Wis. 1978), remanded
sub nom. Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977) (school desegregation); Johnson v. City of
Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Hardy v. Porter, 443 F. Supp. 1164, 1173 (N.D. Miss.
1977). Other commentators also have noted this point. See, eg., Simon, supra note 371, at 1065.
624. See Simon, supra note 371. When the range of goals that a decisionmaking body legitimately can pursue is narrower, there will be fewer purposes with which the body can justify its
actions. Thus, the purported objectives of a body with a limited range of discretion such as an
administrative or lower legislative body, can be exposed more easily as a pretext.
Professor Simon discusses this observation at length and offers the following example: A police
board passes a rule requiring police applicants to pass a test about opera or world history. The test
disqualifies blacks at a significantly higher rate than whites. To avoid the inference of illicit motivation, the board claims that the test was designed either to encourage people to study opera or world
history by rewarding knowledge with employment or to promote a better and more well-rounded
police force. The first explanation is beyond the police board's limited authority; the second merely
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Third, plaintiffs almost always will have a greater need for evidence subject

to a qualified privilege when challenging the actions of most state legislatures
and state and federal administrative bodies that maintain no detailed records of
their proceedings.

625

Last, as litigators and courts develop new methods of

proving impermissible motivations through circumstantial evidence, deci626
sionmakers will become more sophisticated in camouflaging their purposes.
This facility to disguise illicit motivation has evolved rapidly in the last decade, 627 ever since decisionmakers recognized the Supreme Court's intolerance

629
for overt, invidious discrimination, 628 and the trend likely will continue.
seems incredible. It thus is unlikely that the board can demonstrate that a legitimate purpose supports its test.
If a state legislature required the same test, however, these claimed purposes, although still
unconvincing, might be more acceptable. The legislature has much broader discretion to effect a
greater variety of purposes, and could justify more easily its asserted aims.
625. Although all state legislatures maintain some journal of their proceedings, only a few keep
full verbatim or even partial records of legislative debates. See Cashman, Availability of Records of
Legislative Debates, 24 REc. A.B. CiTY N.Y. 153 (March 1969). Even the CongressionalRecord is
only a "substantially" verbatim journal of congressional deliberations. See 44 U.S.C. § 181 (1982).
Several writers have noted that Congress permits members to insert statements in the Congressional
Record that never were made in debate, and to revise those that were. See Cashman, supra, at 142;
Forthe Record, Less Distortion, New York Times, March 5, 1978, § 4, at 2, col. 6. In an attempt to
end this editing, rephrasing, and polishing of remarks, the Record, starting about March 1, 1978,
began placing a large black dot at the beginning and end of material not actually spoken on the floor.
Ironically, however, no identifying dot will be placed next to inserted text if only a few lines are
spoken on the floor. Id.; Neuberger, The CongressionalRecord is not a Record, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20,
1958, § 6 (Magazine), at 14, reprintedin 104 CONG. REc. 6816-18 (1958).
Most administrative bodies also do not maintain detailed records of their proceedings and many
conduct their deliberations primarily behind closed doors. See Cohen, The EqualProtection Clause
and the FairHousing Act: JudicialAlternatives ForExclusionary Zoning ChallengesAfter Arlington
Heights, 6 ENvTL. Aiu. 63, 81 (1977). Many states have enacted "sunshine" laws, however, which
at least require that many governmental decisions be made in a public form. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:4-7 (West 1976) (declaration of legislative policies of open deliberation, policy formulation, and
decision making by public bodies, and the right of citizens to receive notice of and attend all meetings of public bodies). Compelling decisionmakers to testify may increase the maintenance and publication of verbatim records of legislative and administrative deliberations, which often would render
such testimony unnecessary.
626. Even now, when there is a public record of the deliberations of the decisionmaking body,
decisionmakers have become "sophisticated" enough to conceal impermissible motivations from the
record. Professor Hartman also recognizes this trend. See Hartman, supra note 499, at 714 n. 161
(citing Extension ofthe Voting Rights Act: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1189 (1982) (testimony of Joaquin
Avilla, Assoc. Counsel, Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund) (local government minutes do not
contain express statements of illicit motivation required to challenge them without aid of Voting
Rights Act); S. RFP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1982) ("[D]efendants can attempt to rebut
. . . circumstantial evidence by planting a false trail of direct evidence in the form of official resolutions. . . and other legislative history eschewing any [illicit] motive, and advancing other governmental objectives."); see also Extension of the Voting Rights Act: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 906
(1982) (testimony of Rober Kreuger, former member of Congress: modern discrimination against
racial and ethnic minorities is likely to be subtle and unexpressed rather than stated in the press and
chambers of the government).
627. Legislators frequently stage a "planned colloquy" or predesigned debate to plant evidence
from which a court can infer legislative intent. See Cashman, supra note 625, at 154. Moreover,
many critical agreements between decisionmakers are made elsewhere than in public debates.
628. There was no doubt, for example, about the motives of the Alabama legislature when it
redrew the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee from a square to an "uncouth twenty-eight sided
figure," which eliminated virtually all blacks but not one white from the city limits. Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960). Nor was there much doubt about the motives of the officials in
Prince Edward County, Virginia, when, in response to a desegregation order, they refused to appro-
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Thus, the need for the discovery and presentation of evidence of unconstitutional motivation, particularly direct evidence, undoubtedly will increase as
decisionmakers better mask their purposes. As the availability of public sources
of such evidence declines, the need for sources subject to a qualified privilege will
grow. Courts should recognize that this heightened need favors the admissibility
of evidence over the claims of legislative and administrative privilege.
IV.

CONCLUSION

By requiring unconstitutional motivation before invalidating governmental
actions, the Supreme Court complicated the task of litigants challenging those
actions; at times, the only source of evidence probative of illicit purpose may be
subject to a claim of privilege. The purpose of this evidentiary privilege is to
protect the functional integrity of the legislative process rather than the interests
of individual lawmakers. The integrity of the legislative process in turn will
protect the people, whose elected representatives must be free from coercive influences threatening their independent judgment.
Judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative and administrative actions also protects the integrity of the decisionmaking process. To review challenged actions, the litigants and courts must have access to evidence critical for
determining accurately the validity of a challenged decision. If the decisionmakers may claim a privilege prohibiting the discovery and introduction of
evidence necessary for an effective review, there will be diminished protection
against unconstitutional governmental decisions. Thus, the integrity of the decisionmaking process is simultaneously protected and endangered by permitting
the questioning of decisionmakers about their motives for having taken an official action. The purpose of the privilege itself is undermined when the privilege
630
defeats the courts' obligation and ability to review.
When faced with privilege claims under the speech or debate clause, the
Court previously distinguished between essential and nonessential legislative
conduct. If the conduct was legislative, and therefore insulated from judicial
review in actions against legislators, the Court prohibited any inquiry into legislative acts or motives because of the threat that such inquiry posed to legislative
independence. When adjudicating the constitutionality of certain official acts,
however, courts now must examine legislative motivation, despite the potential
priate funds for the public school system (which effectively closed the county schools) and paid
tuition grants to students attending private schools. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218

(1964).
629. See, e.g., McLean v. Arkansas, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
630. Courts historically have narrowed the scope of evidentiary privileges, confining them to the
purposes they were created to achieve, in order to interfere as little as possible with the search for

truth. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("Whatever their origins, these
exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created not expansively construed,
for they are in derogation of the search for truth."); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Limitations are properly placed upon the operation of this general
principle only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant
evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational

means for ascertaining truth.").
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chill to legislative behavior. The simple and categorical distinction between legislative and nonlegislative activity no longer provides a viable framework for
analyzing these claims.
Because the threat to legislative and administrative independence is
subordinate to the courts' obligation to inquire into decisionmaker motivation,
evidence essential to that inquiry should not be barred by the decisionmakers'
inferior interest in absolute autonomy. Although the courts may intrude on legislative independence, that intrusion is warranted only to the extent necessary
for a proper review. Decisionmakers should be privileged to refuse to testify,
except when that evidence is critical or when the questioning will not be particularly intimidating; such evidence generally should be permitted when its helpfulness in fulfilling the courts' obligation outweighs the corresponding damage to
the independence of the decisionmaking institutions. These interests best can be
measured and compared with the methodology that this Article suggests.
Almost fifteen years before the Court's decision in Washington v. Davis,631
Professor Bickel suggested that courts should not inquire into the motives of
legislators because "[t]he only possibility of a solution [to ascertaining legislative
motivation]-itself far from certain-is cross-examination of each individual legislator," and that "is simply unthinkable." 632 In Davis, however, the Court mandated inquiry into such motives. Having done so, the courts should not allow
the evidentiary privileges protecting the integrity of legislative and administrative processes to make it impossible to prove the very facts that the Supreme
Court has deemed critical. What once may have seemed unthinkable now has
become imperative.

631. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
632. A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 215.

